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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Private Nonprofits in the American
Economy
A traditional economic model of the economy has at most three sectors: households
comprising the consumers who purchase goods, work for wages, and enjoy utility; for-
profit firms which make investments and maximize their profits; and a government which
sets taxation and spending policies in pursuit of some social welfare function. Yet a fourth
type of agent, the private nonprofit organization, is responsible for a large and grow-
ing share of the American economy. By definition, private nonprofits are neither profit-
maximizing nor public enterprises in the ways usually meant by economists, and economic
models of the firm or of government are unlikely to be applicable to these entities.
Figure 1.1 plots the nonprofit sector’s share of the American economy over time. The
sector has never been small — its lowest level was about one percent of GDP at the end of
the Second World War — and it has grown over time, to roughly five percent of GDP and
ten percent of wages and salaries in 2012. In spite of the nonprofit sector’s high and grow-
ing importance, it has received comparatively little attention from economics. A search
in the Econlit database for peer reviewed articles in the “top five” economics journals
with abstracts containing the words “nonprofit,” “non-profit” or “charity” turned up just
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Figure 1.1: Nonprofit Sector’s Share of the American Economy Over Time
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Sources: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: National in-
come: Households and institutions: Nonprofit institutions serving households: Compensation of employ-
ees: Wage and salary accruals [W481RC1A027NBEA] ; National income: Households and institutions:
Nonprofit institutions serving households: Compensation of employees: Supplements to wages and salaries
[W482RC1A027NBEA] ; Compensation of employees: Wages and salaries [A576RC1A027NBEA] ; Com-
pensation of employees: Supplements to wages and salaries [A038RC1A027NBEA] ; Gross value added:
GDP: Households and institutions: Nonprofit institutions serving households [B702RC1A027NBEA] ; Gross
Domestic Product [GDPA] ; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/; accessed March 6, 2014.
twelve items. In contrast, “airline” returned fifteen items; “sports” returned nine. “Hos-
pital” returned sixteen articles, variations on “college” and “university” twenty, and a set
of keywords encompassing the arts (such as “symphony,” “museum,” and “dance”) returns
sixteen, meaning that more articles have been published in economics’ most influential
journals on particular nonprofit-heavy sectors than on the nonprofit sector as a whole.1
1Of course, not every article in the leading economics journals concerns the US economy, and the private
nonprofit sector is particularly large in the USA. The “top five” general interest economics journals are Amer-
ican Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies,
and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. Searches in EconLit were conducted using the ab and pub.exact
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This dissertation explores the nonprofit sector generally, focusing on the ways that poli-
cies to encourage private nonprofits aect the organizations themselves. Chapter 2 esti-
mates the importance of the charitable contribution tax deduction for charitable giving.
The eect of tax incentives on individuals’ reported contributions is an old and thoroughly
studied question in the empirical tax literature; a meta-analysis by Peloza and Steel (2005)
tabulates 70 papers estimating the tax elasticity of charitable giving published by 2004.
However, this literature examines the contributions reported by individuals on their tax
returns or in survey responses. While these studies are useful for understanding how in-
centives aect altruistic behavior, they only provide indirect evidence on the relationship
between tax incentives and the resources available to charities, the entities that actually
provide the services tax policy seeks to encourage.
Chapter 2 looks instead at the charitable revenues reported by charities themselves on
their annual IRS form 990. Because only total donations are observed at the charity level, I
restrict the data set to charities which plausibly received virtually all of their contributions
from donors in the state of the filed 990. I then study how reported contributions changes
in response to the after-tax cost of a charitable contribution for a representative taxpayer
under the laws of a particular state and year. The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides
exogenous variation in this measure because of its numerous changes to the tax base, as
well as to the federal rate schedule, interact with the details of state income tax laws to
create substantial unintended variation in the change in tax incentives across US states. I
estimate fairly large eects, finding elasticities of giving with respect to representative tax
price of giving of approximately -4; in contrast, the median estimate reported for individual
tax return data in Peloza and Steel is about -1.2. The discrepancy appears to be explained
by heterogeneity in the sensitivity of contributions among donors and among charities—
high-income households give the largest amounts and are more tax-sensitive than other
search operators.
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households, making the response of the typical dollar given to tax rate changes dierent
from the response of the typical donor.
Understanding how tax policy aects contributions received by charities is valuable,
but is insucient to explain how tax subsidies for giving ultimately aect the provision of
services like education, health care, arts and human services that the special tax treatment
of charities is meant to encourage. For example, if the charitable contribution increases
giving to hospitals, but those contributions only serve to increase the salaries or perquisites
of sta without improving the quality, quantity, or price of health care provided, then the
contribution deduction may not be an eective alternative to direct government provision
of health care.
Chapter 3 considers how charities actually use their charitable contributions. I docu-
ment a tendency of charities to save their donations, rather than spend them immediately on
service provision. This behavior is in contrast with the tendency of charities to spend sub-
stantial shares of other revenues in the period they are received. If charities save rather than
spend their contributions, at the margin contributions (and policies that encourage them)
may not actually be substitutes for government expenditures on similar services. I extend
the data analysis of chapter 2 to look at the eect of a change in tax incentives on charities’
services provided. I show that program expenditures do not fall abruptly in response to
TRA86 tax cut, but instead decline gradually, taking several years to reach maximum im-
pact. While charities treated with a bigger increase in the after-tax cost of contributions are
less likely to engage in paid fundraising than charities facing a smaller increase, the dier-
ence across charities by treatment in the book value of net assets widens gradually. Policy
makers considering a change in tax incentives for contributions should therefore consider
the long-term as well as short-term eects on charities’ services, as the magnitudes dier.
Tax policy is not the only way government interacts with private nonprofits. Many char-
ities operate substantially as government contractors, while others pursue their missions
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using government grants. Grantmaking makes more resources available for a particular
cause, but it can also lead to strategic decisions by donors or charities that undermine the
purpose of the grant. For example, Andreoni and Payne (2003) find that charities receiving
grants report lower fundraising activity and lower charitable contributions. Unfortunately,
the American grantmaking system is dicult to characterize because of its federalist nature;
the levels of government either interact simultaneously (such as the mix of state appropria-
tions and federal student loans and research grants made to public universities) or sequen-
tially (such as the routing of federal block grants through state and local governments) in
ways that make it dicult to separate the eects of the grants themselves from the eects of
shifts in the political relations among private organizations and the layers of government.
It would be preferable to study a grantmaking program with fewer institutional constraints
on grantmaking and clear political goals.
Such a program once existed. The Community Action Program (CAP) was a cen-
terpiece of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty that made grants directly from the federal
government to anti-poverty community organizations with only very modest restrictions
on the grants’ intended uses, their distribution within US states, or the ability of any of-
ficials outside the White House itself to divert resources. Indeed, the CAP was explicitly
used to undermine local elites, dismantle racial segregation, and empower the poor in tar-
geted communities. Where state and local governments opposed poverty relief, the CAP
was permitted to work against them; and where existing nonprofit groups were too closely
aligned with existing interests, the CAP was empowered to create a new, more suitable
organization. As Republican Robert Taft, Jr. of Ohio presciently groused during the House
hearings on the legislation that created the CAP, the Director of the Oce of Economic
Opportunity would be empowerd to “do as he pleased. . . There’s actually no requirement
that the Director consult with anyone, other than find some local agency of some sort, pub-
lic or private, which would be willing to go along. If he did not have one, he could create
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one” (Congressional Record 1964a).
Chapter 4 contributes a novel quantitative understanding of the political economy un-
derpinning the CAP. Newly compiled county-level data on the distribution of spending over
the span of the Johnson administration reveals that the distribution of CAP spending is pri-
marily explained by the distribution of poor and nonwhite Americans, and not by political
or electoral considerations. This stands in contrast to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal,
which aggressively targeted areas with powerful Democrats or swing voters (Wright 1974;
Fishback et al. 2003), and which, ironically, is generally remembered as a less political
and more successful anti-poverty agenda than Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.
Understanding the apparent strategy taken by the Johnson Administration increases our
understanding of this era’s federal social programs, while providing the first step toward
understanding how this large and surprisingly unconstrained federal program may have
eected the private nonprofits it made grants to or, in some locations, chose to compete
with.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are, first, the development of a new strat-
egy for identifying plausibly exogenous changes in tax incentives for charitable giving by
exploiting interactions between state and federal tax laws; second, estimation of a sen-
sitivity of charitable receipts to tax incentives substantially higher than suggested in the
individual tax data; third, estimation of short- and long-run responses of the ultimate pro-
vision of charities’ services to a change in tax incentives for charitable contributions; and
lastly, explicating the poverty- and segregation-targeting political economy of the CAP, a
federal grantmaking program that disbursed sums of money with few institutional restric-
tions in a manner unusual in the postwar era. I hope the reader will find this dissertation to
be a useful contribution to our understanding of the history and behavior of private charities
in relation to government policy.
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CHAPTER 2
Do Tax Incentives Aect Charitable Contributions?
Evidence from Public Charities’ Reported Revenues
Private nonprofit organizations provide many crucial services in the US. They grant 30
percent of bachelor’s degrees, make 69 percent of hospital admissions, and supply nearly
100 percent of religious services. Private nonprofits make up 71 percent of museums and
89 percent of emergency shelters and soup kitchens. These organizations are supported in
part by donors’ gifts; in 2012, charitable giving was equal to 2.0 percent of gross domestic
product.1
Without the nonprofit sector, many of these goods and services would likely be supplied
by the government. Instead of direct government provision, the US indirectly supports
nonprofits by exempting them frommany income and property taxes that for-profit firms are
obliged to pay. Additionally, organizations which serve particular causes can be registered
as public charities under section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code.2 Donations to
1Sources: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, The Condition of
Education 2013; American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics, 2012; Institute of Museum and
Library Services, Exhibiting Public Value: Government Funding for Museums in the United States, 2008;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, National Survey of Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients (1999); Giving
USA (2013); Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2Public charities are a subset of nonprofit organizations. Other types of nonprofit organization enjoy a
wide variety of tax subsidies, such as exemption frommost income and property taxes paid by for-profit firms,
while only public charities and private foundations can receive tax-deductible contributions. Examples of tax-
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public charities can be taken as itemized deductions on households’ tax returns, reducing
the donors’ income tax.
This additional tax benefit to donors is meant to increase charitable giving (and avoid
the need to supply more services via taxation). However, the eectiveness of this incentive
is subject to debate. In the philanthropic world, it has become a stylized fact that charitable
giving is fixed at about two percent of gross domestic product, regardless of tax rates.3
Figure 2.1 plots the ratio of total estimated giving to GDP over time. Even as the top
marginal tax rate fell from 91 percent at the close of the Second World War to 28 percent
in 1988 (before rising to 39.6 percent today), total contributions have indeed remained
steady at roughly two percent of GDP since 1955, and both major political parties have put
forward proposals to increase tax revenue from high-income households by limiting the
charitable contribution deduction.4 Yet, a large empirical literature has found a range of
behavioral responses to tax incentives in household data. Peloza and Steel (2005) analyze
70 studies of the tax elasticity of charitable giving, and tabulate estimates ranging from 0
to -7 (that is, from no eect to a very large eect), with a median estimate of about -1.2.
The importance of the charitable contribution tax deduction to charities therefore remains
an unsettled question.
This paper provides new evidence on this question using the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), which completely overhauled the federal tax code, including a reduction of the
exempt nonprofit organizations that cannot accept tax-deductible contributions include social welfare groups,
political organizations, homeowners’ associations, and some professional sports leagues. See Hopkins (2007,
x1.2-1.3).
3See for example the June 17 2013 Chronicle of Philanthropy, “The Stubborn 2% Giving Rate,” or Dec.
12 2012 Wall Street Journal “A Christmas Wish for Charities.”
4An Obama administration budget proposal would have limited the rate for the contribution deduction to
28 percent, so that taxpayers in the top 39.5 percent bracket would still owe 11.5 percentage points (39.5-
28=11.5) to the federal government on income given to charity (New York Times, 11 April 2013, “White
House Budget Curbs Some Deductions for the Wealthy”; Chronicle of Higher Education, 10 April 2013,
“Obama Renews Eort to Limit Charitable Deduction”). A counterproposal by Republican senators would
have capped all itemized contributions at two percent of income, including charitable contributions (Martin
Feldstein in theWashington Post, 12 March 2013, “It’s time to cap tax deductions”).
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Figure 2.1: Charitable Contributions/GDP, 1919-2010
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top marginal income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent and the elimination or modifi-
cation of several deductions. Tax rates determine the “price” of giving to charity, because
giving $1 to a charity costs an itemizing taxpayer only $1– in after-tax personal consump-
tion, where  is the marginal tax rate.5 A tax cut is therefore equivalent to a price increase
in the cost of charitable giving, and can help to identify the importance of this incentive for
5For example, with a tax rate of 36 percent, an itemizing tax payer can give $1 to a public charity, or
could pay the tax authority 36 cents and keep 64 cents for herself. So by reducing the top marginal rate from
50 percent to 28 percent, the TRA86 increased the federal tax cost of giving $1 to charity among top-bracket
itemizing taxpayers from 50 cents to 72 cents, the amount of after-tax income the household could otherwise
keep for personal use.
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donors.
Federal and state tax laws interact in myriad ways, such as states’ reuse of federal tax
definitions, or the deductibility of state tax from federal taxable income (and sometimes
vice versa). I demonstrate that preexisting dierences among state income tax laws re-
sulted in substantial dierences across states in the change in overall tax cost of giving
following the radical revision of the federal tax code. For example, under 1986 tax law,
a representative donor in Kansas and in North Carolina both faced a tax cost of giving
of about $0.67 ($1 minus a 33 percent marginal tax rate). In 1988, after the TRA86 was
fully phased in, the tax cost rose to $0.82 in Kansas, but to just $0.78 in North Carolina.
The $0.04 dierential is caused by dierences in the state income tax systems preceding
the federal reform. I show that changes across states in tax cost of charitable giving are
uncorrelated with the tax cost of giving before the federal reform.
I exploit these tax cost changes using a panel of reported contributions from charitable
organizations’ Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filings, the federal form 990. I find that
a one percent change in the tax cost of giving following the TRA86 causes about a four
percent decline in charitable contribution receipts. Extensions of the analysis demonstrate
that pre-trends in charitable giving or intertemporal shifting behavior do not drive these
results. Further checks confirm that these results are not driven by sample selection bias,
entry and exit of organizations, extensive margin outcomes, endogenous policy changes, or
outliers. Such elasticities imply a larger tax-sensitivity of charitable giving than is apparent
in the aggregate data or than has been reported by most studies using household data.
This greater tax-sensitivity can be explained by heterogeneous responses of donors
and charities alike to tax incentives, and dierences in the composition of available data
sources. Household tax data only permits analysis of returns with an incentive to re-
port their contributions (generally, higher income households with sucient deductions
to file Schedule A). The IRS does not require some major charitable sectors, particularly
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churches, to file a form 990, and my identification strategy requires a focus on local rather
than nationally prominent charities. The discrepancy between my estimates and the house-
hold literature is consistent with the prior literature on heterogeneous tax sensitivity by
household income and by church/non-church charities. Further analysis of the form 990
sample reveals that the eect of the 1986 tax change on charitable contributions is more
important for some charities than others, particularly health-related causes, and that the
behavior of upper-income households appears to drive variation in giving.
It is the importance of upper-income households for charitable giving that explains the
apparent stability of the contributions-to-GDP ratio over the postwar era. Even as tax rates
have fallen, the share of national income going to the top earners has risen, osetting the
negative incentive eect with a positive income eect. In no decade were either of these
trends as pronounced as in the 1980s. For some local, 990-filing charities, tax incentives to
give are very powerful. Understanding the dierences in incentive eects across donors and
charities is important for interpretation of charitable giving elasticities and for predicting
likely outcomes of future tax reforms.
2.1 Charitable Contributions and the US Tax System
The charitable contribution deduction was added to the federal tax code by the War
Revenue Act of 1917. The federal government sharply increased the burden of the federal
income tax on high-income households as the US prepared to enter the First World War,
increasing the top marginal rate from 15 percent to 67 percent. An amendment to the 1917
tax act was introduced by Senator Henry F. Hollis of New Hampshire (who also happened
to be a regent of the Smithsonian Institution), allowing up to 15 percent of income to be
given without tax to “corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention
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of cruelty to children or animals” (Congressional Record v. 55 pt. 7 p. S6741). Charitable
giving is a luxury good, Hollis argued, and “usually people contribute to charities and
educational objects out of their surplus. After they have done everything else they want to
do. . . they will contribute it to a college or to the Red Cross or for some scientific purpose.”
Therefore, at the margin, high-income households will maintain their own consumption
first, and “when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, [charity]
will be the first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize” (Congressional
Record v. 55 pt. 7 p. S6729).
Hollis’s amendment was accepted quickly and unanimously. The brief Congressional
debate on the matter, however, presaged a long scholarly one: is the Senator’s fear that
charitable contributions respond to taxation empirically relevant? The literature estimating
individual donors’ response to tax incentives is large and long, but a consensus on the
eect the deduction has on charitable giving remains elusive. A meta-analysis by Peloza
and Steel (2005) tabulates 70 peer-reviewed studies, most estimating a tax elasticity of
charitable contributions between -4 and 0, with a median of about -1.2.
One problem with individual tax return data is correctly parsing observed changes in
permanent giving and shifting of giving across years to maximize the tax benefit of antici-
pated rate changes. Using panel data, Randolph (1995) finds that most of the tax response
is temporary shifting, with a permanent giving tax elasticity of about -0.5, while Auten
et al. (2002) find a permanent elasticity of -1.2, with a small temporary response. Because
a household’s income and its tax rate are highly correlated, panel data analysis requires
strong assumptions about the comparability of tax changes across time and across income
groups; see the discussion of estimation issues in Andreoni (2006) and Bakija and Heim
(2011). In addition to shifting of contributions across years, survey data with information
on volunteering has found that tax subsidies do not drive away donors, but instead aect
the substitution between commitments of time (volunteering) and money (Gruber 2004;
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Feldman 2010).
Individual tax filing data also measures actual charitable giving with error. Itemizers
overstate their contributions to evade taxation (Slemrod 1989; Fack and Landais 2010),
while non-itemizers have no incentive to report contributions at all, underreporting their
donations (Dunbar and Phillips 1997; Duquette 1999). Survey datasets avoid the financial
incentives to overstate or not report one’s contributions, but can be costly to gather and may
have their own errors and biases (e.g. if people do not recall their contribution amounts
accurately, or overstate them to impress the survey-taker).
These problems with identification and measurement have motivated experimental ap-
proaches to the study of altruistic giving. Charitable giving experiments vary the cost of
making a contribution through matching grants in a randomized fundraising campaign. For
example, Karlan and List (2007) solicit donations from potential contributors with a ran-
domized matching grant that will contribute an additional $1, $2, or $3 for every dollar
contributed by the solicited donor (making the cost of a $1 contribution $0.50, $0.33, and
$0.25, respectively) and find no eect on contributions from varying the match. Other ex-
periments have found that varying a match does aect donations (Huck and Rasul 2011;
Karlan et al. 2011), though as in studies of tax data, there is some evidence that lowering the
cost of giving through a match may just induce donors to shift their donations across time
(Meier 2007) or across charities (Konow 2010) rather than increase total giving. Karlan
et al. (2011) and List (2011) provide overviews of this literature.
By demonstrating the importance of factors like charitable solicitation and leading
grants, experimental approaches have revealed much about altruistic decisions, but our
understanding of the eects of tax rates (or other changes in cost) on charitable giving is
still murky. I therefore propose a new approach to this question: how does a change in the
tax cost of giving aect contributions reported by the charities themselves?
This paper uses a new approach, using a completely dierent data source to sidestep
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the reporting problems of individual data, combined with a new identification strategy that
avoids endogenous or anticipated changes in tax rates. I exploit a federal tax reform that
changed the tax cost of giving dierentially across US states. By using this plausibly ex-
ogenous variation to isolate the causal eect of tax incentives on charitable giving, I avoid
problems arising from endogenous fundraising by the organizations, the taxable income re-
sponse of individuals, and any unobserved changes correlated both with successful passage
of tax legislation and with charitable giving, plausibly avoiding endogenous or anticipated
tax changes that are the bugbears of empirical tax research. I estimate the eect of this
state-level variation on contributions reported by charities on the IRS form 990, not re-
ported by donors, avoiding problems with unreported and overstated contributions in the
individual tax return data. I use a dierence-in-dierences strategy to identify the eect of
tax price on charitable contributions, and to combine a natural experiment with charities’
reported contribution receipts data to estimate the eects of tax policy.6 By exploiting ex-
ogenous variation across states in the tax cost of giving, I estimate the eects on charities’
contribution revenues of changing donors’ tax cost.
2.2 The 1986 Tax Reform: Background and Data Sources
The classic problem in identifying the eects of tax rates on behavior is the confound-
ing influence of income on tax rates — after all, marginal tax rate is a nonlinear function of
6One paper by Yetman and Yetman (2013) uses form 990 data to estimate partial correlations of direct
contributions with organization characteristics and a vector of time series, including last-dollar average tax
cost, over the 1991-2007 period for major nonprofit subsectors. For the most part, however, economists
have made use of 990 data to examine organizations’ strategic behavior, not tax policy per se. Okten and
Weisbrod (2000) and Andreoni and Payne (2003) use 990 data to show that nonprofits do not choose their
fundraising intensity at a revenue-maximizing level, implying that a revenue-maximizing objective function
is a poor description of these groups’ behavior. Hines (1999) argues that charities pay unrelated income
business tax — that is, they report non-tax-exempt income — only when their tax-exempt funding channels
are insucient to meet their needs (i.e. taxable income is sort of an inferior good). Marx (2012) finds that
charities will reduce their income to avoid a tax compliance notch that requires greater administrative costs
tracking their finances.
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income and other variables. Separating income and price eects therefore becomes a chal-
lenge, and the best available strategies can require, for instance, comparing tax rate changes
among high-income groups with low-income groups, or other not-quite-ideal approaches.
This paper will take a dierent approach by comparing the marginal tax cost of a char-
itable contribution for a fixed set of taxpayers across states and time. The crucial change is
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). This large and complex federal tax reform not only
overhauled the federal tax code, but interacted with state income tax codes such that the
combined federal and state tax cost of giving changed dierently across the states in ways
unlikely to have been intended by legislators at either level of government. I use variation
arising as an accidental byproduct of federal tax reform as plausibly exogenous variation
in the tax cost of giving, and look for a dierence in the changes in charitable giving across
the states.
The Tax Cost of Giving
I construct a measure of the first-dollar tax cost faced by donors from the IRS Public Use
File (PUF) of individual income tax returns and from the TAXSIM calculator (Feenberg
and Coutts 1993; Internal Revenue Service). TAXSIM is a tax calculator maintained and
hosted by the National Bureau of Economic Research which uses up to 198 dierent tax
return variables to compute household federal tax liability for any year since 1960, or state
tax liability for any of the fifty states or the District of Columbia since 1977.
Using a large, national cross-section of individual income tax returns from 1984, I
set charitable contributions equal to zero and adjust all other dollar-valued variables for
inflation, and calculate the combined federal and state tax liability of each return under the
laws of each state and the District of Columbia, for each year. I then perform the same
calculation, this time adding a small cash contribution to each return, and use the resulting
change in tax liability to compute the first-dollar marginal tax cost of a cash contribution. I
15
then take the average of the marginal tax costs, across all returns by state and year, weighted
by total reported contributions, to obtain a measure of the tax cost of giving.7 The detailed
steps of this calculation and more information on the public use cross-section data are in
appendix A.
This approach creates a measure of the state-level eects of tax reform that is not in-
fluenced by states’ income distributions or economic trends — only by states’ legal envi-
ronments. This approach can be thought of as the reduced form of a common instrumental
variables strategy exploiting policy variation across states. For example, Currie and Gru-
ber (1996a,b) apply Medicaid eligibility laws by state and year to a constant, nationally
representative sample of 300 children at each age from zero to fourteen to study the health
eects of Medicaid reform. Health outcomes and insurance utilization are endogenous, but
their state-level measure of insurance eligibility is not. Fishback and Kantor (1995) use
changes in workers’ compensation laws across states and time to construct a measure of
the value of coverage. Feenberg (1987) uses variation across states for a fixed set of returns
to identify individuals’ tax cost of giving in a cross-section of 1977 returns. However, this
is the first paper to use such a strategy to identify variation in the tax cost of a charitable
contribution across states and years.
7In section 2.1, I noted that contributions reported on individual tax returns are reported with error. The
data for 1984 are better than other years in terms of observing the giving of non-itemizers because of the
presence of a modest above-the-line contribution deduction introduced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 (and abolished by the TRA86), which allowed a limited deduction for the first $300 of charitable
giving. This deduction does have limitations: 18.1 percent of non-itemizers claim the maximum allowable
amount, and contributions by people not required to file, or who owed no tax against which to deduct their
contributions, are still unlikely to be observed. On the other hand, the above-the-line deduction was not
aggressively audited, giving both itemizing and non-itemizing taxpayers an incentive to overstate their dona-
tions and reduce their taxes in this year. (I prefer the 1984 data to the 1985 cross-section specifically because
the $300 limit, which was raised in the following year, censors the dishonest as well as the generous; using
1985 data obtains very similar results, though.)
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The 1986 Tax Reform as an Exogenous Shock
I focus on the changes implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). The
TRA86 is best known for its steep reduction in marginal rates — the top rate fell from
50 percent to 28 percent — but it also radically altered the tax base. The TRA86 was
designed to be revenue-neutral within income deciles, and for each point shaved o a tax
rate, somewhere else a deduction, rule, credit or policy had to be altered. It is the scope and
complexity of these other changes — combined with the sudden reduction in marginal tax
rates — that makes the TRA86 a credible natural experiment.
Figure 2.2A plots the tax cost of giving by state and year. The eect of the TRA86 on
the tax cost of a cash donation is apparent; no other federal tax reform over the same period
comes close to matching its magnitude. Figure 2.2B charts the log dierence from year to
year by state and demonstrates that the size of this change varied a lot across states. The
state-level change in the log cost of a contribution from 1986 to 1988 ranged from 14 per-
cent to 22 percent, with a median change of 18 percent. Again, the changes brought about
by the TRA86 dwarf any federal or state tax change before or since. There is substantial
interstate variation in the year-over-year change in the cost of giving following the TRA86,
but only small, isolated changes among the states before and after; the shock of the TRA86
explains most of the change in the state-level tax cost of giving during the time period.
Not only is the change large, but the tax cost before the TRA86 does not predict the
state-level change from 1986 to 1988. Figure 2.3 plots marginal tax cost of a contribution
in 1986 against the change in tax cost from 1986 to 1988. Each point is one state marked
by its postal abbreviation, except for the point labeled “NT” in the upper right region of
the scatterplot, which marks the seven states with no state income tax.8 A linear regression
8Two states are omitted from this and other figures. West Virginia repeals its state charitable contribution
in 1987, and is omitted from every analysis in this paper because of endogeneity concerns. North Dakota has
incorrectly high state marginal rates in and is dropped.
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Figure 2.2: Tax Cost of Giving by State
A. Tax Price by State and Year
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through this scatterplot yields only a weak relationship between change in average tax cost
and the 1986 level:
‘86 ‘88 ln(TaxCostp) = 0:2115 +0:0828  ln(TaxCostp;‘86) + "p
(0:0495) (0:1247)
Where the log of the 1986 federal and state tax cost of giving in a state with policy p
is denoted TaxCostp;‘86, and the change in the tax cost from 1986 to 1988 is denoted
‘86 ‘88 ln(TaxCostp). Regression coecients are reported directly in the estimated equa-
tion, with standard errors in parentheses below. This weak fit is consistent with the expla-
nation that state marginal rates do not monotonically drive the dierences in average tax
costs following the reform.
It may come as a surprise that the proportional change in the tax cost of contributions
is not correlated with the level before 1986. The magnitude of the change is driven not by
rates, but by complex interactions between state income tax laws and the changes to the
federal code made by the TRA86. These interactions are a function of choices made by
state legislators before the federal reform, and the resulting changes in state tax rates are
an accidental byproduct of the federal reform. I will provide three examples, though these
should not be taken as the only ways in which the TRA86 had dierential eects across the
states.
First, fourteen states allowed taxpayers to deduct their federal tax liability from their
state taxable income. This means that a reduction in federal tax liability increased state
taxable income and — to the extent that this increase moved taxpayers into higher-rate tax-
brackets at the state level — also increased state marginal rates. In these states, the overall
change in the cost of giving was dampened by the state response.9
9These states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah (ACIR 1986, table 54).
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Figure 2.3: Change in Tax Price vs. pre-TRA86 Tax Price
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Second, the states varied in the links made between their state systems and federal tax
definitions. In the extreme case, four states used “piggyback” tax systems where state tax
liability was a function of federal tax liability, meaning that when the federal government
reduced its marginal rates, those states’ marginal rates fell proportionally, amplifying the
total change. Four states used the federal definition of taxable income (without a direct
“piggyback” system), which meant that the reductions made by the TRA86 to credits, de-
ductions and exemptions increased state taxable income as well, dampening the federal
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change. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia used the federal definition of adjusted
gross income and most federal deductions, and seven states used the federal definition of
adjusted gross income only, which meant that some federal changes but not others passed
through to the state level. Six states had no federal starting point in their state income tax
laws.10
Third, states were aected to dierent degrees by the AlternativeMinimum Tax (AMT).
The AMT is a parallel tax system designed to prevent high-income households from paying
“too little” tax through the legitimate use of certain deductions. Aected taxpayers have
to calculate their federal tax liability under not just the normal rules, but under the AMT
rules, and pay whichever is greater. By reducing the availability of itemized deductions,
the TRA86 greatly reduced the number of AMT-eligible returns. In 1986, AMT taxpayers
made up 1.3 percent of all federal returns, and 47.9 percent of returns reporting over $1
million dollars adjusted gross income. In 1987, these shares plunged to only 0.3 percent
of all returns and just 6.6 percent of returns on over $1 million (Internal Revenue Service
1987). Therefore, many high-income households who paid the AMT in 1986 saw marginal
rates leap from the pre-1986 20 percent AMT rate to 28 percent or more, reducing rather
than increasing their marginal tax cost of a charitable contribution. Because some state and
local tax payments can be taken as itemized deductions, high-income households in states
where the burden of these taxes was higher were more likely to have a greater share of
AMT taxpayers, dampening the eect of the federal change.
Because its reforms spilled over into state tax incentives in a material and unexpected
10See ACIR 1986, table 52. In 1986, the “piggyback” states are Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Is-
land and Vermont. The states using federal taxable income without a piggyback system are South Carolina,
Idaho, Utah and Oregon. The states using federal AGI and most deductions are Maine, Delaware, Mary-
land, New York, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Virginia, West Virginia,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Colorado, Montana, California, and Hawaii. The states using federal AGI only
are Massachusetts, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin and Arizona. The states with no federal
starting point are New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and North Carolina. Connecti-
cut, New Hampshire and Tennessee only tax capital income. Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, and Wyoming have no state income tax.
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way, the TRA86 is a valuable opportunity to examine an exogenous shock to tax incentives.
I will use data on charities’ reported contribution income together with this exogenous
change in tax price to estimate the eects of this incentive on charitable giving.
Associations Between Tax Cost Changes and Charitable Receipts
I compile a panel of charities’ financial data from full-length IRS forms 990 collected
in the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Data and cleaned and documented
by the National Center for Charitable Statistics. The form 990 is a summary of income
statements, balance sheets, and other data of interest many charities must file with the
IRS each year. The 990 has been a public record since 1950, and the IRS Statistics of
Income Division (SOI) has compiled machine-readable data files for a sample of 990s in
1982, 1983, and 1985 to the present. These data files are designed to be stratified cross-
sections within a year. They sample all organizations with over $10 million in assets and
subsets of smaller organizations. The SOI data also try to follow the same organizations
each year — making it feasible to use SOI 990 data files to construct a panel of nonprofit
organizations oversampling large organizations.11 My measure of charitable contributions
is “direct public support,” the sum of all contributions from taxable entities directly to the
organization, which is overwhelmingly composed of individual donations.
My analysis begins by examining the relationship between reported contributions and
tax cost in the raw data. Figure 2.4A plots the log change in tax cost from 1985 to 1988
against the 1985 to 1988 change in contributions for individual nonprofits filing in that
state. A linear fit through the plot finds that a one percent increase in tax cost is associated
with a 2.6 percent decrease in contributions; this slope estimate is statistically dierent
11The SOI provides cross-sectional but not sample weights, and the procedure for carrying over some
organizations but not others from year to year is not documented; additionally, as described in section 2.5,
organizations that ought to be observed every year are sometimes missing without explanation. For these
reasons, all regressions in this paper are unweighted.
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Figure 2.4: 1985-8 Change in Contributions vs. Change in Tax Price
A. Individual Public Charities
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and West Virginia are plotted. State tax change data are described in notes to figure 2.3 and in appendix A.
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from zero at the five percent level (state-clustered standard error = 1.27 on a coecient of
-2.6).12
However, the most salient feature of this plot is not the negative slope of the linear fit,
but the variance of the changes in contributions. Several organizations report huge swings
in contributions across years: 9.7 percent of organizations report log changes from 1985 to
1988 greater than 2 or less than -2. One Colorado organization at the bottom of the chart
reports a log change in contributions of -11, receiving $6,260,000 in 1985 but just $1,210
in 1988. It seems like an astonishing plunge until one sees that this is the U.S. Olympic
Foundation, which was still riding high on the 1984 summer games in Los Angeles.
Figure 2.4B accounts for this by averaging changes in contributions within bins by the
state log tax change by hundredths (0.14  0.05, 0.15  0.05, . . . , 0.22  0.05). The rela-
tionship between the tax rate change and contributions becomes more visibly negative. Our
next question is whether these dierences are caused by the tax change, or just associated
with it. The following section develops a dierence-in-dierences strategy to isolate the
causal eects of tax cost shifts.
2.3 Estimates of the Tax Elasticity of Charitable Revenues
Section 2.2 demonstrated that the TRA86 shifted the tax cost of charitable contributions
dierentially across US states, and that this interstate variation is associated with changes
in organizations’ donation receipts. Next, I will refine this analysis using a dierence-in-
dierences strategy to determine whether the tax change caused the dierences in charita-
ble receipts.
Changes in tax policy may be correlated with other conditions that aect charitable
12If a linear fit is estimated for between this tax change and three-year contribution growth for 1982 to
1985, the slope is positive and statistically insignificant; estimates and similar scatterplots are available upon
request.
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giving. Therefore, it is important to examine unintended changes in tax rates to isolate
a causal eect. I focus on the change in the combined tax cost of giving from 1986 to
1988 in each state. The large increase in average tax cost in all states — clearly visible
in figure 2.2A — is a federal change that aects all organizations equally. But the state-
level dierences in this measure are particular to that state. Because these are caused by
the complex federal tax changes unlikely to have been anticipated by state legislators, the
dierences in state average tax cost increases from 1986 to 1988 are a plausibly exogenous
byproduct of the federal law, not an endogenous policy choice.
My treatment variable is the change in average tax cost of giving by state from 1986 to
1988. I will compare the changes in charitable receipts received by local organizations in
the states with smaller tax cost increases, before and after the tax reform, with the charitable
receipts received by organizations in the states with the larger tax cost increases, before
and after. There are several reasons to think we should see charitable contributions change
from 1985 to 1988, such as the federal tax change itself and shifts in economic growth
and inflation expectations over that time. However, these national changes should eect
all organizations. The gap between the change in this period for high-tax-cost-increase
states and low-tax-cost-increase states — the dierence in the dierences — is therefore
plausibly caused by the dierent tax shifts across states.
It is unlikely that state legislatures could have anticipated many of the changes of the
TRA86, or that they would have adapted their tax policy for charitable contributions be-
forehand. Nor did state legislatures move swiftly to capture money left “on the table” by
the federal government. Table 2.1 lists the states that changed their state deduction for
charitable contributions or changed marginal tax rates during years 1986 to 1988. If any-
thing, the states moved to reduce their own marginal rates as part of a broader movement of
rate-reducing tax reform. Only one state, West Virginia, changes its charitable contribution
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deduction during this period (and is therefore dropped from the sample).13
Table 2.1: Major State Individual Income Tax Changes Legislated 1986–1988
1986 1987 1988
Eliminated Deduction
for Contributions
WV*
Reduced Marginal Tax
Rates
DE, MI,
PA, VT
CA, IA,
NY, WI
OK, UT,
VT
Increased Marginal Tax
Rates
NM, UT ID, IN,
MT,
NDy
AZ
Notes: (*) W. Virginia is dropped from all regressions because of this policy change. (y) North Dakota has
implausibly high marginal rates in the TAXSIM system until 1987 and is dropped; see discussion in footnote
14.
Sources: ACIR 1987–89, table 49; Feenberg and Coutts (1993).
The 1986 tax reform explains a huge share of variation in state-level tax cost of giving
from 1977 to 2007. If I regress the average tax cost by state and year only on the change in
tax cost after 1986:
ln(TaxCostst) =  + 

ln(TaxCosts;‘88)   ln(TaxCosts;‘86)  Post86t + "st
I obtain an R2 of 0.79. This high explanatory power is consistent with the relatively small
and clustered year-over-year changes in average tax cost in other years shown in figure
2.2B.
In short, the TRA86 not only changed federal marginal tax rates significantly, but made
many other substantial changes to the federal tax system. Because the US states could not
have anticipated the specifics of this reform, and because the states varied in the extent
and manner of the links between state income tax systems and the federal tax code, the
TRA86 created plausibly exogenous variation in the changes in the tax cost of charitable
13In the TAXSIM system, there are five total changes to the deduction policies of states with income taxes
in the 1982-2007 period. In addition to West Virginia’s repeal of its deduction in 1987, Louisiana repeals
theirs in 2003 and then restores it in 2007, and Massachusetts creates one in 2001 but repeals it in 2002.
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giving across states. It is this variation I will use to identify the eect of tax incentives on
charitable giving.
Sample Selection
My research design exploits variation across states in donors’ tax cost of giving. How-
ever, because I am examining donors’ responses as reported by the recipient organization,
I do not directly observe donors’ state of residence. I therefore retain an estimation sample
only of organizations which plausibly receive almost all of their donations from donors in
their state of filing, using multiple filters to exclude charities which might have geographi-
cally dispersed donor bases.
I start with the full IRS public charity data, which includes 296,318 observations on
31,779 dierent organizations in years 1982, 1983, and 1985-2007, altogether accounting
for $1,388 billion in direct contributions over the period (in 2012 dollars). I then refine the
sample by taking the following steps:
1. Discard all observations except for years 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1988–1990; only
keep observations on organizations observed both before and after the 1986 reform.
(Remaining: 24,561 Obs, 4,673 Orgs, $157.4 billion direct contributions.)
2. Discard organizations located in West Virginia (which repeals its contribution deduc-
tion in 1987) or North Dakota (which reports incorrect marginal tax rates in TAXSIM
in 1986).14 Remaining: 24,326 Obs, 4,632 Orgs, $157.0 billion direct contributions.
14For 22.0 percent of sampled returns, TAXSIM computes a state marginal tax rate in North Dakota greater
than 50 percent in 1986. This is true for less than 0.0007 percent of observed returns in the other 49 states
and DC, and because the same calculations are not observed after the TRA86, these high rates lead to a very
large calculated change in North Dakota’s cost of giving from 1986 to 1988. In 1986, North Dakota taxpayers
could choose between a progressive rate schedule with a top marginal rate of nine percent, or a “piggyback”
payment equal to 10.5 percent of federal income tax (ACIR 1987, table 51). Because the top federal rate
in 1986 was 50 percent, high earners should not have faced North Dakota marginal rates greater than 5.25
percent (0.105 * 0.50), and certainly nobody should have been subject to marginal rates over nine percent. I
do not yet know the reason for these high calculated marginal rates in North Dakota.
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3. Discard organizations meeting any of several criteria suggesting they might have
donors outside their filing state.
(a) Organizations that change filing state at any time across all years in the IRS
Statistics of Income (SOI) or Core data files files are presumed to provide non-
local goods and are dropped. Remaining: 22,927 Obs, 4,356 Org, $140.4 billion
direct contributions.
(b) Organizations which ever file a “group return” on behalf of a network of aliated
organizations are presumed to have branches in other states and are dropped.
Remaining: 22,834 Obs, 4,356 Orgs, $138.6 billion direct contributions.
(c) Organizations whose names or form 990 mission statements match key words
implying a non-local orientation (e.g. “national” or “global”) are dropped; see
details in appendix A. Remaining: 20,102 Obs, 3862 Orgs, $106.6 billion direct
contributions.
(d) If an organization is ever among the 25 largest organizations by assets within
its major sector (as classified by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities), I
assume that it is nationally prominent and omit it from the sample. Remaining:
19,120 Obs, 3,684 Orgs, $74.5 billion direct contributions.
4. Finally, since my dependent variable is in logs, I omit organizations that ever report
zero direct contributions in the observation period. As I show in section 2.5, the
overwhelming majority of charities either always receive contributions, or never do.
I omit the few that vary year to year so their patterns of occasional gifts do not
introduce observation error. The final sample contains 16,882 observations on 3,273
organizations, comprising $72.1 billion direct contributions in 2012 dollars.
Section 2.5 uses a series of robustness checks to demonstrate that results are not driven
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by this sample selection procedure, and obtains results consistent with my preferred sample
and empirical approach.
Tax Shock as a Variable Treatment
Given an ideal data set, I would use interstate variation in the eect of the TRA86 on
representative donors as an instrument for changes in a charity’s donors’ tax incentives,
ln(Contributionsit) =i0 + 1 ln(TaxCostit) + Controls
0
st2 + uit
ln(TaxCostit) =i0 + 186 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t + Controls0st2 + rit (2.1)
where Contributionsit is real direct contributions reported by organization i in year t, and
TaxCostit is the tax cost (1   ) in year t for the average of organization i’s contributors.
The instrument for donors’ tax cost of a contribution is 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)), the change
in the log mean tax price of giving (1–) from 1986 to 1988 in state s, interacted with
Post86, a dummy equal to 0 before 1986 and 1 after 1986. Organization fixed eects i0
and i0 capture time-invariant features of each organization including initial tax cost for
donors. Controls is a vector of any other control variables or fixed eects, and u and r are
residuals.
This ideal estimation is impossible because the tax rate of each charity’s donor base,
TaxCostit is unobserved. Instead, I will estimate the reduced form of this IV system, plug-
ging in treatment eect 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)) Post86 directly as a regressor. Using the data
described in the preceding section, I estimate continuous dierence-in-dierences eects
on contributions using the reduced form of this ideal.
ln(Contributionsit) = i + 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t + t + X0st + "it (2.2)
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where Contributionsit, Post86 and 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)) are as defined above; t is a year
eect; and i is an organization fixed eect. The coecient of interest is , which captures
the dierence in contributions between states with dierent changes in tax price following
the TRA86. Since both the dependent and treatment variables are in logs, we can directly
interpret  as an elasticity of contributions with respect to the average tax cost.15
Alternative specifications control for dierential economic trends by including region-
by-year eects r;t that capture unobservable variation across time among the four Census
regions, or a row vector of state-level macroeconomic indicators X0st to capture changes
in the local economic environment over time. Regional patterns are also shown in figure
2.5, which maps tax cost changes by state. State-year macroeconomic variables include
state population, real gross state product, real per capita income, unemployment rate, and
poverty rate, all measured in logs.
Estimates for this regression are reported in table 2.2. I obtain elasticities ranging from
-3.5 to -5. Column 1 reports the basic regression, which finds an elasticity of contributions
of -4.5 with respect to the average tax cost of giving. I obtain similar elasticities using
region-by-year eects (-5.0), macroeconomic controls (-4.0) or both (-3.5). Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and clustered by state. All estimates are statistically dierent
from zero at the five percent level.
These estimates of the tax cost elasticity of charitable receipts for organizations stand in
15This approach makes some assumptions about the relationship between the treatment variable and con-
tributions. First, it assumes that the eect of a tax change is log-linear. A more general specification dividing
states into “treatment” and “control” groups by whether their tax change was above or below the median is
presented in appendix B, and yields similar results.
Second, by interpreting  directly as an elasticity of charitable contributions, this approach assumes that 
is a good estimate of the true parameter of interest, 1 — that is, that the parameter 1 in the ideal regression
equation 2.1 is approximately one. Because this measure is constructed as a dollar-weighted average of do-
nations, and because the TRA86 drives almost all variation in the state-year level tax measure, this parameter
is close to one so long as the composition of donors to sample organizations is close to the composition of all
donors. However, to the extent that the composition of donors in the sample is systematically dierent from
the tax returns used to calculate TaxCostst,  may be scaled incorrectly; this is discussed further in section
2.6.
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Figure 2.5: Tax Cost Treatment Variable by State
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Note: Darker states had greater increase in the log average cost of a charitable contribution from 1986 to
1988.
Source: See appendix A for details of the calculation of the average tax cost variable.
striking contrast to the tax elasticities of individuals estimated in the literature. As described
in section 2.1, individuals’ tax cost elasticity has usually been estimated to be between 0
and -3. In the following sections, I will show that these large estimates are not a fluke.
Section 2.4 checks for dierential pretrends, a common threat to dierence-in-dierences
strategies, and for transitory eects driven by intertemporal shifting. Section 2.5 checks
for threats to identification from other sources, specifically the eects of specific sample
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Table 2.2: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of Eect of Tax Incentives on Charities’
Received Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -4.450** -5.016*** -3.990*** -3.503***
Post86t (1.723) (1.420) (1.185) (1.140)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
R-squared 0.861 0.862 0.862 0.862
Number of Orgs 3273 3273 3273 3273
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real direct public support from a panel of IRS form 990 data for 1982–3,
1985, and 1988–90. 86 88TaxCost is the change from 1986 to 1988 in the first-dollar marginal tax cost of a
charitable contribution in state s, averaged over a fixed set of individual income tax returns. Post86 is equal
to 1 after 1986 and zero before. “Macro Controls” are a set of macroeconomic variables observed in each
state and year: log gross state product, log state population, log unemployment rate, log poverty rate, and log
per capita income. See the discussion in section 2.3 for more detail on the construction of these variables.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: Form 990 data taken from the IRS Statistics of Income Division Exempt Organizations Sample, as
cleaned and documented by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (Internal Revenue Service 2011b).
Marginal tax cost of giving for the representative taxpayer is caluclated using the IRS Individual Public Use
Tax File . Macroeconomic variables from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) include population [series
code POPx], unemployment rate [URx], and per capita income [PCPIx], where x is the two-letter postal
abbreviation of each US state. Gross state product data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
[bea.gov]. State-by-year poverty rates are aggregated from March Current Population Survey microdata, as
maintained by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (King et al. 2010).
selection choices, extensive margin outcomes in receiving or not receiving contributions,
organization entry and exit dierentials across the states, and influential outliers. In section
2.6, I will argue that the dierence between elasticities measured using individual and
charity data is a result of looking at receipts rather than donations, which draws on data
sets which dier in crucial ways. Because donors and charities are heterogeneous, these
questions can have dierent answers.
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2.4 Persistence and Pretrends
The causal eects of a tax cost increase on contribution receipts estimated in section
2.3 suggest that a one percent increase in average tax cost of giving reduces contribution re-
ceipts by about four percent. This result is substantially larger than the eects usually esti-
mated using individual donor data. We may therefore fear that an unobserved phenomenon
correlated with the change in state average tax cost leads the eects to be overstated.
One possible explanation is that dierential pretrends drive the results. If high-tax-
cost-increase states happened to have a population of nonprofit organizations experiencing
slower growth in contributions than low-tax-cost-increase states before the tax reform, then
the dierence-in-dierences estimates would return a larger estimate of the eect that was
actually driven by this pretrend — a common threat to identification with dierence-in-
dierences estimation strategies.
A second concern is that the estimated eect captures intertemporal shifting of con-
tributions, so households can take full advantage of tax incentives. Estimates of the per-
manent elasticity of charitable donations from individual data are often significantly lower
because households “bring forward” gifts they plan to make anyway to the year preceding
a tax rate cut (Randolph 1995). In section 2.3, I tried to account for this by dropping 1986
and 1987 from the analysis; however, if households brought forward contributions to 1986
from more than one year out, it may be that the dierential decline in contributions seen in
1988-1990 is really just a dierence in how aggressively donors brought forward several
years of planned giving.
I will test for both of these conjectured problems simultaneously by extending the data
sample to later years and allowing the estimated eect of the tax change variable to vary by
year. I retain the sample described in section 2.3, but also add any observations with posi-
tive direct contributions in years 1986, 1987, and 1991-2007 to the panel. I then estimate
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an expanded version of equation 2.2
Contributionsit = i + t + X0st +
X
t(86 88
t21982;‘83;‘86;‘87;:::;2007
TaxCosts(i))  1fyear = tg + "it (2.3)
The key dierence from equation 2.2 is the flexible specification of TRA86 treatment ef-
fects, in practice a dierent eect for the tax cost change t in all years. The path over
time described by these coecients shows the size of the gap by treatment dosage each
year, relative to the gap in comparison year 1985. Because the treatment does not actu-
ally occur until 1986, we expect 1982 and 1983 to be equal to zero. If instead we observe
1982 > 1983 > 0, it might mean that the dierence-in-dierences estimates are describing
the continuation of a preexisting trend in contributions. And if the t’s rapidly revert to
zero after the policy change, despite the permanent change in tax cost of giving shown in
figure 2.2A, that would be consistent with the estimates describing a short-term shifting of
intended contributions, rather than a permanent eect of the policy change on contributions.
Figure 2.6 charts the point estimates of t by year, with dashed lines marking pointwise
95 percent confidence intervals for test of t = 0 (that is, statistically indistinguishable from
1985).16 The implications of these estimates for the two concerns raised above are clear.
First, the estimates for 1982 and 1983 are statistically indistinguishable from zero and are,
if anything, increasing over 1982-5. There is no evidence of a 1982-5 pretrend actually
driving the dierence-in-dierences estimates. Second, the eect of the tax cost change is
not only persistent, but if anything the gap between high-increase and low-increase states
expands over the following 10-15 years. This is consistent with an eect that is not driven
by tax-shifting but a permanent fall in the contributions to these organizations. Specifically,
it suggests that donors respond with a lag— the instantaneous shift is less than the long-run
eect of the policy.
16I also tabulate the coecients in appendix table B.2.
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Figure 2.6: Time-varying Estimates of Tax Change Eects
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Notes: Y-axis is the coecient on the 1986–1988 change in log average tax cost by state for year t. Com-
parison (omitted) year is 1985. Dashed lines plot pointwise 95% confidence intervals using state-clustered
standard errors. See discussion of regression equation 2.3 in section 2.4 for more detail.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Overall, these results confirm the validity of the dierence-in-dierences strategy. Two
main threats to my estimates, dierential pretrends and intertemporal shifting, are not in-
dicated by the long-run eects or year-specific coecients estimated. The results also
describe an eect that is durable and persists for years.
2.5 Robustness Checks
This section will investigate other possible explanations of the large estimated eects,
including robustness to the sample selection decisions described in section 2.3, the possi-
bility that organizations enter and exit dierentially across states, and that the estimates are
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driven by outliers. None of these checks prompt a reinterpretation of the estimates obtained
in prior sections; throughout, I find a robust, negative relationship between average tax cost
of giving and charitable receipts.
Extensive Margin of Contributions
My sample selection process discards organizations with zero direct contributions in
any of the years of interest. For the full 1982-2007 sample over 78 percent of organizations
either always receive direct contributions, or never do. It appears there is a fundamental
dierence between organizations that do and do not finance their operations with contribu-
tion revenues. However, focusing on organizations that always receive contributions limits
our ability to observe important behavior at the extensive margin, reflecting an endoge-
nous decision to start or stop soliciting donations; perhaps changes in contribution receipts
would look dierent if we accounted for organizations deciding endogenously to fire their
fundraising sta after the TRA86.
A descriptive multivariate regression allows me to test this claim. Let ReceivedContit
be a binary variable equal to 0 if organization i received zero direct contributions in year t,
and equal to 1 if it received strictly positive contributions. I estimate the linear probability
model
ReceivedContit = i + X0it +  ln(TaxCosts(i);t) + "it (2.4)
for the entire Statistics of Income sample (to year 2007), where X0it is a set of firm financial
variables and TaxCostit is the log average tax cost of a contribution. The estimates are
reported in table 2.3, column 1. Although revenue from other sources is correlated with
contribution revenue, the partial correlation on TaxCost is close to zero and not statistically
significant.
To confirm that the problem is not at the margin of my sample, I repeat this analysis
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Table 2.3: Probability of Positive Contributions (Extensive Margin)
Pr(Receiving Contributions)
(1) (2)
All Observations Main Sample
Log Assets 0.00150 0.00238
(0.00131) (0.00637)
Log Gov. Grants 0.00506*** 0.00752**
(0.00133) (0.00341)
Log Program 0.00617*** 0.00164
Service Revenue (0.00148) (0.00365)
TaxCostst -0.0745
(0.0888)
86 88TaxCosts(i) 0.366
Post86t (0.349)
Org. & Year Eects X X
Observations 296161 21314
R-squared 0.729 0.512
Number of Orgs. 31772 4125
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a charity receives at least one dollar in direct support in year t, zero
otherwise. TaxCost is the marginal first-dollar tax cost of a charitable contribution, averaged over a fixed set
of individual tax returns, in state s and year t. Log of assets is observed at the beginning of the year. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
using data from years 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1988-90 for organizations which meet all
other criteria to be included in the main sample, and instead of tax cost I use the continuous
treatment variable, 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t. These estimates are reported in table
2.3, column 2, and again show no statistically significant relationship between the tax cost
measure and the probability of strictly positive contributions.17
As an additional check, table 2.4 reports regressions identical to those in table 2.2,
column 2, except uses as dependent variable the log of direct contributions plus a constant
(since log of zero is undefined). My preferred additive constant is $25,000, which is the
minimum income requiring an organization to file a form 990, though columns 1 and 3
17Use of a logit instead of a linear probability model does not change either set of results.
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report results for an addition of $10,000 and $50,000 as well.18 Column 4 of the table
repeats the regression with the added $25,000, but only for the same sample as in table 2.2.
Adding the additional data and changing the dependent variable reduces the magnitude
of the estimates somewhat, but qualitatively the result — a large, negative relationship
between average tax cost and contribution revenue — is unchanged.
Table 2.4: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (With Reported Zeroes)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Real Log Real Log Real Log Real
Contributions Contributions Contributions Contributions
+$10,000 +$25,000 +$50,000 +$25,000
Including Zero Contributions Main Sample
86 88TaxCosts(i) -3.160* -3.052** -2.870** -3.794***
Post86t (1.664) (1.431) (1.262) (1.385)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X X X
Observations 21318 21318 21318 16882
R-squared 0.835 0.851 0.862 0.890
Number of Orgs 4125 4125 4125 3273
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real charitable contributions plus a constant, in 2012 dollars. Independent
variables are described in notes to table 2.2. The sample includes organizations reporting zero direct support
in some years. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
In summary, it is uncommon for charities to accept contributions in some years but
not in others. Upon further examination, neither the extensive margin of receiving or not
receiving contributions, nor the use of observations reporting zero contributions (by adding
a constant before taking a log) suggest a dierent interpretation of the results in section 2.3.
18In the literature on individual contributions, it is common to include zeroes in the logged dependent
variable by adding $10. This is appropriate because the individual tax return data includes a large number of
small, positive contributions: for example, in 1985, 11.9 percent of individual returns deducted a gift between
$1 and $100. In contrast, very few charities in the sample ever report contribution receipts below $10,000,
and a change in logs from $10 to $525, the first percentile of positive observations in 1985, is greater than the
log increase from the median ($467,109) to the 95th percentile ($1,110,000). A larger additive constant than
10 is therefore necessary to use observed zeroes in approximate logs without underweighting the variance
among positive observations.
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Entry and Exit
Since the sample defined in section 2.3 only uses organizations observed before and
after the tax change, another concern is that the eect of the tax cost is partly observed in
the form of dierent rates of organization entry and exit.
There is no data source which observes charities’ entry and exit directly. Though the
IRS maintains a master file of registered nonprofit organizations, it is rarely updated and
inappropriate for this type of quantitative analysis.19 Nor are the Statistics of Income data
appropriate for studying entry and exit, as firms are not observed every year: although
charities with at least $10 million in gross assets ought to be observed one hundred percent
of the time, major organizations are frequently missing for a year or two. For example, the
University of Chicago is missing in year 1997; in 1996 Chicago’s total assets were reported
to be $3.1 billion, well above the threshold for mandatory sampling.
Those data limitations mean that I cannot answer the question definitively. As an alter-
native, I demonstrate what the available information hints about entry and exit of organiza-
tions by state. The form 990 includes a field for the date of the organization’s letter from
the IRS recognizing it as a tax-exempt public charity. The date of this letter marks the start
of the IRS’s recognition of the organization as a charity and defines a minimum age for the
organization (which has to be at least as old as its exemption letter date). Therefore, if a
state’s population of charities tends to have more recent exemption letters on average than
other states, that suggests that the turnover rate in the state must be higher (either organi-
zations are being created more quickly than in other states, or old organizations exit more
rapidly, or both).
I plot state-level shares of forms 990 filed by organizations with post-1986 exemption
letters as of 1989 against post-1986 tax rate (figure 2.7A) and 1986–1988 change in tax rate
19See National Center for Charitable Statistics (2013, pp. 4–5)
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(figure 2.7B). I derive shares of organizations with recent exemption letters from the 1989
IRS Core Files, a dataset containing a limited set of form 990 variables for the universe
of filing organizations (Internal Revenue Service 2011a). Neither tax variable is highly
correlated with state shares of recently exempted organizations. Post-1986 tax rate and
recent exemption share have state-level correlation 0.061 (p-value = 0.6799), and tax cost
change and recent exemption letter share have correlation 0.100 (p-value=0.508).
As an added check, I test whether the change in average tax cost is correlated with exit
using prospective data. Let LastObi be the last year up to 2007 in which organization i is
observed in the Statistics of Income or Core Files data sets; though failure to observe an
organization does not mean it has disappeared, a recorded 990 almost certainly means it
still exists. Therefore the last year of observation should be highly (negatively) correlated
with date of exit. For organizations observed in the 1986 Statistics of Income data, I regress
LastObi =  + X0i +  ln(TaxCosts(i);‘86) + 86 88TaxCosts(i) + "i (2.5)
where X0i is a vector of organization i’s financial variables, and the tax variables capture
both the rate before the 1986 tax reform and the TRA86 state level tax change. The results
of this regression are presented in table 2.5. Though income and assets are associated with
a later end date, there is no significant association between last observation year and tax
rates.20 In summary, there does not seem to be a strong association between the TRA86 tax
change and organization entry and exit.
20The channel through which income and asset variables are related to last observation year is ambiguous;
organizations with more money are presumably less likely to exit for financial reasons, but are also more likely
to be required to meet Form 990 filing requirements each year. It is likely that both causes are important.
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Figure 2.7: Exemption Letter Share as Test of Entry and Exit
A. Share of Older Orgs. By Tax Rate, 1989
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B. Share of Older Orgs. By Tax Change, 1989
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Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
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Table 2.5: Last Year Observed Regressed on Financial and Tax Variables
(1) (2)
Data Year 1986 1989
Log Assets 0.245*** 0.331***
(0.0453) (0.00846)
Log Total Income -0.139** 0.0159
(0.0610) (0.0191)
Log Contributions 0.155*** 0.108***
+Grants (0.0154) (0.00670)
Log Program Service 0.0228 0.0536***
Revenue (0.0144) (0.00835)
Log Tax Price -1.469 -0.912
(2.390) (2.177)
86 88TaxCosts(i) -1.177 -0.202
(2.198) (0.801)
Constant 2000*** 1998***
(0.713) (0.497)
Observations 6644 135808
R-squared 0.043 0.055
Notes: Dependent variable is the last year for which the organization is observed in the Statistics of Income
or IRS Core Data files of form 990 filings, up to year 2007 — so column 1 regresses the last year in which
organizations present in the 1986 data are observed, while column 2 regresses last year observed for organi-
zations present in the much larger 1989 Core data set. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors
clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
State Law Exogeneity
Table 2.1 reports changes to state income tax rates over 1986–1988 reported by ACIR.
As described in section 2.3, I drop West Virginia because of changes made to their state
charitable contribution deduction during this period, and North Dakota because of implau-
sibly high marginal tax rates. However, my main analysis does retain the tabulated states
which changed their marginal tax rates during this period. As table 2.1 demonstrates, there
does not seem to be a rush to raise marginal rates at the state level and undo the rate cuts
at the federal level, nor is it likely that states would have changed their laws specifically
to maintain a constant incentive to give to charitable organizations. Still, we may be con-
cerned that the regression results are driven by states that change their own tax laws, and
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that the eect of an exogenous tax change on charitable receipts is therefore not well-
identified.
Therefore, table 2.6 replicates the dierence-in-dierences estimates of equation 2.2,
but drops the sixteen states which changed their marginal rates over this period. The re-
ported estimates indicate that, if anything, inclusion of those states attenuated the estimated
elasticities toward zero; in the reduced sample, the estimates range from -4.7 to -6.2. State
rate changes do not seem to be driving the results.
Table 2.6: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Excluding Rate-Changing States)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -6.164*** -6.263*** -4.731*** -3.977***
Post86t (1.633) (1.592) (1.342) (1.371)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 10422 10422 10422 10422
R-squared 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.861
Number of Orgs 2024 2024 2024 2024
Dierence test (p-value) 0.018 0.0019 0.1847 0.0235
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. Sample excludes states in table 2.1 observing a rate
change in years 1986–8. “Dierence test” reports a p-value for dierence between this subsample and the
main sample used in table 2.2. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Sample Selection Checks
Section 2.3 described a series of steps taken to limit the sample to organizations for
whom the average tax change in the state of filing plausibly describes average tax change
for their pool of possible donors. My estimation strategy requires that a charity’s donors be
located in the state of the charity’s 990 filing, or the attribution of all changes in donation
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Table 2.7: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Nonlocal Organizations Included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -3.153** -3.729*** -2.760*** -3.048***
Post86t (1.562) (1.273) (1.022) (0.996)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 21653 21653 21653 21653
R-squared 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880
Number of Orgs 4146 4146 4146 4146
Dierence test (p-value) 0.0007*** 0.0000*** 0.0004*** 0.0003***
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. Sample does not exclude non-local organizations.
“Dierence test” reports a p-value for dierence between this larger sample and the nested sample used in
table 2.2. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
behavior to particular state policies will tend to attenuate estimates toward zero. (For ex-
ample, though the American Red Cross is headquartered in Washington, the tax law of the
District of Columbia aects only a small share of its donors.) This section demonstrates
that the result is robust to the choices made in that sample selection process.
First, I consider whether the sample is too narrow by estimating the dierence-in-
dierences regression described in equation 2.2 without any limitation of organizations by
likely “local-ness.” Instead, I skip step 3 of the process outlined in section 2.3. I report the
results of using this expanded sample in table 2.7. The obtained dierence-in-dierences
estimates are not wildly altered, ranging from -2.8 to -3.8 and remaining statistically signif-
icant. The lower magnitudes are consistent with attenuation bias in the measure of average
tax cost.
Second, I check whether use of an unbalanced panel distorts the obtained results. Be-
cause the Statistics of Income data only try to sample the largest organizations by assets
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every year, an unbalanced panel allows use of information about more and smaller or-
ganizations than otherwise; however, if the pattern of observation is correlated with the
outcome of interest, then estimates from an unbalanced panel may be biased. Table 2.8 re-
ports continuous dierence-in-dierences estimates using only organizations observed in
all six years. The results are consistent with table 2.2, obtaining elasticities from -3.2 to
-4.3; none are statistically dierent from the corresponding estimate in table 2.2. There is
no indication that an unbalanced panel is driving the results.
Table 2.8: Dierence-in Dierences Estimates (Balanced Panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -3.686* -4.716** -3.673** -2.962**
Post86t (2.074) (1.778) (1.507) (1.453)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 10449 10449 10449 10449
R-squared 0.854 0.855 0.855 0.855
Number of Orgs 1765 1765 1765 1765
Dierence test (p-value) 0.3672 0.8352 0.8606 0.6277
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. Sample is restricted to organizations observed in
1982, 1983, 1985, 1988–1990. “Dierence test” reports a p-value for dierence between this subsample and
the main sample used in table 2.2. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Third, one may be concerned that the filters used to eliminate organizations with broad
donor bases are not strict enough. If the remaining interstate contributions are randomly
distributed, this will tend to attenuate estimates toward zero. But if flows of donations
across states are nonrandom, the estimates might be distorted by these cross-border eects.
I check for this in two ways. First, I check that the results are not driven by patterns of
donation flows within interstate communities by repeating the analysis of table 2.2, but
dropping organizations located in Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas that straddle state
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borders. For example, the Washington, DC metropolitan statistical area spreads over Mary-
land, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, each with their own state tax
laws, and is therefore dropped. The estimates obtained with this restricted sample, reported
in table 2.9, are not qualitatively or statistically dierent from those presented in table 2.2.
Second, I do a placebo test for the possibility that national changes in giving patterns
uncorrelated with donors’ tax rates drive the results, by repeating the analysis in table 2.2
for charities that meet other sample selection rules, but are flagged as nationally prominent
by sample selection step 3 in section 2.3. Table 2.10 reports these results; the coecients on
the tax treatment variable are positive, consistent with the explanation that it is tax changes,
and not some other unobserved change, that drives the results.
Table 2.9: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Excluding Interstate Metropolitan Areas)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -4.415** -4.922*** -4.058*** -3.776***
Post86t (1.757) (1.312) (1.201) (1.144)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 14297 14297 14297 14297
R-squared 0.863 0.864 0.864 0.864
Number of Orgs 2812 2812 2812 2812
Dierence test (p-value) 0.663 0.7835 0.8134 0.8517
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. Data excludes charities sited in Census Metropolitan
Statistical Areas that encompass portions of more than one US state. “Dierence test” reports a p-value for
dierence between this subsample and the main sample used in table 2.2. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Overall, these results suggest that my preferred sampling procedure is not creating a
spurious association between tax changes and charitable contributions.
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Table 2.10: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Placebo Test, National Organizations)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) 1.987 1.654 2.736** 2.277*
Post86t (1.732) (1.418) (1.294) (1.202)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 4771 4771 4771 4771
R-squared 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915
Number of Orgs 908 908 908 908
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. The sample only includes charities excluded for
violating one of the rules for dropping non-local charities, but otherwise meeting the conditions outlined in
section 2.3. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Outliers
Figure 2.4A not only plots a statistically significant linear relationship between state av-
erage tax cost change and log change in individual organizations’ contribution revenue, but
also makes clear that organizations can experience truly huge swings in their contribution
revenue from year to year. One may be concerned that the dierence-in-dierences results
may not be estimating an actual tax eect, but rather just the influence of a few outliers
that experience huge changes in their contributions following the tax change, and that just
happen to be located in high- or low-tax-change states.
Table 2.11 checks for this by omitting organizations with the largest and smallest
volatility of log contribution revenue, measured by individual standard deviations over the
observation period. Column 1 omits the most and least volatile one percent of organiza-
tions (two percent of organizations, total); column 2 omits the most and least volatile five
percent.
The results are qualitatively consistent with table 2.2. Though the obtained point esti-
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Table 2.11: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Excluding Outliers)
(1) (2)
Drop top and bottom Drop top and bottom
most volatile most volatile
1 percent 5 percent
86 88TaxCosts(i) -2.810** -2.654*
Post86t (1.262) (1.374)
Org. Eects X X
Year Eects X X
Observations 16508 15162
R-squared 0.874 0.892
Number of Orgs 3169 2901
Dierence test (p-value) 0.013** 0.0521*
Notes: See notes to table 2.2 for description of variables. The sample excludes charities with variance in
charitable contributions during the sample years above or below percentile thresholds. “Dierence test”
reports a p-value for dierence between this subsample and the main sample used in table 2.2. *** p <0.01,
** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
mates are lower in magnitude, they describe a large negative association between tax cost
change and contributions received (coecients of -2.81 and -2.65), and both are statistically
dierent from zero at the ten percent level. At the same time, both estimates are statisti-
cally dierent from the corresponding estimates in table 2.2 at the ten percent level as well
(p-values of 0.0130 and 0.0521, respectively), suggesting that outliers may be important to
the magnitudes obtained in table 2.2.
2.6 Comparing Donors’ and Charities’ Tax Elasticities
The preceding sections have demonstrated that organizations with a large increase in
tax cost of giving received lower contributions after the TRA86 than organizations in states
where the tax cost increased less sharply. Interpreted as an elasticity, contributions fall by
about four percent for a one percent increase in tax cost. This stands in striking contrast
to the literature on individual donations, which finds a decline of about 1.2 percent in
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individual donations for a 1 percent increase in individual tax cost of giving.
The discrepancy between these two estimates is striking, but readily explained by dif-
ferences in the two data sources and in the methods used to analyze them. First, both data
sets are constructed from subsets of all donations in ways that are likely to make them
unrepresentative of the whole, and dierent from each other. Analysis of household tax re-
turn data excludes a group of people likely to be more tax-sensitive than the population as
a whole — non-itemizers — while the form 990 data excludes one of the least tax-sensitive
sectors — churches and houses of worship. In addition to these compositional dierences,
the composition of observed values diers across the two samples: donors give the most
dollars to churches (a low tax-sensitivity sector), while observed charities receive their
largest contributions from the very wealthy (the most tax-sensitive group). Finally, indi-
vidual income tax elasticities may be biased if charities change their fundraising approach
heterogeneously by donor income or tax rate; estimates from charity data will necessarily
be net of any changes in fundraising.
Heterogeneity by Charity
The sample examined in this paper is not representative of the charitable sector as a
whole in two important ways. First, many charitable organizations do not file the form 990,
including private foundations (which file the 990-PF), government entities (such as public
universities), very small organizations, and churches. In 1985, the charities required to file
the form 990 accounted for 41.5 percent of all public charities by contributions; giving to
churches and other houses of worship made up over half of charitable giving. Second, the
identification strategy used in section 2.3 requires a focus on local charities, whose donors
may not respond to tax incentives in the same manner as donors to national charities. The
charities observed in the Statistics of Income data represent 24.6 percent of all charitable
giving in 1985; the observations retained following the data-cleaning procedure described
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in section 2.3 represent 10.7 percent of all charitable contributions.
Analysis of survey data has suggested that giving to churches is less tax-sensitive than
other charitable giving (Giving USA 2013; Feldstein 1975). This is consistent with the
volatility of aggregates: figure 2.8 plots year-over-year changes in charitable giving. Reli-
gious giving is the least volatile of any of the charitable sectors; over the 1982-1990 period,
real annual change in aggregate religious giving had a coecient of variation of 1.04, com-
pared to a coecient of 2.25 for total charitable contributions.21 Because the form 990 data
does not include churches, we therefore would expect estimates of tax-sensitivity to be of
larger magnitude than if churches were included.
While churches are not observed in form 990 data, we can test for dierences among the
charities that are required to file the form. The NCCS 990 data report National Taxonomy
of Exempt Entities (NTEE) sector codes for each organization. Table 2.12 reports the
number of organizations and observations in the sample by each NTEE code. Retained
organizations are not evenly distributed among the sector codes: health charities, mostly
community nonprofit hospitals, comprise a plurality of observations, followed by education
and human services, then by arts and culture charities and by grantmaking charities (such
as United Ways and community foundations). No other NTEE sectors have more than 100
organizations observed in the sample.
To test for heterogeneity by charitable sector, I modify equation 2.2. For each nonprofit
sector S of interest, I estimate
ln(Contributionsit) = i + 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t + t + X0st + "it
+Post86t  1 [Sectori = S ] + 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t  1 [Sectori = S ] (2.6)
21Over this period, religious giving grew by a mean of 3.7 percent a year with a standard deviation of 3.9
percentage points; total giving grew by an average of 2.6 percent each year with a standard deviation of 5.8
percentage points.
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Table 2.12: Distribution of Charities by Sector
NTEE Sector Example Orgs. Obs.
A - Arts, Culture, and Humanities San Diego Museum of Art 182 824
B - Education Hendrix College 1027 4984
C - Environmental Quality, Protection, and
Beautification
Aspetuck Land Trust 18 81
D - Animal-Related
Humane Society of Marin
County
15 60
E - Health
Children’s Medical Center of
Dallas
1390 6860
F - Mental Health, Crisis Intervention Philadelphia Psychiatric Center 46 197
G - Diseases, Disorders, Medical Disciplines Dana-Farber Cancer Institute 14 72
H - Medical Research Hermann Eye Fund 33 157
I - Crime, Legal Related
Mass. Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Children
14 65
J - Employment, Job Related
Blind Industries and Services of
Maryland
15 65
K - Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition Jackson County Meals Service 3 16
L - Housing, Shelter
Presbyterian Retirement Homes
of Birmingham
25 116
M - Public Safety Tacoma Mountain Rescue 5 16
N - Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics The Fresh Air Fund 18 81
O - Youth Development
Boys and Girls Clubs of Metro
Atlanta
26 131
P - Human Services - Multipurpose and Other YWCA of Walla Walla 428 2047
Q - International, Foreign Aairs, and National
Security
Asia Foundation 3 13
R - Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy Anti-Defamation League 1 6
S - Community Improvement, Capacity Building Junior League of Detroit 12 49
T - Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Grantmaking
Foundations
United Way of Santa Clara
County
165 808
U - Science and Technology Research Institutes,
Services
University City Science Center 18 87
V - Social Science Research Institutes, Services
Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences
2 10
W - Public, Society Benefit - Multipurpose and
Other
Hebrew Free Loan Association
of San Francisco
7 35
X - Religion Related, Spiritual Development Upper Peninsula Bible Camp 23 98
Y - Mutual/Membership Benefit Organizations,
Other
Lower Marion Township Police
Pension Association
1 4
Total 3491 16882
Notes: Tabulation by sector for sample described in section 2.3.
Source: NCCS Statistics of Income.
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Figure 2.8: Year-over-Year Growth in Contributions by Sector
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where 1 [Sectori = S ] is an indicator equal to 1 if organization i is in sector of interest
S . Additional coecients  and  allow for a dierent eect on organizations S than
the rest of the sample. I report these coecients, as well as  and p-values for the joint
significance of the sector-S estimates, for the five most common sectors in table 2.13. The
obtained results are consistent with dierent tax responses by charitable sector: the health
and philanthropy sectors are significantly more tax-responsive than the rest of the sample,
while the culture and education sectors are less tax-responsive. The human services sector
is not statistically dierent from the rest of the sample. The magnitude of the obtained
estimates is particularly striking for the health sector, which not only has a large and highly
significant coecient (-7), but which appears to drive much of the results — the coecient
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for the rest of the sample is much smaller (-0.7) and not statistically dierent from zero
when health charities are allowed to be aected dierently.22
Table 2.13: Regressions Testing Dierential Tax Eects By Sector
Major TaxCosts Post86 TaxCosts;q Sector
Sector Post86 SectorS Post86 Joint
SectorS Test
A- Culture -3.774*** -0.914 6.173* 0.001***
(1.411) (0.627) (3.342)
B - Education -4.493** -0.379 3.421 0.000***
(1.809) (0.406) (2.199)
E - Health -0.715 1.047** -7.273*** 0.000***
(1.285) (0.521) (2.803)
P - Human -4.093*** -0.996 5.260 0.267
Services (1.450) (0.623) (3.371)
T - Philanthropy -3.496** 0.336 -0.704 0.004***
(1.416) (0.646) (3.523)
Notes: Sample is identical to the one used in table 2.2. All regressions include controls for organization fixed
eects, region-by-year eects, and state-level macroeconomic variables. Additional interaction terms with
sectoral indicators are reported; see specification of equation 2.6 in section 2.6. “Joint test” reports p-values
for the hypothesis that both sector interaction coecients equal zero. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Heterogeneity by Donor Income
In addition to dierences in data composition, because donors’ behavior is heteroge-
neous, computing the elasticity of received donations asks a fundamentally dierent ques-
tion than the elasticity of donors’ contributions. As section 2.2 documents, voluntary con-
tributions to charities can vary greatly from year to year; one important component of this
22Tax responses vary by donor as well as by charity. Cross-sectional studies of upper-income households
have found that donors’ tax-sensitivity is “U-shaped” in income (Feldstein and Taylor 1976; Clotfelter 1985).
Because non-itemizers, who tend to have lower incomes than itemizers, have no incentive to report their char-
itable giving in most years, they are generally excluded from analysis of giving in tax return data. However,
from 1983 to 1986, non-itemizers were able to take a limited deduction for their charitable contributions, a
provision repealed by the TRA86. Since non-itemizers saw their tax cost of contributions increase after 1986,
omitting them from analysis of household data may mean focusing on a less tax-sensitive sample than the
population as a whole.
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variation is large one-time gifts. A charity might have many small-dollar donors that give
regularly and are not particularly tax-sensitive, yet its overall contributions could be pro-
foundly aected by tax rates.
I do a rudimentary test for the possibility that high-income households are driving
the tax response by splitting the average tax cost measure into two pieces. Let 86 88
ln(TaxCosts(i);q) denote the change in the average tax cost of giving from 1986 to 1988 for
returns with adjusted gross income in fractile q of the distribution. (That is, follow the
same procedure outlined in section 2.2, but assign zero aggregation weight to returns not in
fractile q of the income distribution.) I split the tax cost treatment variable into the portion
explained by fractile q, and residual variation:
86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)) =0 + 186 88 ln(TaxCosts(i);q) + uqs
Residualqs uˆqs (2.7)
This divided variable is plugged into equation 2.2 to see whether the variation across states
is better explained by fractile q or by the unexplained component of 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))
ln(Contributionsit) = i + r;t + X0st + 
q
1Residualqs  Post86t
+ 
q
2

86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i);q

 Post86t + "qit (2.8)
If q2 explains most of the variation regardless of income tier, that would be consistent
with the interpretation that the change in tax policy common to all levels of the income
distribution are most important for explaining changes in charitable receipts. On the other
hand, if only the top tiers of the income distribution are associated with dierences in
contributions across states, that would be consistent with the interpretation that it is the
eects of the tax cut on high-income households drives the observed changes.
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The estimates for coecients on the income tier averages and residual pieces are pre-
sented in table 2.14. The results are consistent with the interpretation that the tax cut
common to all households is not the driving force behind changes in contribution behavior:
the residual, and not the income fractile component, is most strongly associated with the
tax change for the middle six deciles of the income distribution. On the other hand, for the
top two deciles, the component explained by the income decile is highly statistically sig-
nificant and negative while the residual piece is statistically indistinguishable from zero.23
Additionally, because the size of the tax change for these deciles is larger, the estimates
— negative 2.8 for the top tenth of the income distribution — are somewhat smaller than
the corresponding estimate (-3.5) in table 2.2; this suggests that estimates in table 2.2 may
be overstated because of scaling. That is, because upper-income households experienced
larger tax cuts than the rest of the population on average, if they are the ones driving the
results, then the tax change for the population as a whole will be too small in magnitude,
overstating estimates.
Endogenous Fundraising
A third possible explanation is that the charities themselves change their behavior fol-
lowing a tax change in a way that confounds — or at least changes the interpretation of
— individual charitable elasticities. That is, if charities strategically respond to tax rate
changes by targeting the intensity of their fundraising to potential donors in a way that is
correlated with changes in tax rates, fundraising could be an omitted variable that aects
estimates from individual and organizational data in dierent ways.
To see how the omission of fundraising could aect tax elasticity estimates of contri-
butions dierentially for households and for organizations, consider a hypothetical data
23Intriguingly, the same pattern is observed for the two lowest deciles. This may be driven by older
taxpayers with high wealth but low income in the current year. However, more investigation is necessary.
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Table 2.14: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates (Split by Income Quantiles)
Income TaxCosts;q Residual Income TaxCosts;q Residual
Group Post86 Post86 Group Post86 Post86
Bottom -3.271** -3.560 6th -1.084 -6.536***
10% (1.416) (2.495) (1.904) (1.985)
2nd -3.274** -1.460 7th -2.097 -5.217**
(1.273) (2.796) (1.316) (2.080)
3rd -4.651** -6.459** 8th -2.178* -4.784*
(2.208) (2.850) (1.125) (2.552)
4th -0.697 -3.436** 9th -2.755*** -0.517
(1.691) (1.517) (1.046) (3.887)
5th 1.514 -6.103*** Top -2.760*** 3.086
(2.261) (1.716) 10% (0.899) (3.686)
Top -3.104*** 0.652 Top -2.876* -4.872*
5% (1.049) (3.217) 1% (1.528) (2.498)
Notes: All regressions are on the main sample and include organization eects, region-by-year eects, and
state-level time-varying macroeconomic variables (population, unemployment, per capita income, poverty
rate, and gross state product). See the description in section 2.6 and appendix A for further explanation. ***
p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
set described in table 2.15. In these data, there are three households (h 2 f1; 2; 3g) and
two charities (c 2 fA; Bg) observed in periods t. In each period, each household has tax
rate 1   ht, receives a fundraising solicitation Fhct from charity c, and makes contribution
Chct. However, the investigator only has data on either household-level aggregates such as
Cht =
P
ctChct and Fht =
P
c Fhct, or organization-level aggregates such as Cct =
P
hChct,
Fct =
P
h Fhct, and average tax cost 1   ht = Ph(1   hct)ChctCct . The investigator working
with these aggregated data can estimate the eect of tax rates on contributions from the
household data, likely using a log-linear model with fixed eects for household and period:
lnCht = h + t + 1 ln (1   ht) + 2 ln Fht + uht
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or from charity-level data
lnCct = c + !t + c ln

1   ct

+ 2 ln Fct + ct
The behavior of each actor following a tax cut is driven by the households’ prefer-
ences. Households 1 and 2 care strongly about charities A and B, respectively, and only
give to their preferred charity. Their contributions are increasing in fundraising Fhc for
their preferred organization and decreasing in tax cost of giving 1   h. Household 3 is
not particularly committed to any cause, but will increase contributions when the tax cost
is lowered or fundraising increased. Importantly, household 3’s cross-partial is negative
— when 1   3 increases, the return on a marginal dollar F spent soliciting household 3
declines.
A tax reform increases the tax cost of giving for households 1 and 3, while leaving
household 2’s rate unchanged. Because the value of fundraising from household 3 depends
on its tax rate, both charities decrease their fundraising from that household, and contribu-
tions made by household 3 to either charity fall in response to the higher tax cost and lower
fundraising.
Assuming charities set fundraising levels across household so that marginal expected
C=F is the same, the falling marginal productivity of fundraising household 3 makes it
more appealing for charity A to solicit household 1 more. However, household 1’s tax cut
makes solicitation less productive at the margin. These countervailing eects cancel each
other out, and after the tax change fundraising of household 1 by charity A remains the
same, while contributions from household 1 to charity A fall.
Charity B similarly is willing to accept a lower marginal return on fundraising from
household 2, but unlike household 1, there is no countervailing change in the tax cost of
giving. Charity B increases fundraising of household 2, and contributions from 2 to B
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increase following the tax change.
Table 2.15: Hypothetical Data, Contributions with Endogenous Fundraising
Household 1 Household 2 Household 3 Organization Data
Charity A
F1A unch. n/a
F3A # FA #;CA ##
C1A # C3A # (1   A) ""
Charity B n/a
F2B " F3B # FB unch., CB unch.
C2B " C3B # (1   B) "
Household Data
(1   1) " (1   2) unch. (1   3) "
F1 unch. F2 " F3 ##
C1 # C2 " C3 ##
Notes: Arrows denote increases (") or decreases (#) across observation periods; a double arrow denotes a
bigger change.
This simple story generates omitted variable bias of opposite signs in the two implicit
data sets. In the household data, the covariance between changes in 1 h and Fh is positive:
household 2 has no tax change but observes increased fundraising, while households 1 and
3 have tax cost increases and unchanged or decrease fundraising. Because the omitted
variable bias on the tax cost coecient 1 will have the same sign as the covariance between
tax cost and the omitted variable, leaving out fundraising implies a positive bias. That
is, since we expect tax cost is negatively associated with charitable giving, the negative
coecient should be biased upward, and households should appear less tax-sensitive than
they actually are.
Conversely, the covariance between changes in tax cost

1   c

and fundraising Fc in
the charity data set is negative: both of charity A’s donors experience a tax cost increase,
and A’s fundraising declines, whereas B leaves total fundraising unchanged and sees a cost
increase for just one of its donors. This implies that charity data will tend to overstate the
tax sensitivity of donors.
Of course, this is example is purely hypothetical— it is possible that fundraising creates
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omitted variable biases of opposite signs, but it is not necessarily so. Unfortunately, neither
individual tax return data nor the survey data collected by the Center on Philanthropy/PSID
has information on how aggressively donors were solicited by charities (Survey Research
Center 2013). It is doubtful that donors would remember the details of fundraising cam-
paigns even if survey takers did ask. It is not possible to avoid omission of fundraising
from analysis of individual data.
Our ability to check whether omitted fundraising behavior biases estimates from charity
data is only slightly better. While the form 990 requires charities to report total expenditures
on fundraising, we cannot directly observe changes in the allocation of fundraising among
donors. The best we can do is see whether charities respond to a tax cut by increasing or
decreasing their total expenditures on fundraising. Table 2.16A examines whether fundrais-
ing changes on the extensive margin, by presenting results for regression of a variable equal
to 1 if a charity has strictly positive fundraising and zero otherwise on the same regressors
as table 2.2 (see equation 2.2). Similarly, table 2.16B regresses the log of fundraising ex-
penditure (plus $25,000 to avoid dropping zeroes) on the same regressors. Neither set of
regressions finds a statistically significant change in fundraising following the TRA86.24
The average charity in the sample experiences a change in the TaxCost treatment variable
of 0.185, which means that, interpreted as linear probabilities, the largest point estimates
in table 2.16A imply a fall of about six percentage points in the likelihood of engaging
in fundraising. The point estimates in table 2.16B imply an elasticity of roughly -1 for
fundraising expense in response to a tax change, so a one percent increase in the represen-
tative tax cost of giving might cause a one percent decrease in fundraising. These eects
are economically significant, but not statistically dierent from zero.
We can further test to see whether the results in 2.2 are confounded by the omission
24This regression only compares 1988–90 with the pre-period data. Evidence presented in section 3.4 of
the following chapter will, however, suggest fundraising intensity may more strongly associated with tax rate
changes over the longer term.
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of changes in total fundraising (although, again, we cannot see whether the allocation of
fundraising across donors changes). Table 2.17C modifies the specification in equation 2.2
to add charities’ fundraising expenditures.
ln(Contributionsit) =i + t + X0st + 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t
+1[Fundraising > 0] +  ln(Fundraising + $25,000) + "it (2.9)
where 1[Fundraising > 0] is equal to 1 if fundraising expenditure is strictly positive and
zero otherwise, and ln(Fundraising + $25,000) is log of fundraising expenditure plus a
constant ($25,000).
Unsurprisingly, choosing to fundraise and the amount spend fundraising are both asso-
ciated with higher contribution revenues.25 However, the inclusion of fundraising variables
does not change the estimated tax elasticities greatly, nor are the estimates statistically dif-
ferent from those in table 2.2. To the limited extent we can investigate the question, the
dierence between tax elasticities estimated in this paper and those estimated from indi-
vidual tax data do not appear to be driven by tax-related shifts in charities’ fundraising
activities. However, it is possible that total fundraising expenditures just conceals impor-
tant information about shifts by charities among targeted donors in the manner described
in table 2.15.
In conclusion, there are good reasons to expect that public charity data would yield
a dierent tax cost of giving elasticity than household tax returns. The two data sources
are composed of particular kinds of charity and particular kinds of household that are not
representative of all charities or all household: household tax return data does not observe
non-itemizers’ giving, while my regression sample omits national charities and churches.
25Note that, since we have made no attempt to deal with the endogeneity of fundraising expenditures, these
estimates should not be interpreted as causal eects.
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Table 2.16: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of Fundraising Activity
A. Decision to Fundraise (Extensive Margin)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive Fundraising Expenditure (0/1)
86 88TaxCosts(i) -0.185 -0.348 -0.322 -0.354
Post86t (0.501) (0.518) (0.388) (0.404)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
R-squared 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821
Number of Orgs 3273 3273 3273 3273
B. Log of Fundraising Expenditure +$25,000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Fundraising Expense + $25,000
86 88TaxCosts(i) -0.834 -1.298 -1.212 -1.330
Post86t (1.342) (1.383) (1.159) (1.122)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
R-squared 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899
Number of Orgs 3273 3273 3273 3273
Moreover, because total household donations and total charitable receipts are aggregations
of the contributions from particular donors to particular charities, we expect the measured
responses to dier to the extent that the two variables aggregate the underlying heteroge-
neous responses in dierent ways. A third possibility, that endogenous shifts in fundraising
by the charities creates a dierence between individual and organizational estimates, is not
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Table 2.16 — Continued
C. Direct Contributions With Fundraising Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
86 88TaxCosts(i) -4.297** -4.735*** -3.752*** -3.225***
Post86t (1.731) (1.488) (1.100) (1.065)
1[Fundraising] 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0242)
Log Fundraising 0.130** 0.132** 0.139** 0.139**
+$25,000 (0.0555) (0.0547) (0.0533) (0.0533)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
R-squared 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.865
Number of Orgs 3273 3273 3273 3273
Dierence test (p-value) 0.9300 0.8510 0.8294 0.7952
Notes: Dependent variable in panel A is equal to 1 if charity has strictly positive fundraising expenditure,
zero otherwise. Dependent variable of panel B is the log of fundraising expenditure plus $25,000 (to retain
observed zeroes). Dependent variable in panel C is log of direct contributions; dummy for fundraising at the
extensive margin and log of fundraising expenditure plus $25,000 are added as additional control variables
to panel C. “Dierence test” is p-value for dierence of coecients from corresponding point estimates in
figure 2.2.
Sources: See notes to table 2.2
supported by the limited data available.
2.7 Interpreting Trends in Aggregate Charitable Giving
The preceding sections have shown that tax policy can matter for charitable giving,
at least for local, non-church organizations, especially health charities. Recall, however,
that the share of national income going to going to charitable contributions hardly changed
following the TRA86, and is consistently about two percent of GDP over the postwar period
even as tax rates changed substantially over this period. Far from witnessing a plunge in
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charitable contributions, charitable giving rose 10.1 percent in real terms from 1985 to
1988. A similar modest increase happened for sampled organizations as well: aggregate
gifts to organizations in the regression sample in both 1985 and 1988 rose 4.7 percent
over that period in real terms. If one believes that the tax cost elasticity of charitable
contributions for these charities is really about -3 to -5, then one must also believe that had
the TRA86 not reduced tax rates, charitable giving to these groups over this period would
have risen sharply.
Such a surge is plausible. The contributions-to-GDP ratio in the postwar period masks
two countervailing trends: the steady decline in marginal tax rates (which has decreased
charitable donations by raising the tax cost of giving) and rising income of high-income
households (which, because philanthropy is a luxury good, has increased charitable giving).
The causes and implications of income inequality are a fiercely debated topic, and beyond
the scope of this section. Instead, I will briefly provide two pieces of evidence that the
constancy of the contributions-to-GDP ratio does not tell the entire story.
First, the TRA86 coincided with a rapid increase in real incomes at the top of the income
distribution. Figure 2.9 charts the share of national wage and salary income redounding to
households at the top of the income distribution from 1927 to the present. After a long
decline, the top one percent of households saw their income share increase gradually be-
ginning in the 1970s, with a particularly sharp increase over 1986 to 1988.26 Yet this rapid
26The rapid increase in observed personal income after 1986 was not necessarily independent of changes in
federal tax law. Slemrod (1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) observe that 1988 to 1990 was a brief period
when the top tax rate on personal income was lower than the corporate income tax rate, and argue that much
of the increase in personal income was really business owners moving the tax base from C-corporations to
S-corporations, partnerships, and other forms of personal income. But if the falling share of personal income
contributed to charities were explained by shifting of taxable income out of C-corporations, then we should
expect corporate charitable contributions to rise following the TRA86 (shifting the tax benefit of charitable
contributions from individuals to corporations). Instead, corporate charitable contributions experienced a
year-over-year decline every year from 1987 to 1991, both in absolute terms and as a share of corporate
profits (Giving USA 2013, x18). Furthermore, the inversion of personal and corporate tax rates ended with
the 1990 tax increase, but the rising share of income redounding to the top of the distribution continued
unabated (figure 2.9). It is therefore likely that long-run changes at the top of the income distribution are
driven by real changes in the economy, and not solely by tax base shifting.
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Figure 2.9: Income Share of Top Fractiles
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Source: Piketty and Saez (2003), updated data accessed September 2013.
increase in income did not translate into a surge in charitable contributions: figure 2.10
charts the share of pre-tax non-capital gains income contributed by households top income
tiers. Vertical lines denote federal tax reforms; giving noticeably spikes in 1981 and 1986,
preceding tax cuts, before falling to new rates; it then rises again following the tax hikes in
1990 and 1993.
This income surge explains why my dierence-in-dierences estimates can imply a
large sensitivity of charitable receipts following the TRA86 without an accompanying
plunge in aggregate giving: had income spiked as it did without a simultaneous tax cut,
then charitable contributions would have surged in this period. Table 2.18 reports giv-
ing per household among high-income tiers of itemizing households in 1985 and 1988.
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Figure 2.10: Share of Broad Income Contributed by High-Income Fractiles
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Notes: “Broad Income” follows Gruber and Saez (2002) by excluding capital gains and social security in-
come.
Sources: Tax return data are from the IRS Public Use File maintained by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Had itemizing households with more than $100,000 in real (2012) income contributed the
same share of income in 1988 as they had in 1985, real personal charitable contributions
would have risen by 30 percent over that period instead of 10 percent. Since this back-
of-the-envelope estimate does not analyze possible changes in the giving behavior of non-
itemizers or lower-income itemizers, who also saw their incentives to contribute reduced
after 1986, this is a conservative estimate of the counterfactual increase in charitable con-
tributions. Had the post-1986 surge in incomes happened without a tax cut, and without an
accompanying decline in share of income donated, then a counterfactual surge in charitable
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contributions looks plausible.
Table 2.18: Calculation of Counterfactual Contributions, 1985-88
1985 1988
Real Real Real Contrib. Real Real Contrib. 1988 Income
Income Income Contrib. / Income Income Contrib. / Income x 1985 Share
Tier ($ bil.) ($ bil.) ($ bil.) ($ bil.) Contributed
$100-200K 1140 27.70 2.43% 1180 28.00 2.37% 28.67
$200-500K 342 10.40 3.04% 470 12.10 2.57% 14.29
$500-1000K 89 4.51 5.08% 184 4.50 2.45% 9.36
$1000K 96 7.71 8.03% 322 10.80 3.35% 25.86
Remainder 3340 72.05 2.16% 3600 80.48 2.24% 80.48
Total 5007 122.37 5756 135.88 158.66
Change 11.04% 29.66%
Notes: All dollar values are inflated to real 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Data for high-
income households is taken from the IRS public-use cross-sections of individual tax returns. “Contributions”
is defined as the sum of current-year cash and non-cash contributions. “Income” is the sum of: wages and
salaries, dividends, interest income, alimony, business income, Schedule E income, pensions and annuities,
farm income, unemployment insurance, capital gains, and other income. Each income tier excludes tax
returns which did not file itemized deductions. “Remainder” is total real contributions estimated by Giving
USA, less the sum of itemized contributions from high-income itemized returns, estimated to be $122.37
billion in 1985 and $135.88 billion in 1988 (Giving USA 2013, Table 18).
Sources: Tax return data from the IRS Public Use File. Contribution shares from Giving USA (2013).
Additionally, a comparison with eras with similar income inequality, but diering marginal
tax rates, tells a dierent story. Charitable giving in the interwar period — when marginal
tax rates were below twenty percent for almost everybody, and the income share at the
top of the distribution comparable to the late 1980’s — was significantly lower than two
percent of GDP. Figure 2.1 plots four dierent measures of the charitable contributions-
to-GDP ratio for this earlier period from Andrews (1950) and Jones (1954), as well as
itemized contributions from tax returns. Estimates of total interwar giving are consistent
with a rate of contributions well below the lowest share of GDP observed in the postwar
era — but rising rapidly in the 1940s as tax rates rose broadly for another war.27
27Though marginal rates did rise under the New Deal, before the Second World War they did so more as
a populist gesture than a serious tax reform; the Revenue Act of 1935 set a 75 percent top marginal rate on
incomes over $5 million dollars, a tax bracket believed to have applied solely to John D. Rockefeller. In
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With the benefit of longer historical perspective, there is no reason to believe charita-
ble contributions are permanently anchored to two percent of GDP. Rather, the stability of
charitable giving over the postwar period is consistent with a general decline in tax incen-
tives for charitable giving happening concurrently with an increase in the top households’
share of income. If the charitable contribution for upper-income households were to be
curtailed by a future tax reform, it is entirely possible that charitable giving would fall.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that reducing upper-income households’ charita-
ble contribution tax incentive is not a “free lunch.” Charitable contribution receipts are
sensitive to the tax subsidy for individual income taxes; this sensitivity is driven by the
very high-income households that tax reformers have recently proposed targeting. The size
of the eect is remarkable in light of the consensus from the related literature on individ-
ual donors that finds a less sensitive elasticity of charitable contributions. However, the
discrepancy is explicable because I am estimating a dierent eect — the response of do-
nations, not donors — and those who give the most tend to be the most tax-sensitive. My
estimates imply that the tax cost of a charitable donation matters a great deal, at least for
some donors and some charities.
That these charities appear to be more tax-sensitive than household donations overall
limits the external validity of these findings to the charitable sector as a whole, but it also
implies that a focus on the average donor response ignores heterogeneous eects of changes
to charitable tax incentives across donors and across charities. Upper-income households’
contributions to particular charitable sectors are quite tax-sensitive. Proposed tax reforms
that undermine these incentives could have large eects on provision of these services. As
policymakers consider tax reforms, they should consider both the higher responsiveness
to these incentives of upper-income households, and whether the charities most likely to
contrast, filers at the 99th percentile of income from 1932 to 1939 (ranging from about $74,000 to $138,000
in 2012 dollars) faced marginal rates of 10 to 15 percent. Marginal rates at the 99th percentile of income
ranged from 39 to 62 percent, however, during the war (Piketty and Saez 2003; Tax Foundation 2013).
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be harmed by a change in tax incentives — rather than contributions in the aggregate —
are worth the costs of the foregone tax revenue. Instead of raising revenue by limiting
the existing deduction, legislators might prefer to consider narrowing eligibility for the
deduction to sectors where the incentive has the largest eect.
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CHAPTER 3
On Nonprofits’ Uses of Charitable Contributions
Chapter 2 explored the relationship between the charitable contribution tax deduction
and donation revenue. An equally important question, however, is how the flow of do-
nations aects the provision of charitable services. Donors and policymakers should not
really care about the after-tax cost of giving charity money but the total cost of creating
charitable goods, including the share of donations the charity spends on ends other than
its mission as well as the donor’s tax subsidy (see discussion in Weisbrod and Dominguez
1986).
For example, charities vary substantially in the share of revenues spent on overhead.
Figure 3.1 plots the share of all expenditures going to a charity’s tax exempt purpose for
charities observed in the IRS Statistics of Income or Core Files data sets in 2007 (the
most recent year available). While program expenditures are by far the largest cost for
most charities, a substantial minority spend much of their funds on other things. Charity
watchdog groups like Charity Navigator and GiveWell.org rate charities based in part on
their average propensity to spend contributions on their missions because such behavior is
so prevalent. Charity Navigator automatically assigns groups whose programs account for
less than one-third of expenditures its worst rating.1
1See Charity Navigator, “Financial Ratings Tables”: http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.
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Figure 3.1: Share of Expenditures Spent on Programs, 2007
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Notes: Graph plots distribution of charities by share of expenses spent on their tax-exempt purpose in 2007,
measured as the ratio of program expenditures to total expenditures.
Source: 343,485 charities observed in year 2007 in the IRS Statistics of Income or Core Files data from form
990 with non-missing, non-negative program expenditures and total expenditures observed.
Such ratings, of course, look at the use of the average dollar; it may well be that these
high-overhead charities actually spend the marginal donation almost entirely on programs.
Alternatively, charities may see their charitable goals as largely met beyond some level, and
spend any additional gifts on employee perquisites. Charties can also save surplus contri-
butions for future years, or reduce their eort pursuing other revenue sources — Andreoni
and Payne (2011) for instance find that charities receiving large government grants exhibit
donor “crowd-out” largely due to reduced fundraising by the charity. These charities might
respond to a large gift by investing less eort applying for government grants. Because
cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=48, accessed March 23 2014.
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the relationship between contributions received and program expenditures is unknown, is
unclear how much charitable giving increases services actually provided.
This chapter will consider charities’ response to changes in contributions to draw in-
ferences about the ultimate eect of the charitable contribution deduction on the provision
of charitable services. Form 990 data reveals that charities tend to save their direct con-
tributions — their second-largest revenue source — rather than spend them on programs
immediately. This diers substantially from program service revenue — charities’ largest
revenue source — which is overwhelmingly spent on provision of services.2 It seems cu-
rious that changes in one revenue source would be associated with a completely dierent
pattern of behavior than another, since money is fungible. Yet it is also true that charitable
contributions are less predictable than service revenues, with occasional large gifts mak-
ing total receipts change substantially from one year to the next. Charities save to smooth
contribution revenues over time.
The implied result of this behavior following a reduction in tax incentives for giving is
not an abrupt fall in charity service provision, but rather a gradual decline as savings and ex-
penditures drift toward a lower equilibrium. I exploit variation across states in the change in
incentives to give following the 1986 tax reform to explore how charities’ program spend-
ing and other financial choices respond to a change in the donative environment. I use the
same empirical strategy as in chapter 2 to demonstrate that in states where the combined
federal and state tax subsidy for charitable contributions fell more sharply following the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), there indeed is no immediate dierence in program
expenditures. Instead, there is a gradual widening in net assets and program expenditures
across charities by size of the tax change, peaking five to fifteen years after the tax reform.
2Program service revenue is an umbrella term for any income from provision of the charity’s tax-exempt
purpose. Examples include college tuition, billing for medical expenses, or charges for museum admission.
It does not include revenue from provision of services unrelated to the charity’s core mission, which is in
theory taxable as “unrelated business income,” although the boundary between exempt and unrelated income
is not well-defined.
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3.1 Charitable Contributions as Uncertain Revenues
I begin by establishing an fact about the funding environment for charities: voluntary
contributions are charities’ second largest source of income, yet they are are more volatile
than other income sources. This is not a function of changing fundraising intensity over
time, but because of factors beyond charities’ control.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics and simple autocorrelation results for a panel of
charities’ revenue sources. I estimate a regression of the form
Ri;t = i + Ri;t 1 + "i;t (3.1)
where R is a particular revenue source for charity i in period t, i is a charity fixed eect, and
" is a residual. Table 3.1 reports demeaned autocorrelation coecient  and the R-squared
for each of these simple regressions. Knowing charitable contributions in a particular year
is a weaker predictor of next year’s contributions than any of five other important revenue
items are for the corresponding item; the R-squareds for indirect contributions (that is, from
other charities and foundations), government grants, program service revenue, investment
income, and memberships range from 0.75 (for indirect contributions) to 0.99 (for program
service revenue), compared to just 0.71 for direct contributions.
Charitable contributions are not exogenous — many charities invest considerable eort
and resources into fundraising, and the “power of the ask” is an important determinant
of charitable giving (Andreoni and Rao 2011).3 Table 3.1 does not indicate whether it is
fundraising intensity (which charities can control), or giving habits (which they cannot),
3The psychological power of a charitable solicitation is such that in field experiments, informed subjects
will avoid solicitors rather than pay the financial cost of a donation or the mental cost of refusal (DellaVigna
et al. 2012; Andreoni et al. 2011). Professional fundraisers, too, place particular emphasis on the act of
asking, to the point of teaching that “[s]uccess in fundraising is defined by how many people you ask, not
how much money you raise,” (Klein 2009, p. 116); at least one book, Axelrod (2004, chap. 16), capitalizes
“the Ask.”
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Table 3.1: Year-to-year Volatility of Charities’ Revenues and Fundraising
Revenue Source Mean
Standard
Deviation
Share of
Total
Income
Coe. R2
Program Service
Revenue 49.5
248.6 75.4% 1.06 0.99
Direct Contributions 5.0 27.9 7.6% 0.87 0.71
Government Grants 3.1 31.9 4.7% 1.02 0.96
Investment Income 2.9 58.1 4.4% 1.05 0.98
Indirect Contributions 0.9 25.3 1.4% 1.10 0.75
Dues and Memberships 0.4 9.7 0.6% 0.93 0.89
Other Income 3.8 40.4 5.8% 0.82 0.60
Total Income 65.6 297.8 100% 1.05 0.98
Fundraising
Expenditure 0.5
2.9 0.8% 1.02 0.95
Direct Contributions /
Lagged Fundraising 88.8
3984.1 0.03 0.00
Direct Contributions /
Current Fundraising 73.9
2301.9 0.19 0.04
Notes: Mean and standard deviations are for 248,774 complete observations in 1982, 1983, and 1985–2007.
Coecient and R-squared are for a regression of each variable on its lagged value for the same charity. See
specification described in equation 3.1.
Sources: National Center for Charitable Statistics, IRS Statistics of Income and 990 Core Files.
that causes contributions to fluctuate from year to year.
Though fundraising increases expected contributions, it does not follow that contribu-
tion revenues are predictable for charities. Figure 3.2 charts the distribution of charities’
return on fundraising expenditures. Following Okten and Weisbrod (2000), this is calcu-
lated as the ratio of the current year’s direct contributions to the previous year’s fundraising
expenditure.4 Consistent with Andreoni and Payne’s (2011) findings, the modal return on
fundraising is over five-to-one. However, many fundraising campaigns do significantly
worse: 5.4 percent of observations report less in contributions than was spent on fundrais-
4A ratio of current-year contributions to current-year fundraising expenditure obtains a similar distribu-
tion.
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ing, that is, they lost money. Furthermore, while most of the distribution is log-hump-
shaped, there is a spike in the distribution just over a one-to-one ratio, suggesting charities
or professional fundraisers may put forth additional eort or manipulate financial reporting
in order to disguise a fundraising campaign’s failure to cover its own expenses.5
Figure 3.2: Ratio of Contribution Revenue to Fundraising Expenditure
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Notes: Plot is a histogram of ratios of current year direct charitable contributions to previous year’s fundrais-
ing expenditure. Values plotted are for 80,570 observations with strictly positive and observed values for
contributions and for lagged fundraising, less 982 observations with ratios below 0.2 and 3,420 with ratios
above 100, which are suppressed for better visibility.
Sources: National Center for Charitable Statistics, IRS Statistics of Income.
This variability in the return on fundraising is not a function of some charities be-
5This distribution also mismeasures the return to fundraising by attributing all contributions to the current
year and to paid fundraising. A large share of charities — 33.6 percent of non-missing observations — report
strictly positive contributions in years where the current and prior year’s fundraising expenditure was zero.
A significant share of contributions are likely to come not from formal fundraising campaigns but charity
ocers soliciting potential large donors without a formal expenditure. Thus 5.4 percent of observations have
a contribution/fundraising expense ratio over 100, which is unlikely to be strictly an outcome of a fundraising
campaign.
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ing naturally better at solicitation than others. In addition to revenue variables, table 3.1
presents autocorrelation regression results for fundraising expenditure and for the ratio of
contributions to fundraising. Fundraising expenditure is highly autocorrelated for particular
nonprofits, with an R2 of 0.95, but the ratio of direct contributions to fundraising expendi-
ture is not, with regression of this fundraising ratio on its lag explaining less than half of
one percent of variation.
The volatility of contributions is important for interpreting what charities do with re-
sources at the margin. If charities adjust their total expenditures in response to current
revenues each period, then we can simply see whether fluctuations in giving shift program
expenditures, or mostly aect other expenditures. However, if charities prefer to smooth
their expenditures over time — perhaps because adjustments to program service capac-
ity over time are costly, or perhaps for other reasons (e.g. risk-averse trustees) — then
it is reasonable for charities to smooth unpredictable revenues using their endowments.
If charities are expenditure-smoothing, it is possible that changes to the environment for
charitable contributions will not aect program expenditures with a lag, as charities draw
down their endowments to ensure a “soft landing.” The following section will demonstrate
that in the raw data, changes in contributions are associated with changes in saving, not
changes in program expenditures, in contradistinction with program service revenues and
other sources of income. Discussion of charities’ propensity to adjust program expenditures
will therefore need to pay attention to how any eects change over time.
3.2 Do Charitable Contributions Increase Program Expenditures?
The previous section established a pattern in charities’ income statements: contribution
revenues are volatile, and not because of patterns in fundraising. This section establishes a
second fact, this time about patterns in charities’ balance sheets: charities save increases in
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charitable contributions rather than spend them, whereas increases in revenue from other
sources tend to be spent on program expenditures, not saved.
Figure 3.3 plots the change in dollars in two possible uses of charities’ revenues —
program expenditures and savings (measured by change in net assets) against changes in
revenue from program services or from direct charitable contributions.6 The most extreme
one percent at the top and bottom for either variable are not plotted to make the core of
the distribution more visible. A black line through each plot shows the least-squares fit
through the distribution. Because the scales of the axes and the number of organizations
with complete observations change across panels, the slope of the linear fit and the number
of observations is printed in the top left corner of each plot. Each observation is the change
for one organization in one pair of consecutive periods; if an organization is observed over
20 consecutive years, it appears in the plot 19 times.
The first four panels of figure 3.3 reveal a distinction between the uses of program ser-
vice revenue and of direct contributions. A one-dollar increase in program service revenue
is associated with an increase of $0.74 in program expenditures (figure 3.3A), but only
$0.06 in flows to net assets (figure 3.3B). In contrast, an extra dollar in direct contributions
is associated with just $0.15 in additional program expenditures (figure 3.3C), but an addi-
tional $0.73 in flows to net assets (figure 3.3D). This relationship is not solely a function
of expanding program capacity increasing revenues and expenditures at the same time: ad-
ditional panels show that charities tend to increase program expenditures by $0.74 for a
one-dollar increase in government grants (figure 3.3E), by $0.51 for a one-dollar increase
in grants from foundations or other public charities, such as United Ways (figure 3.3F), and
by $0.54 for a one-dollar increase in revenue from investments (figure 3.3G). Direct chari-
table contributions are unique in having a weak relationship between program expenditures
6“Net assets” or “total fund balances” is the dierence between the book value of a nonprofit’s assets
and its liabilities. This dierence on a for-profit balance sheet is called “shareholder equity,” but of course
nonprofits have no shareholders.
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Figure 3.3: Changes in Expenditures vs. Changes in Revenues (Outliers Censored)
A. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (Outliers Censored)
B. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (Outliers
Censored)
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Figure 3.3 — Continued
C. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Direct Contributions (Outliers Censored)
D. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Direct Contributions (Outliers Censored)
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Figure 3.3 — Continued
E. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Government Grants (Outliers Censored)
F. Change in Flows to Program Expenditures vs. Change in Indirect Contributions (Outliers Cen-
sored)
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Figure 3.3 — Continued
G. Change in Flows to Program Expenditures vs. Change in Investment Income (Outliers Censored)
Notes: All variables are dierenced across consecutive observation periods for one of four financial flows
taken from the IRS form 990, adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. All variables are in year
2012 dollars. Program expenditures, direct contributions, and program service revenue are all as reported.
Flows to Fund Balances is calculated by taking the dierence between the charity’s net assets or total fund
balances (akin to shareholder equity of a for-profit firm) at the beginning and the end of the fiscal year; both
values are reported on each form 990. The black line represents a least-squares fit through the plotted points.
The slope of the fitted line is printed in the top left corner of the plot. Any observation in the top or bottom
one percent of observed values for either change in flow variable is omitted. See appendix figure B.1 for the
same charts with outliers retained, and appendix figure B.2 for plots normalized to organizations’ means.
Sources: National Center for Charitable Statistics, IRS Statistics of Income and 990 Core Files.
and revenue flows.7
The relationships between program expenditures, saving, program revenue, and contri-
butions is investigated more carefully in table 3.2, which presents regression results from a
7The panels of figure 3.3 trim the top and bottom one percent of both variables for ease of viewing, which
does not change the results; appendix figure B.1 leaves extreme values in without changing the observed
relationships. One may also be concerned that, by leaving changes denominated in dollars, this result is
driven by large organizations that are likeliest to have large changes to their financial variables in dollar
terms; appendix figure B.2 plots changes in variables in terms of standard deviations from the mean of each
organization, without a qualitatively dierent finding.
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regression of the form
Yi;t = i + Ri;t + "it (3.2)
where Yi;t is a the change in flow variable for a use of charitable funds (program expen-
ditures or change in net assets) for charity i from period t   1 to t; Ri;t is the change in
vector of revenue sources R for charity i from period t   1 to t, i is a fixed eect for
organization i, implemented by demeaning all regression variables, and "it is a residual.
Vector of revenues R includes all the major revenue streams of charities, allowing analysis
of the relationship between any one revenue source and program expenditures and savings
holding other revenues constant.
Because there are a few extreme values in most change variables, results are computed
using both ordinary least squares and “robust regression,” which places less weight on
very influential observations.8 Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
presented for the OLS results, bootstrapped standard errors for the robust regrssions. As
in figure 3.3, both the dependent variable and independent variable of interest are in real
dollars, and the coecient of interest can be interpreted as the change in dollars for a
particular expenditure item associated with a one-dollar change in a particular revenue
source.
Consistent with figures 3.3B and 3.3A, a dollar increase in program service revenue is
associated with an increase of 0.89 dollars in program expenditures (0.79 dollars if out-
liers are downweighted), but the change in organizations’ balance sheets is tiny: negative
and statistically insignificant under OLS, 0.06 dollars saved per dollar of program service
revenue with reweighting. Conversely, a dollar change in contribution revenue is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.28 dollars of program expenditure and 0.67 dollars of increases
8Robust regression is implemented using the rreg Stata function, which iteratively downweights obser-
vations with residuals beyond a fixed value proportionally to the inverse of the residual; default reweighting
parameters are used.
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Table 3.2: Changes in Expenditures vs. Changes in Revenues
 Program Expenditures  Flows to Fund Balances
OLS Robust Reg. OLS Robust Reg.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Program 0.893 0.786 -0.044 0.064
Service Revenue (0.025) (0.017) (0.195) (0.011)
 Direct 0.276 0.003 0.656 0.962
Contrib. (0.089) (0.002) (0.10) (0.009)
 Indirect 0.094 0.007 0.822 0.915
Contrib. (0.028) (0.010) (0.206) (0.054)
 Government 0.729 0.701 0.168 0.168
Grants (0.046) (0.030) (0.144) (0.036)
 Investment 0.067 0.012 -1.366 0.904
Income (0.120) (0.007) (1.694) (0.070)
 Dues and 0.853 0.764 -0.393 0.070
Memberships (0.047) (0.049) (0.470) (0.019)
 Other 0.049 -0.001 1.128 0.883
Income (0.014) (0.003) (0.214) (0.028)
Constant 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.081
(0.033) (0.002) (0.204) (0.004)
Observations 248774 248747 248774 248753
R-squared 0.652 0.998 0.104 0.997
Organization Fixed
Eects
Y Y Y Y
Notes: All variables are dierenced across consecutive observation periods for one of four financial flows
taken from the IRS form 990, adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. All variables are in year
2012 dollars. Program expenditures, direct contributions, and program service revenue are all as reported.
Flows to Fund Balances is calculated by taking the dierence between the charity’s net assets or total fund
balances (akin to shareholder equity of a for-profit firm) at the beginning and the end of the fiscal year; both
values are reported on each form 990. All observed values are used for all regressions, and number of obser-
vations changes slightly when one variable is not observed or outlier-robust regression assigns zero weight.
Outlier-robust regression is implemented using Stata’s rreg command. Huber-White heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are presented for OLS regressions. Standard errors for outlier-robust regressions are
bootstrapped (100 repetitions).
Sources: National Center for Charitable Statistics, IRS Statistics of Income and 990 Core Files.
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in net assets; if influential observations are downweighted, an increase in contributions is
associated with just 0.003 dollars of program expenditures and 0.96 dollars of net assets.
Consistent with figures 3.3D and 3.3C, changes in contributions are overwhelming associ-
ated with increases in flows to net assets, not in expenditures. The uses of these revenue
sources are very dierent.
The tendency of charities to save one type of revenue while spending the other is strik-
ing — whatever the source, a dollar of one kind of revenue should be just as appropriate for
serving the charities’ mission as any other dollar.9 Not only are contributions more volatile
than other revenues, as shown in section 3.1, they are spend dierently.
3.3 IV Estimates of Contributions’ Eect on Program Expenditures
Chapter 2 documented an abrupt decline in charitable contributions to charities in states
where the TRA86 aected tax incentives more intensely. Using the same sample described
in section 2.3, I get IV (2SLS) estimates of the eect of a change in contributions on
program expenditures using the following.
ln(ProgramExpendituresit) =
i
0 + 1 ln(Contributionsit) + Controls
0
st2 + uit (3.3)
ln(Contributionsit) =i0 + 186 88 ln(TaxCosts(i))  Post86t + Controls0st2 + rit
(3.4)
9One possible exception is if a charity receives a gift restricted by donor wishes to an endowment only,
that is, that is not to be drawn down and spent. However, such a constraint should only aect charities that
cannot shift unrestricted funds. For instance, a wealthy private college which regularly requests donations
from me oers a menu of purposes I would like to designate my contribution toward — e.g. financial aid,
athletics, or performing arts — but the institution has a large general fund that can be reallocated among these
goals. Conti-Brown (2010) notes that over half of large university endowments are comprised of unrestricted
funds, giving these institutions wide leeway to shift resources in response to a restricted gift. The ability to
designate funds for one goal or another is either an expressive act or possibly a fundraiser’s trick, but is not
likely to constrain this college’s budgetary choices.
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where ProgramExpendituresit is the program expenditures of charity i in year t plus $25,000.
Addition of a constant allows the use of the same estimation sample as table 2.2; otherwise,
1.6% of observations with zero program expenditures in a particular year would be dropped
after taking logs. Contributionsit are direct contributions received by the charity in that
period, and instrumental variable 86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)) Post86t is the change in represen-
tative tax cost interacted with a post-period dummy. Organization fixed eects are denoted
i0 and 
i
0. Additional controls X
0
st vary by specification, always including either year fixed
eects or region-by-year fixed eects, as well as a vector of time-varying macroeconomic
variables by state and year in some specifications (including gross state product, unemploy-
ment rate, population, poverty rate, and per capita income). Residuals are denoted uit and
rit. OLS standard errors are clustered by state; 2SLS standard errors are bootstrapped, with
100 replications.
Both OLS estimates of equation 3.3 and corresponding two-stage least-squares IV es-
timates are presented in table 3.3.10 The OLS estimates vary little with the addition of
various sets of control variables, consistently obtaining an elasticity of about 0.016. In the
estimation sample, direct contributions has a mean of $1.08 million (in 2012 dollars) while
program expenditures has a mean of $18.6 million; at the means, an elasticity of 0.016
implies that an additional dollar of contributions is associated with an extra $0.28 in pro-
gram expenditures.11 Even if the true elasticity were at the high end of the 95% confidence
intervals (about 0.03), this still suggests only about half of an extra dollar of contributions
goes to program expenditures.
The IV point estimates are two to ten times larger than the corresponding OLS esti-
mates, although the much larger (bootstrapped) standard errors mean these estimates are
not statistically dierent from the OLS estimates or from zero. Such wide confidence in-
10Table 2.2, which presents regressions of contributions on the tax cost instrument, is equivalent to first-
stage results.
11 18:6
1:08  0:016  0:276
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tervals require cautious interpretation, although the large dierence in magnitude suggests
OLS could be biased downward, suggesting an omitted variable (such as financial distress)
may be correlated with endogenous decisions to increase contribution revenues and lower
program expenditures.
Table 3.3: IV Estimates of Eect of Additional Contributions on Program Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Program Expenditures: Ordinary Least Squares
Log Direct 0.0159** 0.0159** 0.0161** 0.0158**
Contributions (0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0073)
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Log Program Expenditures: Instrumental Variables
Log Direct 0.0387 0.113 0.112 0.157
Contributions (0.210) (0.183) (0.300) (0.221)
F-statistic 46.54 45.04 45.35 43.83
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real expenditures on exempt programs plus $25,000. Contributions is
log of real direct public support. “Macro Controls” are a set of macroeconomic variables observed in each
state and year: log gross state product, log state population, log unemployment rate, log poverty rate, and log
per capita income. See the discussion in section 2.3 for more detail on the construction of these variables.
First-stage results for regression of contributions on instrument for tax cost of giving are equivalent to table
2.2. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. OLS standard errors are clustered by state. IV standard errors are
bootstrapped (100 replications).
Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
Unfortunately, it is not obvious that this IV’s exclusion restriction is satisfied. If the tax
cost of giving aects the productivity of expenditures on fundraising, then the instrument
may also aect program expenditures by leading charities to decrease their fundraising ex-
penditures and spend those marginal dollars on additional programs.12 The “real” equations
12Alternatively, if the charity is liquidity constrained or otherwise dependent on contributions, it might
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of interest may therefore be something like
ln(ProgramExpendituresit) =
i
0 + 1 ln(Contributionsit) + 2 ln(Fundraisingit) + Controls
0
st3 + uit
ln(Contributionsit) =i0 + 1 ln(TaxCostit) + 2 ln(Fundraisingit) + Controls
0
st3 + rit
ln(Fundraisingit) =
i
0 + 1 ln(TaxCostit) + Controls
0
st3 + it
This system is not identified with a single instrument for TaxCost, but may be estimable
using an additional instrument for fundraising expenditure. Andreoni and Payne (2011) in-
strument for fundraising expense using measures of charities’ “financial security.” This
approach may be promising, although its validity depends on donor perceptions of chari-
ties’ financial stability either being unrelated to their giving decisions or varying little over
time (and thus absorbed into fixed eects). Further investigation is necessary to determine
whether Andreoni and Payne’s strategy is appropriate for this estimation, or whether an-
other instrument for fundraising is available.
Instead, I return to the methodology employed in section 2.4, which looks at time-
varying associations between the change in tax cost of giving and direct contributions.
If we similarly look for such associations between program expenditures and tax cost,
we can take such estimates as the total eect of tax reform through all causal channels.
This approach will also allow us to see whether charities smooth a post-1986 shortfall in
contributions using their endowments, leading to dierent short- and long-term eects of
tax reform on program expenditures.
fundraise more and spend less on programs.
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3.4 The Long-Run Impact of Tax Reform on Charities’ Finances
The previous sections established that there is not a clear link between additional di-
rect contributions and program expenditures. However, to the extent that contributions are
endogenous, this failure to find a correlation may be spurious. I will now look for causal
eects of the charitable contribution deduction on other elements of nonprofits’ finances,
using the same time-varying continuous-treatment dierence-in-dierence framework of
section 2.4. Specifically, I use a regression specification similar to equation 2.3:
Y it = i + t + X0st +
X
t(86 88
t21982;‘83;‘86;‘87;:::;2007
TaxCosts(i))  1fyear = tg + "it (3.5)
where Yit is a logged dependent variable from the form 990 of organization i in year t;
86 88 ln(TaxCosts(i)) is the change in the log mean tax price of giving (1–) from 1986 to
1988 in state s; 1fyear = tg is equal to 1 if y = t and 0 if y , t; t is a year eect; and i
is an organization fixed eect. All regressions use, to the greatest extent possible, the same
sample as the regressions in figure 2.6, described in section 2.3.13
The coecients of interest are t, which capture the change in variable Y in year t
caused by the change in charitable contribution tax incentives following the TRA86, rela-
tive to the dierence across states in 1985 (the year before the bill became law and its terms
known). As discussed in section 2.4, we should expect 1982 and 1983 to be zero. However,
we should not necessarily expect t to be nonzero immediately following the tax reform,
if the financial variable of interest responds to tax reform with a lag. Point estimates for
each regression are presented graphically in the panels of figure 3.4. Dashed lines repre-
sent pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals, clustered by US state. Appendix table B.2
presents these point estimates and clustered standard errors as text.
13Appendix B presents results for alternative samples of form 990 data and for additional dependent vari-
ables, as well as tabulating point estimates and standard errors for results which are here presented graphically.
87
Figure 3.4A plots estimates of year-varying treatment eects on the log of program
expenditures. As with other variables, and consistent with the finding that stock of assets is
the pathway for contributions’ eect on program expenditures, organizations’ spending on
exempt purposes declines slowly but steadily for years, reaching its greatest extent in 1997,
ten years after TRA86 passed into law. In that year the time-varying elasticity is estimated
to be -4.1 to -4.5, which translates into an interquartile dierence in program expenditures
of 10 to 11 percent.
This is a substantial eect. In 1997, program expenditures by all public charities filing
the form 990 exceeded $571 billion in real (2012) dollars (Internal Revenue Service 2011a).
Even if we conclude that elasticity estimates for the sample may not be representative of
the nonprofit sector as a whole (see the discussion in section 2.6), even a one percent dier-
ence in program expenditures in this period is equal to 5.7 billion real dollars, an amount
roughly equal in size to the entire 1997 federal appropriation for the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (S-CHIP).14 Furthermore, the time-varying estimates presented in fig-
ure 3.4A reveal an increasing pretrend in states with the more intense treatment, suggesting
that these estimates may be too small if they are confounded by a countervailing trend.
And yet, the immediate eect on program expenditures is smaller. Estimates for time-
varying elasticities across the four sets of covariates in years 1988 to 1990 range from -0.9
to -1.6, or one-third to one-quarter the magnitudes observed in 1997. Taking the elasticities
for 1996 to be the “long run,” the estimates shown in figures 2.6 and 3.4 imply a long-run
elasticity of program expenditures of approximately 0.6; at the means for this period, this
means that for every dollar in contributions unobserved because of the tax change, about
seven dollars in program expenditures is unobserved.15 Obviously, a greater than one-to-
14105th Congress Public Law 33, “Balanced Budget Act of 1997,” x2104. The law appropriated $4.275
billion for fiscal 1998, or $6.085 in 2012 dollars, adjusted using December values of the CPI. http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ33/html/PLAW-105publ33.htm.
15Calculated using the elasticities presented in appendix table B.2 for year 1996: "Programs;Contributions =
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one ratio cannot be supported by a direct reduction in contribution spending. Instead, this
may mean that the saving behavior noted for charitable contributions is used to expand
the capacity for future program expenditures. Such an interpretation is consistent with
observing a smaller eect in the short run: in 1989, a year after the full phase-in of the
TRA86, the equivalent ratio of elasticities is about 0.2, corresponding to a ratio of 2.4
dollars in program expenditures per dollar of contributions. 16 Still, this short-run ratio is
greater than 1, implying that more than the direct spending of contributions on programs
may be involved.
One complication for such an interpretation of the relative magnitudes is the evolution
of the coecients across states before the tax change. Unlike the time-varying coe-
cients for contributions presented in figure 2.6, there is a clear positive pretrend in the
time-varying estimates of program expenditures. If we interpret this to mean that program
expenditures were rising before 1986 for some reason correlated with, but independent of,
the tax reform, then this implies that these estimates underestimate the eect on program
expenditures! On the other hand, if there organizations in more heavily treated states co-
incidentally happened to increase their expenditures in the years leading up to the change
— and would have backed o in the following years anyhow — then the eect of TRA86
on expenditures is overstated. In the absence of further evidence these results should be
interpreted cautiously.
Next, we look at how the stock of net assets evolves in response to dierential changes
"Programs;1 ="Contributions;1  =  2:838  1 4:530  0:626, that is,
d lnPrograms
d lnContributions
=
d lnPrograms
d ln 1 
d lnContributions
d ln 1 
In 1996, mean values within the sample of direct contributions and program expenditures were $5.3 million
and $64.8 million, respectively, in 2012 dollars, a ratio of 12.2 dollars of program expenditures for every
dollar of contributions.
16  1:074
 5:331  0:201. The within-sample ratio of program expenditures to contributions is also about 12 in
1989.
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Figure 3.4: Year-varying Tax Price Elasticities of Nonprofit Financial Variables
A. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log Program Expenditures
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B. Tax Elasticities by Year, Net Assets (Log-level)
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Figure 3.4 — Continued
C. Tax Elasticities by Year, Fundraising (Extensive Margin)
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D. Tax Elasticities by Year, Fundraising Expenditure (Log + $10,000)
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Notes: Figures present coecients for year-varying eects of 1986 tax rate changes on nonprofit financial
variables: log of net assets or total fund balances (A), a binary variable equal to 1 if a charity had strictly
positive fundraising and zero if zero fundraising (B), log of fundraising expenditure plus $10,000 (C), and
log of program expenditures (D). Point estimates for four dierent specifications with and without state-year
macroeconomic variables and region-by-year eects are presented. Dashed lines represent 95% pointwise
confidence intervals, clustered by US state. See sections 2.3 and 2.4 for a description of the sample selection.
Sources: NCCS Statistics of Income and Core Files 990 Data.
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in the contribution deduction. Graphical evidence in section 3.1 suggested that charities
save rather than spend contribution revenues. Following the large and rapid decline in
contributions caused by the 1986 tax reform (see section 2.3), we might see charities draw
down their savings to dampen the shock. On the other hand, in the short run charities
might save more in response to the reduced appeal of fundraising. Figure 3.4B plots the
relationship between state-level variation in the TRA86 treatment eect on end-of-year net
assets, measured by time-varying treatment coecients t.
Since net assets is a stock, rather than a flow, one would not expect to see a discontinu-
ous drop after 1986, and the estimates do not show one. Instead, the gap among the states
by treatment intensity widens each year (t declines) for over ten years following the law.
Consistent with the observation in the raw data, organizations receiving lower contributions
see their financial position grow more slowly (or shrink faster) than less aected charities.
The estimated dierence reaches its largest magnitude of -3.7 to -4.4, varying by the set
of controls, in 1999. To give this number some perspective, the interquartile range in the
log tax change is about 0.025, meaning that an elasticity of -3.7 implies a gap of about 9.2
percent in charities’ net assets across the interquartile range by 1999.17
Lastly, as noted in the preceding section, we may be concerned that charities change
their fundraising intensity strategically if changes in tax incentives reduce the return on
fundraising. Analysis of fundraising behavior is complicated by the high share of charities
which, though they receive direct contributions, do not spend money on fundraising: of the
81,264 observations meeting all other sample selection criteria, 78,201 have nonmissing
observations for log net assets, and 68,110 have nonmissing observations for log of direct
contributions.18 In contrast, barely more than half of all observations, 41,152, have values
17One-quarter of organizations observed in 1986 have a log tax change in the tax cost of a charitable
contribution greater than or equal to California’s (0.1981); one-quarter have a change less than or equal to
Kentucky’s (0.1734). The dierence between these percentiles is about 0.025 log-points.
18All 3,063 missing observations for log net assets are undefined because net assets was a nonpositive
number. For direct contributions, 5,439 reported a nonpositive number, while 7,715 did not report direct
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for log of fundraising expenditure.19 Because the decision whether or not to engage in
fundraising at all may be important, I present two more sets of results, one focused on the
extensive margin, the second adding a constant before taking logs to avoid composition
errors.
Figure 3.4C presents estimates for linear probability model regressions with a depen-
dent variable equal to 1 if the organization i reported positive fundraising expenditure in
year t, and zero if it reported zero expenditure. Relative to the pre-period, the likelihood
that an organization chose to spend money fundraising falls in the years after the TRA86,
stabilizing about five years later. Over 1992 to 1999, year-varying coecients across the
four models range from -1.6 to -0.8; across the interquartile range of state treatment vari-
ables, this suggests a dierential of two to four percentage points in the change in likelihood
of engaging in paid fundraising.
Figure 3.4D presents the regression results for the entire sample where the dependent
variable is the log of $10,000 plus total fundraising expenditure. As discussed in section
2.5, the addition of $1 or $10 before taking logs, as is common in the individual tax litera-
ture, is inappropriate for the larger dollar amounts handled by nonprofit organizations, and
so a bigger additive constant is used.20 Consistent with the results in figure 3.4C, the pooled
data also show a decrease in fundraising for organizations in states with a greater treatment
eect. Point estimates in the years following TRA86 for both fundraising specifications
are statistically dierent from 1985 but generally not 1982 or 1983; in the absence of a
longer pre-period or other evidence, it is ambiguous whether the fundraising response is
understated by a pre-trend associated with the size of the following tax change, or whether
1985–6 is an unusual period and fundraising activity reverts to an earlier, stable level.
contributions, largely because they were drawn from the IRS Core files (which do not report that variable).
1939,965 reported nonpositive fundraising expenditures, while 147 reported a missing value.
20For example, the first percentile of strictly positive fundraising expenditure observed is $2,542; the dif-
ference between the log of 2552 and 10 is greater than the log dierence between 2552 and the median
($533,367). Regressions with additive constants, and constant samples, are presented in appendix B.
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3.5 Discussion
This chapter has established a new stylized fact about the behavior of nonprofits —
that contributions are associated with greater saving, while program revenues are associ-
ated with greater program expenditures. This observation may signify that charities smooth
their program expenditures across time, as contributions are charities’ most unpredictable
revenue streams. If charities are expenditure-smoothers, it follows that a reduction in char-
itable contributions following a tax cut may not immediately translate into a reduction in
program expenditures. An attempt to measure the eect of the TRA86 on program ex-
penditures via its eect on charitable contributions using two-stage least squares yielded
estimates too imprecise to be definitive.
Using the same estimation strategy as section 2.4, I show that the Tax Reform Act of
1986 did not immediately aect program expenditures, but rather diminished them with
a ten-year lag, though a surprising pretrend in the data before 1986 suggests these results
should be interpreted cautiously. The fundraising of charities in more strongly treated
states did decline after 1986, but the eect was primarily observed on the extensive mar-
gin as more intensively treated organizations were less likely to engage in paid fundraising
following the reform. These lagged eects have implications for future reforms to the char-
itable contribution deduction and the level of service provision. Because charities respond
to changes in the giving environment by at least partially smoothing using their endow-
ments, tax incentives for voluntary contributions are likely to be an ineective vehicle for
changing the level of services provided by a large amount, quickly. Further research on
this question should consider not only changes in donation behaviors by the dynamics of
service provision implied by policy changes.
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CHAPTER 4
How Johnson Fought the War on Poverty:
The Politics and Economics of Funding at the Oce of
Economic Opportunity1
In his first State of the Union address in January 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson
asked Congress to declare an “unconditional war on poverty” and to aim “not only to re-
lieve the symptom of poverty, but to cure it and, above all, to prevent it” (1965). Over the
next five years, Congress passed legislation that transformed American schools, launched
Medicare and Medicaid, and expanded housing subsidies, urban development programs,
employment and training programs, food stamps, and Social Security and welfare benefits.
These programs more than tripled real federal expenditures on health, education, and wel-
fare, which grew to over 15 percent of the federal budget by 1970 (Ginzberg and Solow
1974).
Using the volumes of oral histories, taped conversations, and archival documents, his-
torians have pieced together competing (but not mutually exclusive) narratives of this
1This chapter is adapted from Martha Bailey and Nicolas Duquette, “How Johnson Fought the War on
Poverty: The Politics and Economics of Funding at the Oce of Economic Opportunity,” Journal of Eco-
nomic History 74(1):351–88, June 2014. A preprint version of this paper is also available as NBER Working
Paper #19860. Appendices C and D are taken from the corresponding online appendices of Bailey and Du-
quette (2014).
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decade’s political economy (Levitan 1969; Ginzberg and Solow 1974; Gettleman and Mer-
melstein 1966; Caro 2012, 2002, 1982; Gillette 1996; Davies 1996; O’Connor 2001; Ger-
many 2007; Orleck and Hazirjian 2011). Economic historians attribute the policy shift in
the 1960s to a long-term decline in Southern planters’ demand for cheap agricultural work-
ers and accompanying decline in plantation paternalism (Alston and Ferrie 1999, 1993).
Relative to the large literature that examines the political economy of the New Deal, little
quantitative research has considered the political economy of the War on Poverty: how
and why it evolved from the small-scale, academic brainchild of the Council of Economic
Advisors to a controversial and enduring legacy of the Johnson presidency.2
This paper contributes a novel quantitative description to the vast narrative, documen-
tary, and oral history of the 1960s political economy. We analyze how the War on Poverty
was fought through the lens of the legislation that came to define it: the 1964 Economic
Opportunity Act (EOA).3 This centerpiece legislation created the Oce of Economic Op-
portunity (OEO) to coordinate federal antipoverty initiatives and empower the poor to trans-
form their own communities. The EOA also contained two radical provisions that facilitate
our analysis. First, the EOA apportioned funding across states according to an index, but
it imposed no requirements on how and where to spend money within states. Second, the
EOA enabled the federal government to fund local private and nonprofit organizations di-
rectly, rather than funneling money through state or local governments. This provision
2Many reasons recommend a separate treatment of the two periods. The New Deal was developed in
response to high unemployment and the economic crisis of the Great Depression; Johnson launched the War
on Poverty during a period of widely shared economic prosperity. The New Deal significantly expanded
programs cooperatively administered between the federal and state governments (Fishback and Wallis 2012,
p. 291), whereas the federal government retained the purse strings and discretionary power for many of the
War on Poverty programs. Finally, the New Deal built on and expanded many existing national programs
(public infrastructure, benefits to veterans, agricultural assistance, and emergency loans for farmers) and
significantly expanded unemployment relief—programs that benefited the average American and median
voter. In contrast, the War on Poverty made longer-term investments with less tangible eects for smaller
subgroups. See Fishback et al. (2003) and Fleck (2008).
3Public Law 88-452, 78 Stat. 2642 and amendments. Public Law 89-794, 80 Stat. and Public Law 90-222,
81 Stat.
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encouraged the development of customized programs to combat the root causes of local
poverty and also allowed the federal government to work around widespread de jure racial
segregation, which had restricted the political participation of African Americans, and de
facto exclusion of the poor from the policy making process. These provisions relaxed many
of the usual constraints on federal funding choices (for example, cooperation with state and
local government ocials). Observed funding choices, therefore, provide a great deal of
information about the objectives of the Johnson administration during this transformative
period of U.S. history.
Our analysis uses data on OEO grants from the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration (NARA), which we link to a variety of other data sources to describe the
decade’s complex political economy. These county-level data include measures of local
demographic characteristics, political importance, local government expenditures and tax
revenue per capita (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1964), riot intensity (Collins and Margo
2007), the escalation of the Vietnam war (casualty rates from U.S. Department of Defense
2008), and the intensity of sharecropping to proxy for Alston and Ferrie’s (1993) pater-
nalism hypothesis. Our quantitative findings show that a modest share of the within-state
spending is explained by this rich set of covariates (5 to 9 percent versus roughly 37 percent
during the New Deal). The variation explained by the model reflects systematic spending in
higher poverty areas. After accounting for a variety of other county-level covariates, the ex-
tent and intensity of poverty significantly predict within-state, county-level CAP spending
from 1964 to 1968 in both the South and the non-South.
An important and often forgotten component of the War on Poverty is its “assault on
[racial] discrimination” (Council of Economic Advisers 1964, p. 56). The OEO moni-
tored compliance with the Civil Rights Act and threatened violators with the withholding
of federal funds. Interestingly, counties’ share of population that was nonwhite in 1960
accounts for the bulk of explained, within-state variation in OEO funding nationally—a
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pattern driven by the non-South. Together, poverty rates and the share nonwhite explain
more of the within-state variation in OEO spending (roughly 30 percent) than do the more
than twenty other covariates combined. In the non-South, these two variables alone account
for over 60 percent of the explained, within-state variation in OEO spending.
Consistent with New Deal funding patterns, political considerations also influenced
where OEO money was spent. We find that the Johnson administration invested in Demo-
cratic strongholds and rewarded areas with bigger swings in favor of the Democrats in the
1964 presidential election. Swing counties received slightly less funding overall, but swing
counties won by Johnson in 1964 received slightly more OEO money ceteris paribus. But,
although politics mattered, political considerations together explain surprisingly little of
the county-level variation in OEO funding. Measures of political considerations explain no
more than 1 percent of the variation in county-level spending at the national level. In short,
the Johnson administration appears to have invested in nonwhite and poor areas rather than
in Democratic strongholds, newly won districts, or the districts of powerful congressper-
sons. Our analysis of voting reinforces the notion that Johnson’s War on Poverty failed to
build a Democratic constituency in the short run. Although turnout increased in areas with
higher spending, a greater share of votes in nonwhite areas went to Republicans. The paper
concludes with a discussion of how these findings inform a better understanding of why the
War on Poverty is remembered as a failure.
4.1 The Enactment and Provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act
Poverty emerged as a new and pressing social issue in the United States in the late
1950s and early 1960s (O’Connor 2001). Bestselling books on the topic, including The
Auent Society by Galbraith (1958) and The Other America byMichael Harrington (1962),
as well as popular journal articles, catapulted the issue into the national consciousness.
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Yet Johnson’s motivations for championing the War on Poverty as the centerpiece of his
domestic agenda have been subject to disagreement among contemporaries and historians.
The facts are straightforward. Johnson inherited a large legislative backlog from the
John F. Kennedy administration. Arthur Schlesinger (1965) argues that Johnson continued
what would have been Kennedy’s poverty agenda. Yet Walter Heller, the chairman of
Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), notes that only days before his Dallas
assassination, Kennedy’s thinking on the matter “had not gone beyond the vague concept of
doing something that would focus specifically on the roots of poverty” (1970, pp. 19-20).
In contrast, Heller recalls Johnson’s unequivocal armation of the poverty program in his
first briefing: “That’s my kind of program. I’ll find money for it one way or another. If
I have to, I’ll take away money from things to get money for people....Give it the highest
priority. Push ahead full tilt” (p. 21). In the seven weeks between Kennedy’s assassination
and Johnson’s State of the Union debut, the “War on Poverty” grew from a small, academic
pilot program of the CEA to a core agenda of Johnson’s presidency. In the next seven
months, the EOA morphed from a draft bill into one of the most controversial pieces of
legislation passed during Johnson’s administration.
The Conception and Promotion of the Economic Opportunity Act
The EOA was the centerpiece of Johnson’s War on Poverty and has been remembered
as “the most dramatic and highly publicized of the Great Society’s programs” (Levitan
1969, p. 3). It established the OEO, a new agency within the executive branch charged
with initiating and coordinating government-wide antipoverty initiatives.
Shortly after Johnson’s State of the Union address, he appointed Sargent Shriver,
Kennedy’s brother-in-law, to head the antipoverty task force. Within six weeks of his ap-
pointment, Shriver claimed that he had consulted with over one hundred dierent leaders
in agriculture, business, labor, and civil rights groups; ocials from various levels of gov-
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ernment; and academics, administrators, and foundation representatives (Levitan 1969, pp.
30–31). Johnson’s insistence that there be “no doles” and Shriver’s commitment to doing
things his way meant that social workers and welfare administrators—the embodiment of
the old school of thought on reducing poverty—were omitted from this list or given little
attention (p. 31). Shriver’s task force drafted the final bill (with no input from Congress)
and sent the draft EOA to Congress on 16 March 1964.
To promote the EOA, President Johnson embarked on a public relations tour. In April he
visited the family of Tom Fletcher, an unemployed coal miner with a wife and eight children
who lived in the hollows of Appalachia outside of Inez, Kentucky. The Fletchers had been
chosen by the White House to become the face of American poverty—the faces of the 35
million Americans (roughly 20 percent of the population) who lived on less than $3,000 per
year, roughly the poverty threshold for a family of four. Johnson is said to have remarked
to a reporter, “I don’t know if I’ll pass a single law or get a single dollar appropriated, but
before I’m through, no community in America will be able to ignore poverty in its midst”
(Jordan and Rostow 1986, p. 16). Indeed, Walter Bennett’s iconic Time Magazine photo
that captured Johnson chatting with the Fletchers on their front porch achieved just that.
The Enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act
The passage of the EOA was swift and decisive. The Senate approved the bill on 23
July 1964 by a vote of 61 to 34 after only two full days of debate, in which a conservative
coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans succeeded in modestly reducing the au-
thority of the OEO director.4 On the House side, though final passage took only a few days,
4The Congressional Quarterly’s Weekly Report states, “In a series of tight roll calls, the Democratic lead-
ership turned back crippling ‘states’ rights’ amendments by Sens. Winston L. Prouty (R. Vt.) and Spessard
L. Holland (D. Fla.)...the final bill included two compromise states’ rights amendments, oered by George
A. Smathers (D. Fla.)...the first, adopted July 22 by voice vote, permitted the Governor of a state to veto the
establishment of a Job Corps camp in his state, within 30 days after being notified of the project. The second,
adopted July 23 by a 80-7 roll call, gave the Governor an identical veto power over all anti-poverty projects
contracted between the Federal Government and a private agency. Contracts with public bodies, such as city
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the process was more contentious. Levitan (1969, p. 40) notes that Republicans found the
EOA hearings “frustrating” because only nine of the 69 primary witnesses opposed the bill.
Moreover, Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY), chairman of the House Edu-
cation and Labor Committee that received the bill, excluded Republicans from raising their
objections in the hearings and from subsequent participation in the EOA’s amendment.
Many congressmen objected to the concentrated power of the OEO director. On 17
March 1964, the first day of hearings before the House’s War on Poverty subcommittee,
Representative Robert Grin (R-MI) asked Shriver,
As much as we all admire your work and believe in your competence. . . I think
we must. . . look at this legislation from the point of view that you may not al-
ways be the chief of sta. . .
In every title of this bill, it provides that the Director shall establish criteria to
achieve an equitable distribution of funds among the States. I see this as handing
to the Director a blank check in terms of deciding how much money the various
states are going to get. . .
Do you have any idea at this time how you are going to distribute the money
among the States? (U.S. House of Representatives 1964a, pp. 70–71).
Shriver sardonically replied that the concentration of power in his oce conveniently
solved the problem of distribution across states by making it easy for Congress to determine
whom to fire if things went badly. Unsatisfied with Shriver’s answer, Representative Peter
Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) announced an alternative antipoverty bill on April 28, the last day of
the hearings. His bill appropriated funds to antipoverty programs created by states (rather
than the OEO) and apportioned funds across the states using an index based on total pop-
ulation, unemployment, and average income (Congressional Record 1964a).5 Democrats
ultimately compromised to include an apportionment index, but not the one Frelinghuysen
proposed.
councils and county committees, were not subject to the Governor’s disapproval” (Congressional Quarterly,
“Senate Passes Johnson’s Anti-Poverty Bill, 61-34,” 23 July 1964, pp. 1533-34).
5Wall Street Journal, “GOP Critic of Johnson’s Drive on Poverty Oers Plan with Lower Federal Outlays,”
29 April 1964, p. 5.
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This compromise was enough to pass the EOA in the House (Gillette 1996, pp.121–
23) On 5 August 1964, the Economic Opportunity Act (H.R. 11377) was introduced to
the House floor with six hours for debate. Northern House Republicans spent much of
their time decrying the power the EOA gave to the OEO director. One such remark in the
Congressional Record was by Republican Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio, who complained,
[T]his attack which we are supposed to be launching upon poverty would en-
able the Director to do as he pleased....There’s actually no requirement that the
Director consult with anyone, other than to find some local agency of some sort,
public or private, which would be willing to go along. If he did not have one
available, he could create one (Congressional Record 1964a).
This was a prescient criticism of the provision that ultimately would give significant power
to Shriver and the Johnson administration to exercise as they saw fit.
Southern Democrats occupied important posts in the House and Senate and had the
power to block legislation—a power they had long exercised to protect the interests of the
Southern elites (Katznelson 2013). They succeeded only in securing modest amendments—
most notably the inclusion of a gubernatorial veto for key programs (x209[c]). Shriver re-
called that Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), a former governor, suggested the veto as
a way to let Southerners support the bill while neither alienating states’ rights supporters
nor “allow[ing] all this money to become bogged down in the state and local government
apparatus, and...frustrated totally by the clique that might be hanging around a particular
governor” (Gillette 1996, pp.129–30).6
6Southern Democrats ultimately voted for passage 60-40 in the House and 11-11 in the Senate (Congres-
sional Quarterly. “Congress Clears Johnson’s Anti-Poverty Bill,” 14 August 1964, p. 1729-30; Congres-
sional Quarterly. “CQ Senate Votes 218 through 223,” 23 July 1964, p. 1567). In practice, the gubernatorial
veto was rarely exercised and, when exercised, was so blatantly political that the gubernatorial veto was
eectively removed only one year later. In the first year of the OEO’s existence, the governors’ veto was
exercised just five times, including one widely publicized case in May 1965 when George Wallace made a
point of blocking a grant to a racially integrated antipoverty program in Birmingham (New York Times, “Wal-
lace Vetoes a Poverty Grant.” 13 May 1965, p. 23; Levitan 1969, p. 62). The 1965 amendments defanged
the gubernatorial veto by allowing the OEO director to override a veto if a grant was “reconsidered by the
Director and found by him to be fully consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes of
[the relevant portions of the EOA].” See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, Public Law 89-253,
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In contrast to state governors, local government had no power in the original EOA.
Even though the U.S. Conference of Mayors and National Association of Counties had en-
dorsed the original EOA with the reservation that funds be channeled through an ocial
local poverty agency, the 1964 bill was never revised in this manner (Levitan 1969, p. 65).
Local government had no direct, statutory power to block EOA spending or designate com-
munity groups until the EOA was later amended. The President’s deftness at influencing
the media—liberal and conservative—ensured that those opposed to the EOA looked like
they were for poverty and against helping the poor. With the election looming in the fall of
1964 and the President’s support surging, the amended 27-page EOA passed the House on
8 August 1964 with a vote of 226 to 185, just three days after it was introduced.7
The Radical Provisions and Financial Stakes of the Economic Opportunity Act
The EOA was an experiment on a grand scale. About half of the EOA’s funding went
to programs with a direct chain of command linking local organizations to Washington,
such as Job Corps, Work-Study, and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA); the other
half went to the Community Action Program (CAP), which funded ideas put forth by local
organizations that were to be customized to the needs of dierent communities.8 The OEO
designated over 1,000 Community Action Agencies (CAAs) between 1965 and 1968 to
coordinate these locally customized antipoverty initiatives.
The CAP was the most novel and idealistic part of the War on Poverty and, unsur-
79 Stat. x16. In short, the OEO director could largely do as the administration pleased after 1965.
7Using newly assembled data on individual roll-call votes in the House and Senate (ICPSR 2010), mea-
sures of Democratic electoral strength (Clubb et al. 2006), and economic and demographic characteristics
(Adler, undated) we find that party identity is the most important determinant of a favorable vote on the
EOA. Southern Democrats were less likely to vote for the EOA than Democrats of other census regions, but
were more likely to cast a favorable vote than Republicans from any region. We find a negative relationship
between a positive EOA vote and share of black population—perhaps a prescient resistance to the imminent
sea change in race politics encouraged by the EOA that would negatively aect Democrats in subsequent
elections. In the House, we also find that unemployment rates were a strong predictor of a positive vote.
8Haddad, William F. “Mr. Shriver and the Politics of Poverty.” Harper’s Magazine, December 1965, pp.
43-50.
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prisingly, the most controversial. “Community action” was vaguely defined as a program
“which provides services, assistance, and other activities to give promise of progress toward
elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty” (x202 a[2], emphasis added). The
EOA also contained three radical provisions about how CAP grants could be made. First,
CAP funds were to be allocated across states according to an apportionment index in the
legislation. States with more of the nation’s poor were supposed to get more funding. But
within states, the OEO had complete discretion to spend its money in “any...geographical
area” (x202 a[1]). Second, funds need not flow through or to state or local governments.
Instead, the EOA authorized the federal government to fund programs “conducted, admin-
istered or coordinated by a public or private nonprofit agency (not a political party)” (x202
a[4]). A final provision noted that CAP programs should be “developed, conducted, and
administered with maximum feasible participation of residents of areas and members of
groups served” (x202 a[3]).9
The combined eect of the EOA’s provisions was to allow Shriver to circumvent state
and local governments, which many believed had failed to alleviate poverty or, worse, been
complicit or instrumental in its persistence. This direct funding mechanism allowed the
federal government to work around de facto exclusion of the poor from designing programs
to address their own poverty and de jure racial segregation that had restricted the political
participation of African Americans.10 CAPs aimed to empower the poor themselves to
9Levitan (1969, pp. 110-11) writes that most of the Johnson administration ocials who testified to
Congress regarding the EOA were naı¨ve about the implications of this clause. Only Robert Kennedy, the
chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, which oversaw an earlier, localized federal
community action program, mentioned the provision of “maximum feasible participation” in his congres-
sional testimony. Kennedy argued that “there certainly should be an opening to deal with local agencies,
private and public, who could get together and come up with a plan or an organization which could handle a
particular function.”
10Strom Thurmond (D-SC) railed against this provision during the debate over the EOA: “Under the in-
nocent sounding title of ‘Community Action Programs,’ the poverty czar would not only have the power to
finance the activities of such organizations as the National Council of Churches, the NAACP, SNCC, and
CORE, but also a SNOOP and a SNORE which are sure to be organized to get their part of the green gravy.”
Thurmond also accused Shriver of having promised the NAACP that he’d use the OEO to promote desegre-
gation (Congressional Quarterly. “CQ Senate Votes 218 through 223,” 23 July 1964, p. 1567). Thurmond
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change their communities—to fight poverty while reforming local social institutions and
undermining entrenched racial segregation (Forget 2011).
These radical provisions would have mattered little had the demands of the OEO been
modest or the financial stakes small. But Johnson’s choice of Sargent Shriver to head the
poverty task force and the EOA’s funding for local organizations made the EOA matter.
Shriver had an impressive record of political eectiveness. According to Murray Kemp-
ton, Shriver could weather the political attacks of Congress by day but “then at night he
will call up some power figure from [the Representative’s] district and the next morning [the
Representative] is unexpectedly slapped on the back of the head.”11 Shriver maintained in-
dependent stang and funding criteria. He also linked OEO funding to compliance with the
1964 Civil Rights Act and interpreted “maximum feasible participation” for CAA boards
more strictly than was popular.
The federal funding at stake was large. From 1965 to 1968, the CAP funds amounted
to a cumulative $2.64 billion (in real 1968 dollars). While small in relation to other fed-
eral expenditures, these funds were large relative to local government spending on related
programs. Average, annual real CAP funding from 1965 to 1968 amounted to over a 25
percent increase relative to the sum of local government welfare expenditures in 1962. Fur-
thermore, public welfare spending was often lower in the poor counties where CAP funds
went. In 791 funded counties, average real CAP grants from 1965 to 1968 more than
doubled 1962 public welfare spending. In addition, CAP grants were made to 83 coun-
ties which in 1962 spent nothing on public welfare (OEO 1965-1968, U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1964).12 Roughly 38 percent of CAP dollars went to Head Start and another 39
would change his party aliation to Republican the following September.
11Kempton, Murray. “The Essential Sargent Shriver.” New Republic, 28 March 1964, p. 13.
12County-level data are created by aggregating data on individual CAP grant actions from NACAP files
to the county-year level. These data contain 162,795 individual grant actions to 4,818 grantee organizations
from 1965 to 1981 (figures for 1969 are lost). They also include information on funding amounts from the
OEO, cost sharing by local governments and other sources, the name and address of the grantee (county, city,
street address, and name of the grantee), and brief descriptions of grants’ intended uses. See appendix C for
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percent went to local initiative programs (Levitan 1969, p. 123). CAP money, therefore,
represented a tremendous increase in funding available for local anti-poverty programs.
The direct financial stakes also understate the broader implications of federal dollars
for communities. In addition to over 18 million people who participated in CAP programs
(equivalent to half of America’s poor), Shriver told Congress in 1965 that “the most im-
portant and exciting thing about the War on Poverty” was “that all America is joining
in...religious groups, professional groups, labor groups, civic and patriot groups are all ral-
lying to the call” (Gettleman and Mermelstein 1966, p. 207).13 Similarly, the New York
Times featured the “group of leaders” in “every city and community” who “believe this job
can be done and who are helping.”14 Importantly, CAP dollars may have crowded in lo-
cal resources from public, private, and nonprofit sources, making the financial stakes even
higher.15
In summary, the EOA allowed tremendous federal discretionary power over a mean-
ingful amount of resources. Our analysis adds to the historical literature on this topic by
quantifying how the administration used this discretion in two steps. First, we investigate
whether the OEO complied with the EOA’s apportionment index, which was added as a
check on the director’s power. Second, we investigate how the OEO spent money within
states, which was not prescribed by legislation. Both shed light on the how the War on
Poverty was fought.
more detail.
13The 18 million figure relies upon summing over all participants recorded in administrative records.
14Reston, James. “The Problem of Pessimism in the Poverty Program.” New York Times, 10 January 1965,
p. E12.
15Much has been written about the controversy surrounding the CAP program, but the vast majority of
CAAs functioned with the support of their communities. When the 1967 EOA amendments required that the
CAAs be designated by state or local governments (and that the OEO director could designate CAAs only in
the event that local governments failed to exercise their authority), 792 of the aected 1,018 state, county, or
city governments exercised their new authority to designate CAAs within the year. Moreover, 97 percent of
these governments elected to continue the existing CAA without change (Levitan 1969, p. 67)—a testament
to the program’s widespread local approval.
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4.2 Was the Index Binding? OEO Funding Decisions at the State
Level
The EOA nominally imposed a constraint on Shriver’s discretion by requiring that the
OEO allocate 78.4 percent of federal CAP funds (what we call “index eligible funds”)
across the 50 states and the District of Columbia using the apportionment index. The index
assigned a share of eligible funds to each state, s, in a fiscal year (FY; July 1 to June 30 in
this period), t, using the following formula,
EOAs;t =
1
3
UEs;t +
1
3
PAs;t +
1
3
PKs;t (4.1)
where UE is the state’s share of the national number of unemployed, PA is the state’s share
of the national public assistance recipients, and PK is the state’s share of poor children
(defined as the number of children in families with household incomes below $1,000).16
For instance, in 1964 Michigan was estimated to have 3.89 percent of the nation’s public
assistance recipients (295,278 out of 7,581,084), 4.04 percent of the nation’s unemployed
workers (154,700 out of 3,832,500), and 2.72 percent of the nation’s children in families
earning less than $1,000 (92,000 out of 3,382,000). Therefore, the index gave Michigan
$7,124,240 or 3.55 percent of the 1964 index eligible CAP funding (U.S. House 1964b).
In practice, the EOA gave Shriver considerable discretionary power to withhold grants.17
16The rationale for this poverty threshold is unclear. It is below Orshansky’s poverty line, which estimated
that a family of four would spend $1,033 per year on food alone (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2000). Most
of the details of how the index was developed are not in the historical record. Asked whether the poverty task
force ever kept records, member Eric Tolmach replied, “Not formally, no. . . there were no recorders. . . no
secretaries. . . at the meetings. No minutes were kept. There are memos based on people’s interpretations of
what took place at the meeting. There are no word-for-word accounts” (Gillette, 1996, p. 45). Oral histories
provide incomplete accounts.
17The EOA also included requirements that the OEO “establish procedures which will facilitate eective
participation of the States in community action programs” (x209[a]) and develop guidelines for “equitable
distribution of assistance under [the Community Action Program] within the States between urban and rural
areas” (x210). Like many of its other provisions, the details of these regulations were left to the OEO itself
and, ultimately, imposed insignificant constraints. Although the EOA was amended in each year from 1965 to
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For instance, EOA x203(c) left it within Shriver’s authority to reallocate CAP money desig-
nated for one state to the others. In addition, the EOA imposed no restrictions on Shriver’s
use of the remaining non-index eligible CAP funds, which made up 20 percent of the to-
tal. Even if the EOA permitted deviations in practice, the index apportionment provided
a transparent benchmark by which politicians could evaluate whether their state had been
shortchanged.
The historical record is rife with examples of Shriver’s use of discretionary power. One
highly publicized showdown in early 1965 featured Louisiana’s governor, John J. McKei-
then. McKeithen announced the appointees to run the EOA-funded antipoverty program,
but many objected (and wrote to Washington) that the appointees were “rabid segregation-
ists” (Germany 2007, p. 49).18 Although Shriver could not pick the appointees, he had
the authority to withhold funding (which he did) if he disapproved. McKeithen appealed
to Congress, the Vice President, and the President, to no avail. Ultimately, McKeithen
selected a new set of appointees, and OEO money began to flow into Louisiana.
But the OEO was not always successful. The Child Development Group (CDG), which
obtained a grant to set up a Head Start program in rural Mississippi, shows how Congress
could check the OEO’s power. After a media bonanza at launch, the CDG infuriated politi-
cians and other Mississippians because it oered a blueprint for desegregation in Missis-
sippi’s public schools. The administration ultimately backed down and reduced the CDG’s
funding when Senator John Stennis (D-MS), chair of the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, threatened to hold the President’s other legislation hostage, including funding for the
1967, the poverty index remained unchanged except for using updated information for the index components
(U.S. House 1967). The funding formula set aside 2 percent of the eligible index funds for U.S. territories,
which means that 78.4 percent (rather than the printed 80 percent) went to states. In addition, the funding
formula only applied to funds for general program development and administration, not technical assistance
or training costs, or programs funded in other sections of the EOA. Programs for migrant workers and job
retraining were funded in separate sections of the EOA, although the migrant programs were administered
under the CAP.
18Haddad, William F. “Mr. Shriver and the Politics of Poverty.” Harper’s Magazine, December 1965, p.
48.
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Vietnam War (Carter 2009).
Figure 4.1 describes the OEO’s use of discretion by examining deviations from the
apportionment index. The horizontal axis plots each state’s apportionment under the EOA
and the vertical axis plots each state’s receipt of funding. A state will fall along the 45-
degree line (plotted as a solid line) if it received the minimum apportioned in the EOA and
above/below it if the state received more/less than its index apportionment. Positive and
negative deviations are interesting because they represent, respectively, the OEO’s topping
up of a state’s apportionment with discretionary funding or its failure to reach an agreement
with a particular local organization. The dashed line represents the least squares regression
fit, shown in detail in table 4.1.
Between FY 1965 and 1968, federal EOA appropriations grew from $237 million (nom-
inal dollars) to $867 million in FY 1968 (U.S. House of Representatives 1964b, x2; 1967,
x2). The OEO’s diculties spending its allocation in its first FY—due to Shriver asserting
his authority and challenges setting up programs—is captured in Figure 4.1A. By the end
of the first FY on 30 June 1965, the CAP had only existed for nine months and spending
reached only $143 million of the budgeted $199 million in nondiscretionary funds. Forty-
one states lie below the 45-degree line because they received less than their EOA mini-
mum apportionment in federal funds. Many states fell very far below their apportionment:
Mississippi received about 3 percent of its apportionment; South Carolina, 7 percent; and
Nebraska, 11 percent. These surpluses at the OEO resolved within several years as local
organizations developed more applications and as OEO administrators succeeded in mak-
ing grants. By FY 1966, most states had moved closer to or exceeded the 45-degree line;
many had crossed it (Figure 4.1B). In this year, each apportionment dollar translated into
$1.14 in actual funding (table 4.1A, column 2). By FYs 1967 and 1968, almost all states
lie near or above the 45-degree line and most exceeded it (figures 1C and 1D). In these
two years, each apportionment dollar translated into $1.40 and $1.19 in actual funding, re-
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Figure 4.1: The Relationship of 1965-1968 CAP Spending to the EOA Apportionment In-
dex, by Fiscal Year
A. Fiscal Year 1965
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B. Fiscal Year 1966
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C. Fiscal Year 1967
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D. Fiscal Year 1968
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Notes: The x-axis indicates the total minimum funding according to the EOA poverty index for each state
for the relevant fiscal year in millions of 1968 dollars. See equation (1) and the text for details. The y-
axis indicates actual federal allocations in millions of 1968 dollars for each state for the relevant fiscal year,
including index allocations and the remaining 20 percent of CAP funds at Shriver’s discretion. The solid line
is the 45-degree line, and the dashed line is fit by least squares regression. A state will fall along the 45-degree
line if it received the minimum apportioned in the EOA. Points above the 45-degree line indicate that a state
received more than its minimum apportionment, whereas points below the line indicate the reverse.
Sources: EOA index is developed from U.S. House of Representatives (1964a), U.S. Department of Labor
(1968), and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1968). Actual allocations are aggregated
using the NACAP grant data.
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Table 4.1: The Relationship between EOA Poverty Index and CAP Spending, 1965 to 1968
1 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Funding (No Census Region Fixed Effects) 
 1965 1966 1967 1968 1965-1968 
Index apportioned funds in FY 
 
0.898*** 1.137*** 1.395*** 1.190***  
[0.137] [0.0915] [0.0563] [0.0362]  
 Cumulative apportioned funds, 1965-1968     1.206*** 
    [0.0549] 
Constant -1.002** -0.373 -0.495 1.015 -1.16 
 [0.476] [0.876] [0.708] [0.680] [2.408] 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 
R2 0.763 0.914 0.93 0.92 0.932 
Coefficient >1 p-value 0.230 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficient=1.25 p-value 0.033 0.497 0.001 0.790 0.914 
B. Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Funding (With Census Region Fixed Effects) 
 1965 1966 1967 1968 1965-1968 
Index apportioned funds in FY 
 
0.938*** 1.168*** 1.418*** 1.201***  
[0.103] [0.0724] [0.0366] [0.0372]  
 Cumulative apportioned funds, 1965-1968     1.230*** 
    [0.0340] 
Midwest=1 -1.470* 0.654 -2.756* -1.841 -5.591 
 [0.734] [1.268] [1.397] [1.247] [4.028] 
South=1 -3.339*** -0.999 -4.486** -1.53 -10.90** 
 [0.925] [1.464] [1.800] [1.888] [5.183] 
West=1 -0.201 3.297* 0.572 1.548 5.699 
 [0.695] [1.683] [1.322] [1.454] [4.493] 
Constant 0.346 -1.295 1.285 1.479* 1.542 
 [0.448] [1.150] [0.988] [0.861] [2.738] 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 
R2 0.862 0.93 0.945 0.927 0.946 
Coefficient >1 p-value 0.274 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficient=1.25 p-value 0.014 0.659 0.000 0.970 0.386 
  
Notes: Stars denote statistical significance as follows: * = Significant at the 5 percent level. ** = Significant
at the 1 percent level. *** = Significant at the .05 percent level. Huber-White standard errors are in brackets.
Sample excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia.
Sources: See Figure 4.1.
spectively (table 4.1A, columns 3 and 4). Aggregating over 1965 to 1968, the OEO hit the
apportionment requirements for almost all states and, although not mandated by the EOA,
tended to spend CAP discretionary funding in proportion to each state’s index (Figure 4.2).
For the overall period, the regression line slope is greater than the 45-degree line; every
apportionment dollar translated into $1.21 in actual spending, almost the $1.25 one would
obtain if the OEO, on average, allocated its discretionary 20 percent in proportion to the 80
allocated by apportionment index (table 4.1A, column 5).
Three main conclusions follow. First, the EOA apportionment index was not absolutely
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Figure 4.2: The Relationship of Cumulative 1965-1968 CAP Spending to the EOA Appor-
tionment Index
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Notes: The x-axis indicates the total minimum funding according to the EOA poverty index for each state
for fiscal years 1965-1968 in millions of 1968 dollars. See equation (1) and the text for details. The y-axis
indicates actual federal allocations in millions of 1968 dollars for each state, including index allocations and
the remaining 20 percent of CAP funds at Shriver’s discretion.
Sources: See Figure 4.1.
binding at the state level. Consistent with Shriver’s reputation and the historical literature
on funding controversies, this analysis suggests that Shriver had a good deal of leeway and
that he exercised it (at least in the program’s early years). Over time, however, compli-
ance with the poverty index increased as Congress and the public pressured the Johnson
administration.
Second, the South was an important outlier (table 4.1B), which is consistent with Alston
and Ferrie’s (1999) hypothesis about Southern politicians trying to dissuade Shriver from
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putting EOA money into their states. Contrary to the common perception that the South
received more War on Poverty spending, Southern states averaged almost $11 million less
in actual CAP funding than Northeastern states over the 1965 to 1968 period, after account-
ing for their shares of the nation’s poor (table 4.1B, column 5). The Southern disadvantage
persists even in specifications including multiple covariates.
Third, the OEO largely allocated CAP funds across states in proportion to the appor-
tionment index. This was the case both for the nondiscretionary index-apportioned spend-
ing and the discretionary spending. The apportionment index explains 76 to 93 percent of
the variation in state-level CAP spending across the four fiscal years (table 1A, columns
1-4) and exceeds 93 percent for the entire period (column 5). The inclusion of region fixed
eects has almost no eect on this relationship (table 4.1B). Considering the tremendous
power given to the OEO director, President Johnson’s reputation for playing politics, and
the empirical literature showing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of New Deal funds to build
a longer-term political coalition, this compliance may be surprising. Yet compliance is
consistent with Democrats having chosen the apportionment index and hints that fighting
poverty reflected the Johnson administration’s unconstrained choice.
4.3 How the War on Poverty was Fought: A County-Level Analysis of
OEO Spending
Within states, the EOA imposed no constraints on the distribution of funds, location
of CAP project (such as a congressional district or city), or type of project funded. The
rationale for this flexibility was that it allowed antipoverty programs to be customized to
community needs and would create pressure for the reform of social institutions that per-
petuated an economic underclass. In practice, this flexibility allowed the Johnson adminis-
tration to pursue its broader agenda. How these funds were spent, therefore, reveals much
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about the Johnson administration’s objectives.
The Competing Objectives of Politics and Poverty
Fighting poverty and building political coalition were potentially competing objectives
determining the Johnson administration’s funding choices. One hypothesis is that Johnson
used theWar on Poverty to forge a new electoral consensus, much as Roosevelt had used the
New Deal (Wright 1974; Fleck 2001; Couch and Shugart 1998; Wallis 2001, 1998, 1987,
1984; Fishback and Wallis 2012; Fishback et al. 2003). Johnson cut his political teeth as
a New Dealer and may have learned from Roosevelt’s and Harry Hopkins’ alleged claim
to “tax and tax and spend and spend and elect and elect” (Fishback 2007). Congressional
testimony following the EOA’s first year claimed as much, saying that its funding had
degenerated into “giant fiestas of political patronage.”19
Building political consensus should result in measurable spending patterns. As Gavin
Wright (1974) and Fleck (2008) argue regarding the New Deal, a reelection-seeking pres-
ident should spend more on swing districts. Because congressional races are determined
by winning a plurality, Democrats would seek to convince the pivotal voter to put them
in oce (or keep them there) through greater spending when a particular race is almost
even. OEO funding could also be used to repay favors to prominent congressional commit-
tee members or chairs or to encourage favorable future votes for items on the Democrats’
agenda. This would result in more OEO funds being spent in areas served by powerful
congressional committee members or chairpersons (Anderson and Tollison 1991).
Our analysis tests the importance of political considerations by examining the relation-
ship of OEO funding to the share of the county population voting for Democrats in the 1964
19Congressional Quarterly Almanac. “Antipoverty Program Funds Doubled,” 1965, pp. 405-20. Multiple
accounts reflect this thinking in the months leading up to the passage of the EOA. For instance, Johnson
promised a reluctant congressman that despite CAP’s direct grant mechanism, no money would be spent in
his district “that hasn’t got your initial on it, or mine” (McKee 2011, p. 50).
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presidential election, the change in the Democratic vote share between 1960 and 1964 in
the presidential election, whether Johnson won the county in the 1964 election, whether the
1964 presidential election was close (the margin of victory or loss was within 10 percent-
age points), and the interaction of a Democratic win with a close election. These political
variables allow us to test whether CAP funds disproportionately flowed to those counties
with stronger Democratic constituencies, those with newer (young) Democratic constituen-
cies, or those districts Democrats narrowly lost but hoped to regain in the 1966 midterm
elections. The analysis also examines the relationship between OEO funding and whether
the county was represented by a member or chair of a major House committee during the
89th Congress (January 1965-December 1966).20 These variables allow us to test whether
major committee members or chairs brought more funding to their home districts (or kept
it out).21
A second (and potentially complementary) hypothesis is that the Johnson administra-
tion prioritized fighting poverty and racial discrimination, two pillars of his domestic cam-
paign platform. This agenda may have been chosen because Johnson saw the platform’s
potential political benefits or because it reflected Johnson’s long-suppressed humanitarian
20See appendix C for more detail on sources and data construction.
21“Keeping funding out” relates closely to Alston and Ferrie’s hypothesis about the political power and
interests of the Southern Democrats. They argue that, after slavery was abolished, Southern plantations
owned by the elites developed a system of plantation paternalism to attract and retain labor. Compliant
laborers were rewarded with economic support and protection, and this system allowed Southern plantations
to retain a supply of cheap workers to keep the plantation system functioning (Alston and Ferrie 1993; 1999).
To protect this paternalist system, the South had opposed federal antipoverty programs during Reconstruction
and the New Deal, which threatened to give agricultural laborers better outside options. (Thus, for example,
agricultural workers were excluded from the original Social Security program. See Alston and Ferrie 1999,
pp. 67-70; Newman and O’Brien 2011, pp. 7–20). As the invention of a mechanical cotton harvester made
low-wage labor less important and the obligations of paternalism thus became a burden to the landed elite,
the South’s incentives for blocking federal welfare legislation fell. Mechanization, in eect, made a federal
antipoverty program more appealing to Southern elites—as long as the programs were implemented in other
areas and would encourage the outmigration of black and poor white farm laborers. We examine whether
Johnson earned the support, or at least the neutrality, of Southern power brokers by not making CAP grants
in areas dominated by Southern paternalism. Such a pattern would suggest that members of Congress had
compromised with Johnson about the EOA’s implementation in their districts instead of blocking the EOA’s
passage.
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agenda. Robert Caro’s biographies of Johnson document episodes during Johnson’s rise to
power that revealed “hints of compassion for the downtrodden, and of a passion to raise
them up; hints that he might use power not only to manipulate others but to help others—to
help, moreover, those who most needed help” (2002, p. xxi). Johnson also may have be-
lieved his domestic legacy would be the antipoverty agenda. Speaking with Senator Joseph
Clark (D-PA), Johnson commented, “Lincoln abolished slavery, and we’re going to abolish
poverty” (Miller Center 1964).
Our analysis tests the importance of fighting poverty and racial discrimination by ex-
amining the relationship of EOA funding with measures of poverty and the nonwhite share
of the population. Greater spending of EOA money in areas with higher poverty rates is
broadly consistent with the Johnson administration targeting funds in accordance with the
War on Poverty platform. We also examine the extent of this commitment. Whereas po-
litically expedient adherence to the platform might result in the targeting of funds to areas
with more citizens just under the poverty line, a more sincere (and less expedient) approach
might target the most disadvantaged areas. These areas could show less measureable im-
provement by ocial poverty rates, even if livelihoods and individual welfare improved
significantly (albeit not enough to cross the poverty threshold). We measure the intensity
of disadvantage by the share of individuals in households with incomes below $2,000 and
$1,000.
Spending OEO money in areas with more nonwhites is consistent with the Johnson
administration’s battle against racial discrimination and Johnson’s antipoverty agenda. Not
only did African Americans have twice the national poverty rate of whites, but de jure and
de facto institutions limited their opportunities to escape poverty. The distribution of more
OEO funding directly to communities with more racial minorities could empower these
minorities to develop their own antipoverty programs. It also could diuse civil unrest
and rioting (Gillezeau 2012) or reduce crime rates by allowing minorities greater access
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to formal institutions (Cunningham 2013). Moreover, even if money was not flowing to
minorities directly, the OEO could threaten to withhold funding from whites to ensure
greater cooperation. Thus OEO funding could help the federal government buy compliance
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and catalyze racial integration while fighting poverty.22
Determinants of County-Level OEO Spending
Figure 4.3 maps cumulative real per capita federal grants from 1965 to 1968 by county,
with the more darkly shaded areas receiving more funding per person. Fewer obvious
patterns emerge than might be expected. The counties of Appalachia are well funded,
as are poor rural areas like the desert Southwest, eastern Oklahoma, and the Mississippi
Delta. Large cities and metropolitan areas received grants but not typically amounts out
of proportion to their populations. Yet clusters of unfunded counties appear in eastern
Mississippi, rural Georgia, and the eastern Carolinas: all high-poverty regions.
Our regression analysis describes the role of politics and poverty in determining EOA
funding using the following linear specification,
Yi = H0i + P
0
i + X
0
i + "i (4.2)
Y is real cumulative CAP funding for years 1965 to 1968 in county i, expressed as real 1968
dollars per 1960 county residents, purged of state fixed eects. (Y can be thought of as the
within-state variation in per capita EOA funding: the component of EOA funding that was
not determined by the apportionment index.) The first two sets of covariates correspond to
our two hypotheses: P is a row vector of covariates to measure political considerations, in-
cluding the inverse population ratio (1,000/total county population), the 1964 Democratic
22Previous versions of this paper included explicit tests of the role of race riots, the escalation of Viet-
nam, and Alston and Ferrie’s (1993) hypothesis about the erosion of paternalism. This version of the paper
suppresses discussion of these hypotheses, because our analysis revealed that they played little role in the
distribution of OEO funding decisions.
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presidential vote share, whether Johnson won the county in 1964, whether the presiden-
tial election was close, the interaction of whether the election was close and Johnson won,
and the dierence in Democratic vote shares between the 1964 and 1960 presidential elec-
tions.23 In some specifications we include variables for the power of the county’s delega-
tion in the 89th Congress. These variables include the proportion of representatives that
are Democrats; indicator variables for whether any of the county’s representatives were
members of a major committee, chairs or minority leaders of a major committee, or part
of the House leadership; and indicator variables for whether any of the county’s represen-
tatives were both Democrats and held seats or powerful positions on major committees or
in House leadership. H is a row vector containing covariates related to fighting poverty
and racial discrimination. These include measures of the share of the county population in
households with annual incomes of less than $3,000 in 1960, measures of the intensity of
poverty (share of individuals in households earning less than $2,000 and the share earning
less than $1,000 in 1960), and the share of the population that is nonwhite.
In addition, all specifications include other covariates, X, to account for other cross-
sectional dierences between counties that may have influenced the distribution of OEO
funding: the shares of the county’s population in urban areas, in rural farm areas, under age
5, over age 64, and of the very auent (in households with annual incomes of $10,000 or
more in 1960). X also includes the size of local government in terms of total local govern-
ment expenditures per capita, local government welfare expenditures per capita, and total
local government tax revenue per capita in 1962. We also include a riot intensity measure
for the fiscal year of funding (Collins and Margo 2007); a measure of the escalation of
the Vietnam war (casualty rates), which many claim robbed the War on Poverty of funding
and Johnson of political and public support; and a proxy of Alston and Ferrie’s “paternal-
23The inverse of population is often included in the New Deal literature to capture a fixed dollar amount
per state or county. It is also an approximation of the importance of a given voter in a jurisdiction (Fleck
2001; Wallis 2001; Fishback et al. 2003).
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ism” using the share of sharecroppers in the total number of farm operators from the 1930
Census of Agriculture (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1930; Depew et al. 2012).24
Table 4.2 presents the regression results. For brevity, tables 4.2 and 4.3 suppress the
point estimates for the covariates in X (the full set of estimates is reported in appendix
D). Huber-White standard errors are presented in brackets beneath each estimate. The first
three columns present the point estimates of dierent metrics of county-level poverty rates
and column 4 uses the share of the county population that is nonwhite. Column 5 adds
the political variables.25 Columns 6 to 8 present the estimates with all of the variables
combined using each of three poverty rates (the three measures are highly collinear, so they
are not included together).
These results provide strong evidence that the Johnson administration used OEO fund-
ing to fight poverty. Within states where the poverty index did not bind, the population share
in poverty (by three measures) and share nonwhite are individually statistically significant
at the 1 percent level and robust to the inclusion of other covariates in columns 6 through 8.
But the eects are not large in an economic sense. A one standard-deviation higher share
of the 1960 population in households with incomes less than $3,000 (0.16) implies a $7.86
increase in real, cumulative per capita federal CAP funding—about one-fifth of a standard
deviation in funding (column 6). The implied elasticities are similar for measures of the
24A further source was Price Fishback, Michael Haines, and Paul Rhode, “Data Entered from the Agri-
cultural Censuses of 1930, 1935, and 1940,” personal communication, 20 June 2012. Paternalism is dicult
to measure with existing data, so we experiment with multiple measures of Southern plantation agriculture.
Qualitatively similar results were derived by using an indicator variable based either on counties considered
plantation areas, according to a special U.S. census report on 1910 cotton farming (U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus 1916; Whatley 1987), or on the devolution of the plantation system, using sharecropping rates in 1959
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1959; Haines 2010) to determine the percentage of sharecroppers among farm
operators. Alston and Ferrie’s hypothesis also bears on the interpretation of variables for whether Democratic
power on key committees in the House of Representatives is negatively correlated with CAP spending in the
South, although we described these variables as part of P.
25Note that the partial R2 statistics are calculated by leaving each individual or set of regressors out of
the respective model. This approach may understate the explanatory power of the excluded regressor to
the degree that it is correlated with the included regressors. We choose this approach because it is a more
conservative approach to attribution.
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Table 4.2: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending, 1965 to 1968
2 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita 
Poverty Variables        
Population share in with incomes        
     ! $3K 72.34***     49.14***   
 [14.290]     [11.649]   
     ! $1K  144.86***     80.92***  
  [36.345]     [25.957]  
     ! $2K   93.40***     51.75*** 
   [19.661]     [13.186] 
Share nonwhite    85.59***  85.14*** 82.04*** 82.09*** 
    [21.242]  [21.777] [20.671] [21.554] 
Political Variables          
1,000/population     7.63 9.75* 6.69 6.19 
     [5.850] [5.579] [5.353] [5.291] 
1964 Presidential Election         
Change in share for      26.97*** 56.62*** 54.68*** 55.03*** 
     Democrat, 1960-1964     [10.404] [14.875] [14.743] [14.832] 
Share for Democrat     29.70** 32.30** 33.72** 32.79** 
     [13.337] [13.084] [13.190] [13.130] 
1= Democrat won     -5.08 -4.88 -5.05 -4.92 
     [3.511] [3.424] [3.436] [3.428] 
1=Election close      -6.07*** -4.29** -4.36** -4.26** 
     (+/-10 points)     [2.116] [1.997] [1.992] [1.995] 
1= Election close     7.66** 6.67* 6.94* 6.78* 
     x 1=Democrat won     [3.695] [3.569] [3.547] [3.578] 
89th Congress House Representative(s)      
1=Democrat     0.20 -0.87 -0.90 -0.79 
     [2.311] [2.262] [2.264] [2.256] 
1=Major committee      -2.02 -0.78 -0.75 -0.69 
     member/leader     [3.067] [2.832] [2.813] [2.821] 
1=Major committee      0.32 0.75 0.69 0.59 
     member x 1=Democrat     [3.598] [3.450] [3.418] [3.429] 
1=Major committee chair/     -0.17 0.10 -0.21 -0.16 
     leader     [2.368] [2.242] [2.281] [2.262] 
1=Major committee chair/     -0.40 -1.27 -0.30 -0.81 
     leader x 1=Democrat     [3.223] [3.222] [3.199] [3.223] 
         
Observations 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 
R2 0.045 0.050 0.050 0.070 0.038 0.090 0.089 0.089 
         
Partial R2         
Poverty variables  0.009 0.015 0.014 0.022  0.031 0.027 0.028 
Political variables     0.004 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Notes: The unit of observation is a county or “super-county,” whichever is the lowest unit of geographic aggregation observed in all of our data 
sources. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares regression of the specification described in equation (2). The dependent variable is the 
residual of a regression of real federal expenditures through the Community Action Program from 1965 to 1968 on state fixed effects. Suppressed 
covariates include percent of a county’s population that is rural or farm and percent that is urban, under the age of 5, over the age of 64, or lives in a 
household with more than $10,000 in annual income. They also include the Vietnam casualty rate, a measure of riot intensity (Collins and Margo 
2007), the number of sharecroppers per total farm operators,  local government’s direct expenditures per capita (1962), direct expenditures on welfare 
(1962), and total tax receipts per capita (1962). Estimates are unweighted. Stars denote statistical significance as follows: * = 5 percent level. ** = 1 
percent level. *** = .5 percent level. Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. The county sample includes the coterminous United States, 
excluding the District of Columbia. Sources: See data appendix for more details and analysis appendix for coefficients on suppressed covariates.  
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Table 4.2 — Continued
Notes: The unit of observation is a county or “super-county,” whichever is the lowest unit of geographic
aggregation observed in all of our data sources. Estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares regression
of the specification described in equation 4.2. The dependent variable is the residual of a regression of
real federal expenditures through the Community Action Program from 1965 to 1968 on state fixed eects.
Suppressed covariates include percent of a county’s population that is rural or farm and percent that is urban,
under the age of 5, over the age of 64, or lives in a household with more than $10,000 in annual income. They
also include the Vietnam casualty rate, a measure of riot intensity (Collins and Margo 2007), the number
of sharecroppers per total farm operators, local government’s direct expenditures per capita (1962), direct
expenditures on welfare (1962), and total tax receipts per capita (1962). Estimates are unweighted. Stars
denote statistical significance as follows: * = 5 percent level. ** = 1 percent level. *** = .5 percent level.
Huber-White standard errors are in brackets. The county sample includes the coterminous United States,
excluding the District of Columbia.
Sources: See appendix C for more details and appendix D for coecients on suppressed covariates.
intensity of poverty. For a one standard deviation higher share of the 1960 population in
households with incomes less than $1,000 and $2,000, columns 6 and 7 imply a similar
increase in cumulative per capita federal CAP funding—0.14 and 0.17 of a standard devi-
ation, respectively. By this metric, the population share of nonwhites, however, is about
twice as economically important. A one standard-deviation higher share of nonwhites
(0.16) implies a $14 increase in real, cumulative per capita federal CAP funding—over
one-third of a standard deviation in the dependent variable (columns 6 to 8).
Political considerations also shaped decisions at the OEO. A one standard-deviation in-
crease in Democratic share in the 1964 presidential election has roughly the same eect as a
one standard-deviation increase in poverty—about 0.16 of a standard deviation increase in
funding. Not only did more Democratic counties receive more money per capita, funds also
rewarded districts with larger increases in Democratic share in the presidential elections be-
tween 1960 and 1964, with a one standard-deviation increase in this variable leading to 0.20
of a standard deviation increase in funding. Whereas swing counties received less funding,
swing counties won by Democrats received slightly more ceteris paribus. These findings
are robust to the inclusion of identical covariates for the 1960 presidential election as well
as to alternative definitions of “swing” areas. In short, the Johnson administration invested
in its new Democratic constituency by directing OEO funds to Democrat-trending areas
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as well as to Democratic strongholds. In contrast, we find no evidence that congressional
committee membership during the 89th Congress mattered at all (the results for the 88th
and 90th Congress do not alter this conclusion). Counties with representatives on major
House committees, chairing major committees, or in positions of leadership (Democratic
or Republican) have no predictive power in any of our regressions.
Presidential politics, however, explains very little of county-level OEO’s funding deci-
sions. To make the relative contributions of poverty and politics more explicit, we sum-
marize the partial R2 values of these sets of variables at the bottom of table 4.2—a simple
metric for determining how much of the variation in within-state per capita CAP funding is
explained by the set of poverty variables or the set of political variables. The R2 value for
the political variables is 0.004 (column 5), significantly lower than for the poverty variables.
Across specifications, approximately 3 percent of the variation in funding is explained by
poverty, or 30 percent of the variation explained by the model. Politics explains less than 1
percent in all cases.
Much of the history of the War on Poverty focuses on the South and its interaction with
civil rights. The majority of nonwhites lived in the South, and table 4.2 shows that the
nonwhite population share played an important role in shaping OEO funding. Moreover,
the paternalism hypothesis (Alston and Ferrie 1999, 1993) suggests that local economic,
demographic, and political considerations may have had dierent eects in the South. For
both reasons, table 4.3 splits our sample into non-Southern and Southern counties, roughly
partitioning the country into halves (46 percent of all counties are in the South).
The results highlight some similarities and dierences between the regions: poverty
rates and share nonwhite have a strong and robust relationship to OEO spending. Similarly,
changes in the share of a county voting for Democrats also matters in both regions, although
Democratic strongholds do not appear to be rewarded in the South (where most places were
Democratic strongholds). The economic significance of each of these variables, however,
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Table 4.3: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending in the South and Non-South, 1965 to
1968
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita 
 Non-South Only South Only 
Poverty Variables      
Population share with incomes      
     ! $3K 83.45***   31.93**   
 [26.025]   [12.451]   
     ! $1K  211.44***   45.54**  
  [70.400]   [20.150]  
     ! $2K   127.09***   34.39*** 
   [37.551]   [12.256] 
Share nonwhite 411.66*** 396.67*** 396.04*** 21.65* 20.18* 19.45 
 [88.228] [81.937] [85.550] [12.375] [11.710] [11.972] 
Political Variables       
1,000/population 7.75 2.69 2.84 1.39 0.36 -0.85 
 [8.332] [8.355] [8.818] [2.974] [3.030] [3.195] 
1964 Presidential Election       
    Change in share for  45.86** 45.01** 42.77** 33.04** 31.83** 31.93** 
      Democrat, 1960-1964 [20.882] [21.264] [21.223] [13.342] [13.390] [13.405] 
    Share for Democrat 51.78** 53.59** 53.19** 1.69 2.27 1.96 
 [22.044] [22.018] [22.090] [14.422] [14.373] [14.384] 
    1= Democrat won -9.11* -9.08* -9.00* 1.26 1.17 1.25 
 [5.073] [5.085] [5.064] [4.337] [4.337] [4.334] 
    1=Election close  -3.48 -3.83 -3.33 -2.37 -2.40 -2.37 
      (+/-10 points) [2.965] [3.049] [3.012] [2.317] [2.343] [2.314] 
    1= Election close 9.23* 10.05** 9.30* 2.72 2.66 2.76 
      x 1=Democrat won [4.735] [4.764] [4.746] [4.480] [4.500] [4.487] 
89th Congress House Representative(s)     
    1=Democrat -1.97 -2.24 -2.02 2.54 2.60 2.82 
 [2.251] [2.229] [2.243] [3.519] [3.561] [3.554] 
    1= Major committee  3.26 3.41 3.48 -6.09 -6.27 -6.08 
      member/leader [2.791] [2.770] [2.766] [3.897] [3.876] [3.892] 
    1= Major committee member -3.68 -4.26 -4.16 4.39 4.54 4.31 
      x 1=Democrat [3.529] [3.489] [3.507] [3.920] [3.929] [3.930] 
    1=Major committee chair/ -2.68 -2.75 -2.58 -0.12 0.41 0.13 
      leader [3.038] [3.030] [3.045] [2.813] [2.785] [2.796] 
    1=Major committee chair/ 20.37* 19.49* 20.35*    
      leader x 1=Democrat [10.742] [10.478] [10.481]    
       
Observations 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,414 1,414 1,414 
R2 0.413 0.419 0.417 0.028 0.027 0.028 
       
Partial R2    
Poverty variables  0.279 0.253 0.252 0.006 0.005 0.006 
Political variables 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 
  
 
Notes: See table 4.2 notes for specification and other details. In columns 4-6, interactions of 1=Represented
by a House Democrat with committee membership and chairmanship/leadership are omitted due to collinear-
ity.
Sources: See appendix C for more details.
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is weaker in the South. A one standard-deviation increase in Southern poverty rates or
share nonwhite implies a 0.12 and 0.11 standard deviation increase in EOA spending, re-
spectively (column 4). This is one-half (for poverty) to one-fifth (for share nonwhite) the
magnitude of these eects in the rest of the United States (column 1).
The results also reveal striking dierences in funding patterns between the two regions.
First, roughly 40 percent of the variation in per capita OEO funding is explained by the
model in non-Southern regions (partial R2, columns 1 to 3). In the South, less than 3 per-
cent is explained by the model (columns 4 to 6). Second, the lion’s share of the explained
variation outside the South is accounted for by the poverty variables (25 to 27 percent),
whereas in the South very little of the variation is explained by poverty measures (less
than 1 percent in all cases). Third, presidential politics seem to matter very little in gen-
eral and even less in the South. Putting aside the fact that these estimates are statistically
insignificant, their magnitude in the South is half the size of the implied eects elsewhere.
Correlations of OEO Spending with Electoral Outcomes
Our final analysis investigates whether EOA money was successful in building the
Democratic coalition. Our analysis draws upon estimates by Clubb et al. (2006) of House
election voter turnout and share of votes for Democrats by county using a panel version of
equation (2) which omits the political variables and includes state-by-year fixed eects,
Yit =
X
y

H0i + X
0
i

1ft = yg + s(i);t + 'i + "i;t (4.3)
where Yit is now voter turnout or share of votes cast for Democratic candidates in county
i, in year t=1950, 1952,...,1958,1962,..., 1972 (note: 1960 is omitted); 'it are county fixed
eects; s(i);t are state-by-year fixed eects; and other variables remain as previously de-
fined. The specifications describe changes in voter turnout and support of Democrats in
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poorer and more nonwhite counties after accounting for secular changes in state politics,
redistricting in the state-by-year fixed eects, and the time-varying eects of other covari-
ates.
Figure 4.4 supports the claim that OEO spending boosted voter turnout (panel A) and
support of the Democrats (panel D) in poor areas. Panel A plots the point estimates for each
year on the interaction between year and either (1) the share of the population in households
earning less than $3,000 per year (solid line) or (2) the share nonwhite (dashed line). Except
for a short-term increase in 1958, the relationship of share nonwhite (dashed line) to voter
turnout is stable from 1950-1962. In 1964, however, the relationship increases rapidly.
Counties with a one percentage point higher share nonwhite in 1960 experienced a 0.20
percentage point increase in voter turnout during the 1968 election—a pattern driven by
higher turnout in nonwhite counties of the South. A more modest and short-run relationship
is seen for poorer counties, which experienced low turnout in 1960 and 1964 relative to the
Eisenhower era, only to surge to their highest level in 1966 before falling steadily from
1968 to 1972.
One interpretation of this result is that the groups the OEO intended to empower, es-
pecially nonwhites, became more politically engaged during the 1960s. If this were the
case, the share of voters supporting Democrats should also grow in poorer and more non-
white areas where turnout increased after 1964. But panel D shows this is only part of the
story. After steadily decreasing during the 1950s and early 1960s, support for Democrats
in poorer areas increased from 1964 to 1968 (solid line). A one standard-deviation higher
poverty rate in 1960 (0.16) implies a 1.8 percentage point (11.3 x 0.16) higher Democratic
vote share in the 1966 election, or an increase of 3.5 percent. Because turnout was not
trending this way, the War on Poverty may have won over existing voters or changed the
composition of who went to the polls. The reverse appears to be true for more nonwhite
areas. Again, after the 1950s and early 1960s, when the relationship between nonwhite pop-
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Figure 4.4: County-Level Election Outcomes in the House of Representatives by Year and
County Characteristics
A. Voter Turnout, All Counties
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Figure 4.4 — Continued
D. Democratic Vote Share, All Counties
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Notes: Estimates plot the changing relationship of share of population in poverty and share of population
nonwhite to the outcome variable of interest. The outcome variable for panels A, B, and C is voter turnout.
For panels D, E, and F, the outcome variable is Democratic vote share. See text for more details.
Sources: Estimated voter turnout and Democratic vote share from Clubb et al. (2006). Household income <
$3,000 and nonwhite shares from Haines and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(2010). See appendix C for more details.
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ulation share and share voting for Democrats changed little, the Democratic vote share in
areas that were more nonwhite decreased rapidly between 1964 and 1968. A one standard-
deviation higher share nonwhite in 1960 (0.16) implies a 1.4 percentage point (8.7 x 0.16)
or 2.8 percent lower vote share in the 1968 election. The rising turnout in more nonwhite
counties, therefore, reflected increases in votes for Republicans. This is consistent with
backlash voting or to growing disillusionment with the War on Poverty.
Notably, these patterns dier across regions. Voter turnout in poor areas increased
in non-Southern regions (figure 4.4B) but not in the South (figure 4.4C), whereas voter
turnout in nonwhite areas increased in the South (figure 4.4C) but not in non-Southern
areas (figure 4.4B). Interestingly, the share of the vote for Democrats changed little in
poorer areas of the non-South (figure 4.4E), whereas Democratic vote share rose sharply
in poorer areas of the South (figure 4.4F). For more nonwhite areas, Democratic vote share
increased in the non-South (figure 4.4E) but fell sharply in the South (figure 4.4F). On
the whole, these results are consistent with the Democrats’ strategy backfiring, but only
somewhat. Although turnout increased after 1964 in areas getting greater EOA funding,
Democrats gained fewer of these votes than the Republicans did, and in the region where
they gained the greatest share among the poor—the South—they appear to have lost more
to the politics of race (see also Cascio andWashington 2014 on the role of the Voting Rights
Act).
4.4 Remembering the War on Poverty: The Importance of Politics
Just a few years after Johnson’s bold 1964 State of the Union declaration, the OEO’s
demise began. As early as 1967, Congress transferred control of some of its programs to
local governments. Largely due to discontent over the Vietnam War, Johnson dropped out
of the 1968 presidential election. Under President Richard Nixon, more OEO programs
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were transferred to other federal agencies and, ultimately, the oce was disbanded. The
conventional wisdom about the War on Poverty and the OEO has become that they failed.
How this conventional wisdom came to be is not precisely known. It emerged in the
late 1960s and early 1970s as the ocial poverty rate plummeted to reach its historic low
of around 11 percent in 1973, down from 19 percent in 1964. Even though presidents
are generally held accountable for changes in economic outcomes occurring during their
administration (regardless of whether they caused them), Johnson did not get credit for the
30 percent drop in poverty (6.2 percentage points, over 19.1 ocial poverty rate in 1964)
from 1964 to 1968.
One hypothesis for the conventional wisdom that the War on Poverty failed is that its
programs did not work. Recent work, however, suggests that the War on Poverty had a
large impact on poverty (Bailey and Danziger 2013). Some of this eect was immediate.
Recent work extending the supplemental poverty measure (which takes a fuller accounting
of changes in non-cash transfers and those through the tax code) backwards in time shows
that poverty rates fell from almost 26 percent in 1967 to 16 percent today, a fall greatly
aided by programs begun under the War on Poverty (Wimer et al. 2013). A complementary,
consumption-based measure of poverty registers a 26 percentage point decline from 1960
to 2010, with just over two-thirds of this decline occurring before 1980 (Meyer and Sullivan
2012). Many benefits were also longer-run in nature: a growing literature argues that many
War on Poverty programs were fairly successful at increasing human capital, improving
health, and reducing racial inequality over the longer term (Gillezeau 2012; Almond et al.
2011; Ludwig and Miller 2007; Almond et al. forthcoming; Alston and Ferrie 1999, 1993;
Bailey 2012; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2013; Chay et al. 2010; Bailey 2013; Cascio
et al. 2010; Cunningham 2013). In short, it seems puzzling that the Johnson administration
did not get credit for some of these successes.
A second hypothesis is that the “failure” narrative reflects the success of critics in
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rewriting history. But this claim forgets the fact that President Ronald Reagan’s quip in
his 1988 State of the Union that “the federal government fought the war on poverty, and
poverty won” was not new. Allegations of the War on Poverty’s failure dates to critics in
both political parties. Accounts from the late 1960s argued that the CAP programs were
born of conflicting ideas and administrative chaos—the programs of professors, not prac-
titioners (Levine 1970; Forget 2011).26 Prominent scholars agreed saying that the War on
Poverty’s “promises were extreme; the specific remedial actions were untried and untested;
[and] the finances were grossly inadequate” (Ginzberg and Solow 1974, p. 219).
The dierence in historical memory of the War on Poverty and the New Deal is striking.
Although the NewDeal’s eectiveness as a set of policies has been contested in scholarship,
its policies—in spite of a large or immediate rebound in private sector employment—were
regarded as successful at the time and today are remembered as successes. This collective
memory of the New Deal’s success transcends party lines. When criticized for dismantling
New Deal programs, Reagan corrected reporters noting he had voted for Roosevelt four
times and remarked, “I’m trying to undo the Great Society...it was LBJ’s war on poverty
that led us to our present mess” (Berkowitz 2001, p. 98). Although the Great Depression
lasted, Roosevelt’s New Deal programs are not remembered as failures.
This paper’s analysis provides hints regarding a third hypothesis for the belief that
the War on Poverty failed: implementation. Our finding that the Johnson administra-
tion distributed CAP funds to poorer areas—much more than those with greater political
importance—shows how dierently the War on Poverty was waged than the New Deal.
Rather than including and empowering state and local politicians and community leaders
in the allocation process as in the New Deal, OEO funds were used to circumvent and chal-
lenge these interests. OEO funds flowed to poor and nonwhite areas, which empowered
26Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. “The Professors and the Poor.” Commentary, August 1968. Other critics
argued that not enough money was spent on the poor and that the Johnson administration did too little to
eect change (King 1968; Katznelson 1989).
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new constituencies of poor and African Americans. Our quantitative analysis underscores
these dierences. Measured by partial R2, Fishback et al.’s (2003) political variables ex-
plain 25 percent of the county-level distribution of New Deal spending. The equivalent
variables during the War on Poverty explain roughly one percent of the variation in OEO
county-level spending (see appendix table D.5). Unlike New Deal funding, OEO grants
did not flow to (or away from) areas with powerful congresspersons or meaningfully re-
ward swing voters that helped Democrats win the most liberal Congress since the New
Deal.
In line with many contemporary accounts and retrospectives, our analysis suggests that
OEO funding generated backlash and appeared to hurt Democrats in the late 1960s and
early 1970s—especially relating to the politics of race in the South. Unlike the New Deal,
which engendered good will for decades, the War on Poverty generated resentments—and,
in the shorter term, votes for Republicans, especially in areas with more African American
voters.
Given Johnson’s ambition to recreate Roosevelt’s style and political reputation, the dif-
ferences between the political economy of the New Deal and War and Poverty are strik-
ing. Just days after Kennedy’s assassination, a staer advised Johnson to focus on small,
popular policy proposals instead of bold—and divisive—goals like civil rights. Johnson
responded, “What the hell’s the presidency for?” (Caro 2012, p. 428). The OEO’s focus on
fighting poverty and racial discrimination—over politics as usual—is consistent with this
humanitarian vision. The quantitative picture that emerges from our analysis of the War on
Poverty is that of a sincere attempt, albeit an underfunded one, to champion change.
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APPENDIX A
Charitable Giving Data Appendix
IRS/NCCS 990 Data
My sample of IRS form 990 data is taken from the IRS Statistics of Income micro data,
as cleaned and documented by the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statis-
tics (NCCS). This is a detailed data set including most data items on the form 990. The
data are tiered by asset classes, including 100% of the largest organizations and decreasing
shares of smaller organizations by total assets, with thresholds for asset size varying a little
bit each year; however, the same small organizations tend to be observed each year of the
panel, indicating that these are not cross-sections selected by stratified random sampling
but that the IRS has tried to make a somewhat balanced panel with extra weight on the
largest organizations.
The NCCS variable names of 990 data used are tabulated in table A.1.
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Table A.1: Form 990 data items by NCCS variable code
Statistics of Income Core Files
Form
990EZ
All Forms
990
Form
990EZ
1982-1999 2000-2007 1992-1999 1989-2007
Employer Identification
Number
ein ein ein
Organization Name name name name
State state state state
Primary Metropolitan Area pmsa pmsa pmsa
Major Subsector (NTEE) ntee1 ntee1 ntee1
Major Subsector (12 groups) ntmaj12 ntmaj12 ntmaj12
Total Revenue e047 r270 ez31 totrev2
Total Contributions and Grants e024 r040 ez17 cont
Direct Contributions e021 r010 -- --
Indirect Contributions e022 r020 -- --
Government Grants e023 r030 -- --
Total Investment Income -- rz100* ez20 invinc
Interest Income e027 -- savint
Dividend Income e028 -- secinc
Net Rental Income e031 -- netrent
Other Investment Income e032 -- othinvst
Memberships and Dues e026 r060 ez19 dues
Program Service Revenue e025 r050 ez18 progrev
Total Assets, Beginning of Year e177 a030 ez47 ass boy
Total Assets, End of Year e178 a180 ez48 ass eoy
Net Assets or Total Fund
Balances, Beginning of Year
e194 ez41 neta boy
Net Assets or Total Fund
Balances, End of Year
e195 n040 ez43 fundbal
Fundraising Expenditure e050 x030 -- solicit
Program Service Expenditure e048 x010 -- --
Filed Group Return e012 cond -- frcd
Compensation of ocers, total e060 f825 -- compens
Other salaries and wages, total e064 f830 -- othsal
Total payroll tax e076 f845 -- paytax
IRS exemption letter date -- -- -- ruledate
Notes: *rz100 for 990EZ only.
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TAXSIM Cost of Giving
The tax cost of giving measure used in this paper is created by estimating a first-dollar
marginal cost of giving cash for a constant set of individual tax returns, indexed for inflation
and calculated for each state in each year. The only change in the measure is therefore in
state and federal laws.
I start with the IRS Public Use File for 1984, a cross-sectional sample of 79,556 indi-
vidual income tax returns for that year. For each state s and year t from 1979 to 2007, I (1)
replace the year variable (data103) with year value t; (2) replace the state variable (data6)
with numeric state code s; (3) replace variables for cash contributions (data58), gifts of ap-
preciated assets (data59) and carryover contributions (data60) with zero values; and (4)
use the Consumer Price Index to adjust all other money variables from year-1984 dollars to
year-t dollars. This modified data set is fed into the taxpuf9 FORTRAN program, which
calculates the federal and state tax income tax for each return i— call them Federal0i;s;t and
State0i;s;t. I then repeat the calculation, changing only the value of cash contribution to $10.
The individual’s tax cost of giving is calculated as the change in total income tax liability:
TaxCostist 

Federal0i;s;t + State
0
i;s;t

 

Federal10i;s;t + State
10
i;s;t

10
(A.1)
For a small number of observations, the implied marginal rate can be very large. I censor
TaxPriceist above at a marginal rate of 100% and below at 0% before aggregating.
The state-year-level tax cost is then calculated by taking a mean weighted by sampling
weight (data1) and reported contributions (data58+data59+data60).1
1Because there was an above-the-line contribution in 1984, non-itemizers had an incentive to report their
contributions in the 1984 tax return data. Weighting by reported contributions will be incorrect to the extent
that contributions are misreported.
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TaxCostst =
P
i data1i  (data58i + data59i + data60i)  TaxCostistP
i data1i  (data58i + data59i + data60i) (A.2)
Guidestar Mission Statement Data
Form 990 mission statements are looked up by searching the Guidestar database (www.
guidestar.org) for each employer identification number (EIN) of organizations in the
sample. Of the 4,356 EINs attempted, 3,984 had retrievable mission statements; 363 were
in the Guidestar database but had no recorded statement; 315 were not in the Guidestar
database. Organizations were encoded as nonlocal if the mission statement or organiza-
tion’s name included any of:
 “Global”
 “National” or “International”
 “World”
Macroeconomic Data
The nonprofit regressions in chapters 2 and 3 include in some specifications a set of
logged macroeconomic variables observed at the state-year level, intended to capture time-
varying changes in the resources of possible donors and the demands on charity services
perhaps not captured by fixed eects.
Macroeconomic variables from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) include pop-
ulation [series code POPx], unemployment rate [URx], and per capita income [PCPIx],
where x is the two-letter postal abbreviation of each US state.
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Gross state product data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s U.S. Eco-
nomic Accounts:Regional:GDP by State and Metropolitan Area:Gross Domestic Product
by State:Gross Domestic Product:All Industries. The data were extracted as two separate
files, one for 1997 following the SIC breakdown of industries, and one from 1997 onward
following the NAICS system, and the two merged together. Because only total product was
of interest, the change in classification schemes was not relevant.
State-by-year poverty rates are aggregated from March Current Population Survey mi-
crodata, as maintained by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (King et al. 2010).
State-year poverty rates were calculated using weighted shares of households in each state
below 100% of the poverty line, as observed in the POVERTY variable.
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Table A.2: Change in Average Tax Cost of Giving by State, 1986 to 1988
State Tax Rate
Log
Di.
State Tax Rate
Log
Di.
1986 1988 1986–8 1986 1988 1986–8
Alabama 32.2% 19.4% 0.173 Montana 33.2% 23.3% 0.138
Alaska 32.7% 20.6% 0.164 Nebraska 34% 19.1% 0.204
Arizona 32.8% 21.7% 0.154 Nevada 30.8% 14% 0.218
Arkansas 30.8% 14% 0.218 New Hampshire 30.8% 14.6% 0.21
California 35.1% 20.9% 0.198 New Jersey 30.4% 16.1% 0.186
Colorado 32.8% 19.6% 0.179 New Mexico 32.7% 20.6% 0.165
Connecticut 30.6% 15% 0.203 New York 34% 19.7% 0.196
Delaware 34.3% 21.8% 0.174 North Carolina 33.2% 22% 0.154
District of
Columbia
35.4% 23.5% 0.168 North Dakota* 37.6% 19% 0.261
Florida 30.8% 14% 0.218 Ohio 30.2% 16.8% 0.176
Georgia 33.1% 20.6% 0.171 Oklahoma 33.1% 20.4% 0.173
Hawaii 35.5% 24.9% 0.151 Oregon 34.7% 23.3% 0.162
Idaho 35.1% 21.3% 0.193 Pennsylvania 30.5% 16% 0.19
Illinois 30.5% 16.1% 0.188 Rhode Island 34.6% 19.8% 0.204
Indiana 30.4% 16.8% 0.179 South Carolina 34.6% 21.4% 0.184
Iowa 33.3% 21.4% 0.163 South Dakota 30.8% 14% 0.218
Kansas 32.7% 18% 0.198 Tennessee 30.8% 14.7% 0.208
Kentucky 32.8% 20.4% 0.169 Texas 30.8% 14% 0.218
Louisiana 31.8% 17.6% 0.188 Utah 32.9% 21.5% 0.157
Maine 34.6% 21.2% 0.186 Vermont 35.2% 19.8% 0.214
Maryland 32.5% 19.7% 0.174 Virginia 33.1% 20.4% 0.173
Massachusetts 30% 17.9% 0.159 Washington 30.8% 14% 0.218
Michigan 30.3% 17.3% 0.171 West Virginiay 34.2% 17.2% 0.23
Minnesota 34.2% 21.5% 0.175 Wisconsin 31.8% 20.8% 0.148
Mississippi 32.7% 19.3% 0.181 Wyoming 30.8% 14% 0.218
Missouri 32.2% 19.2% 0.176
Notes: * North Dakota calculates impossibly high marginal rates pre-1986 and is dropped. y West Virginia
repeals its contribution deduction in 1987 and is dropped.
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APPENDIX B
Charitable Giving Additional Results
Median State Change as Treatment/Control Divide
The continuous dierence-in-dierences specification used in section 2.3 of this paper
implicitly assumes a log-linear relationship between change in the tax cost and change in
contributions. This assumption can be relaxed somewhat by splitting states by tax change
into “treatment” and “control” groups and comparing across the two. The downside of this
alternative specification is the loss of information within the state groups.
I use above- and below-median state treatment groups to conduct a dierence-in-dierence
analysis of individual nonprofits. I estimate
ln(Contributionsit) = i + D86s(i)  Post86t + t + X0st + "it (B.1)
where Contributionsit is real direct contributions reported by organization i in year t;  is a
year or region-by-year eect; D86 is equal to 1 (0) if state s(i) has tax price change above
(below) median for 1986-8; Post86 is equal to 0 for years 1982-3 and 1985 and equal 1 for
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years 1988-2007; i is an organization fixed eect. The coecient of interest is , which
captures the dierence in contributions between states with above- versus below-median
changes in tax price following the TRA86.
The results of this regression are reported in table B.1. For the basic version of the
regression, reported in column 1, organizations located in state with an above-median tax
cost increase receive about 14% lower direct contributions than organizations in states with
below-median increases. The size of this gap is even larger when we add region-by-year
eects (-20%, column 2), state-year macro variables (-15%, column 3) or both (-16%,
column 4). All of these estimates are statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level using
state-clustered standard errors. The mean log dierence in tax cost across states is 0.03,
which means these estimates translate into an elasticity of contribution receipts with respect
to average tax cost of -4 to -5, consistent with the magnitudes in table 2.2. (That is, a one
percent increase in the average tax cost is associated with about a four percent decline in
contribution receipts.)
Table B.1: Dierence-in-Dierence (at Median)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Direct Contributions
D86s(i)  Post86t -0.141** -0.202*** -0.147*** -0.155***
(0.0632) (0.0593) (0.0449) (0.0463)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Observations 16882 16882 16882 16882
R-squared 0.861 0.862 0.862 0.862
Number of Orgs 3273 3273 3273 3273
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by state.
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Scatterplots of Changes in Revenues vs. Changes in Expenditures
The scatterplots in section 3.2 omitted the most extreme one percent of changes in
either plotted variable for ease of viewing. This trimming does not change the results
substantially. Figure B.1 repeats the first four panels of figure 3.3 with extreme values
included. Though a few extreme values make it much harder to see what’s going on in the
rest of the distribution, the slopes of the fitted lines printed in the top left corner of each
panel are not particularly dierent: figure B.1A fits a slope of 0.91 dollars in additional
program expenditures for a dollar in program revenues (compared to 0.74 in figure 3.3A);
figure B.1B estimates a slope of 0.28 dollars in program expenditures for a dollar of direct
contributions (0.15 in figure 3.3C); on the other hand, a dollar of program revenues is
associated with -0.06 dollars in additional saving according to the slope plotted in figure
B.1C (0.15 in figure 3.3B) and an additional 0.61 dollars for an extra dollar of contributions
in figure B.1D (0.73 in figure 3.3D). While extreme values influence the slope of the line,
they do not qualitatively change the observed relationship.
Plotting these data in terms of dollar changes makes the slopes very easy to interpret,
but make it possible that the relationships for the largest organizations, which are likelier
than small groups to have big changes in dollar terms in their financial inputs and outputs,
dominate the figures and the observed plots. I therefore present one more set of scatterplots
with changes normalized to individual organization’s size. For each variable Xit, including
flows to net assets, direct contributions, program revenues, or program expenditures for
organization i in year t, I calculate z-scores for the size of the observed change in terms of
organization-level standard deviations from the organization’s mean change.
Zi(Xit) =
Xit   Xiq
1
Ni
P
Xit   Xi
2
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where Xi is the average of all first dierences in variable X observed for organization i
in the data, and Z is the organization-level standard deviations from the mean observed
in period t for charity i. These renormalized variables allow examination of the relation-
ship between large changes in charities’ finances relative to the norm for that charity. The
downside of this approach is that the slope of a fitted line will now be more dicult to in-
terpret, since changes in terms of standard deviations have dierent dollar meanings across
charities and across variables.
Figure B.2 presents scatterplots in terms of normalized variables. Consistent with fig-
ures 3.3 and B.1, the panels of figure B.2 reveal a strong positive relationship between pro-
gram revenues and expenditures and between contributions and savings. Figure B.2A finds
a one standard deviation increase in the growth of program revenues is associated with an
additional 0.371 deviations in program expenditures; figure B.2B finds a one standard devi-
ation increase in contributions is associated with just 0.036 standard deviations in program
expenditures. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in program revenues is
associated with an increase of 0.11 deviations in flows to net assets (figure B.2C), compared
with an increase of 0.30 standard deviations for direct contributions (figure B.2D).
Estimates with Added Constants
Figure 3.4D plotted estimates of a time-varying treatment eect of a tax reform on
fundraising expenditure plus an added constant. The charts in this section similarly add
$10,000 to the dependent variable, maintaining a consistent sample while still using an
(approximately) log-log regression specification.
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Figure B.1: Changes in Expenditures vs. Changes in Revenues (All Observations)
A. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (All Observations)
B. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Direct Contributions (All Observations)
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Figure B.1 — Continued
C. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (All Observa-
tions)
D. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Direct Contributions (All Observations)
Notes: See notes to figure 3.3.
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Figure B.2: Changes in Expenditures vs. Changes in Revenues (Standard Deviations)
A. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (Standard Deviations)
B. Change in Program Expenditures vs. Change in Direct Contributions (Standard Deviations)
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Figure B.2 — Continued
C. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Program Service Revenue (Standard
Deviations)
D. Change in Flows to Total Fund Balance vs. Change in Direct Contributions (Standard Devia-
tions)
Notes: See notes to figure 3.3.
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Figure B.3: Tax Elasticities by Year with Added Constants in Dependent Variables
A. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Net Assets + $10,000
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B. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Program Expenditures + $10,000
−
5
0
5
El
as
tic
ity
 o
f P
ro
gr
am
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
+$
10
,00
0 b
y Y
ea
r
W
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
ta
x 
pr
ice
 (1
−τ
)
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Year
Year Effects Year x Region Effects
Year Effects
& Macro Controls
Year x Region Effects
& Macro Controls
148
Figure B.3 — Continued
C. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Government Grants + $10,000
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D. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Indirect Contributions + $10,000
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Sources: See notes to table 2.2.
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Additional Dependent Variables
For brevity, section 3.4 does not consider the eect of the 1986 tax reform on all finan-
cial variables of possible interest. Those additional results are presented in the panels of
figure B.4. All are consistent with the behavior described in chapter 3, and arguably shed
further light on charities’ behavior.
As in section 3.4, all panels plot time-varying coecients of the state treatment eect
on some dependent variable, as specified in equation 3.5. One possible strategic response
of charities to a shortfall in contributions would be to strive to increase program service
revenue. Figure B.4A plots time-varying treatment eects of the tax treatment on program
service revenue. Any eect is not visible before the late 1990s, when there is a modest
decline in the estimates which is statistically significant in some specifications. Overall,
figure B.4A is not strong evidence for an eect on endogenous program revenue decisions,
but should not be taken as strong evidence against changes, either. Since figure 3.4A doc-
uments a negative eect on program expenditures, flat program service revenue may mean
charities extract higher per-unit service charges for a lower level of provision. Unfortu-
nately, form 990 data do not allow us to observe price increases directly.
Since much of the existing literature on nonprofit behavior has debated the motivations
of charity managers, we may also be interested in the eect of tax reform on managers’
salaries. Figure B.4B plots time-varying estimates of the treatment eect on executive
ocers’ compensation. The obtained estimates are very small and not consistently signed
across time, suggesting that there is not an observable dierence in executive salaries across
states by treatment intensity.
This does not mean there is no eect on compensation, however. Figure B.4C plots es-
timates for the eect on total employee compensation, and consistent with the main results,
dierences in compensation expenditure increase steadily following the TRA86, with the
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estimated eect at its most negative in 1997. Figure B.4D repeats this analysis for expen-
diture on payroll taxes, which can be thought of as a proxy for spending on lower-income
employees (since above some maximum employees no longer owe payroll taxes). Taken
as a whole, these results oer suggestive evidence that charitable contributions do not have
a direct eect on trends in executive compensation in the nonprofit sector, but do aect
demand for non-executive labor.
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Figure B.4: Year-Varying Tax Elasticities by Year for Additional Dependent Variables
A. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Program Service Revenue
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B. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Executive Compensation
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Figure B.4 — Continued
C. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Total Compensation Expense
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D. Tax Elasticities by Year, Log of Payroll Tax Expense
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Tabulated Estimates of Time-Varying TRA86 Treatment Eects
This section tabulates the time-varying estimates plotted in figures 2.6 and 3.4.
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Table B.2: Tabulated Estimates of Time-Varying Treatment Eects
A. Time-Varying Treatment Eects, Log of Direct Contributions
1982 -1.333 -0.837 -1.624 -1.528
(2.321) (2.458) (1.876) (2.035)
1983 -1.167 -0.552 -1.207 -0.882
(1.214) (1.184) (1.129) (1.110)
1986 -1.679 -0.898 -1.293 -0.492
(1.593) (1.135) (1.416) (1.011)
1987 -3.487* -3.824** -3.450** -3.354***
(2.031) (1.445) (1.633) (1.219)
1988 -3.766** -3.711*** -3.892*** -3.327**
(1.470) (1.265) (1.391) (1.351)
1989 -5.331*** -5.999*** -5.783*** -5.911***
(1.668) (1.171) (1.576) (1.375)
1990 -5.858*** -6.166*** -6.230*** -6.077***
(1.376) (1.173) (1.260) (1.097)
1991 -4.402*** -4.839*** -4.722*** -4.740***
(1.567) (1.599) (1.325) (1.405)
1992 -4.575*** -5.517*** -4.719*** -5.241***
(1.647) (1.371) (1.531) (1.333)
1993 -5.513*** -6.043*** -5.274*** -5.570***
(1.918) (1.686) (1.882) (1.636)
1994 -3.630* -4.082** -3.414* -3.591**
(2.116) (1.940) (1.990) (1.724)
1995 -5.991*** -5.874*** -5.921*** -5.533***
(1.912) (1.923) (1.864) (1.765)
1996 -4.530** -5.486*** -4.586** -5.172***
(2.122) (1.918) (2.154) (1.902)
1997 -4.547** -5.138*** -4.732** -4.944***
(2.045) (1.774) (1.834) (1.720)
1998 -4.803** -5.348** -5.003** -5.125**
(2.092) (2.086) (2.227) (2.156)
1999 -4.865** -5.760*** -5.302** -5.557***
(2.029) (1.923) (2.171) (1.878)
2000 -4.637** -5.279** -4.819** -4.906**
(2.220) (2.354) (2.003) (1.995)
2001 -6.667** -7.524*** -6.796** -7.111***
(2.833) (2.726) (2.722) (2.361)
2002 -5.613** -5.966** -5.844** -5.698**
(2.376) (2.479) (2.235) (2.170)
2003 -5.115** -5.614** -5.684** -5.539***
(2.403) (2.346) (2.273) (2.038)
2004 -2.590 -3.783* -3.525 -3.922*
(2.453) (2.127) (2.358) (2.052)
2005 -3.857 -5.454** -5.122** -5.768***
(2.499) (2.107) (2.268) (2.049)
2006 -2.180 -3.283 -3.861 -3.894
(2.651) (2.573) (2.414) (2.369)
2007 -2.578 -3.970 -4.353 -4.678*
(3.009) (2.640) (3.177) (2.631)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
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Table B.2 — Continued
B. Time-Varying Treatment Eects, Log of Program Expenditures
1982 -2.506** -2.176** -2.353** -2.143**
(0.973) (0.962) (0.980) (1.055)
1983 -1.862*** -1.729** -1.731** -1.670**
(0.628) (0.661) (0.686) (0.723)
1986 -0.845 -0.552 -0.650 -0.395
(0.552) (0.527) (0.587) (0.556)
1987 -0.989** -1.032** -1.003* -0.937*
(0.443) (0.413) (0.527) (0.484)
1988 -0.976* -1.035** -1.092* -0.994*
(0.514) (0.451) (0.627) (0.527)
1989 -1.074* -1.075* -1.216 -1.074*
(0.625) (0.558) (0.753) (0.607)
1990 -1.308* -1.441** -1.574** -1.524**
(0.675) (0.554) (0.777) (0.608)
1991 -1.233 -1.236** -1.550* -1.364*
(0.765) (0.591) (0.882) (0.701)
1992 -1.228 -1.129* -1.498* -1.235*
(0.745) (0.662) (0.798) (0.708)
1993 -2.026*** -2.014*** -2.269*** -2.082***
(0.717) (0.673) (0.734) (0.718)
1994 -2.099** -2.091** -2.246** -2.108**
(0.955) (0.843) (0.932) (0.913)
1995 -2.677** -2.681*** -2.852*** -2.739***
(1.050) (0.941) (0.936) (0.945)
1996 -2.838*** -2.893*** -3.071*** -2.993***
(1.028) (0.932) (0.882) (0.898)
1997 -4.105*** -4.325*** -4.388*** -4.477***
(1.012) (1.021) (0.854) (0.996)
1998 -3.720*** -3.779*** -4.003*** -3.951***
(1.011) (0.942) (0.769) (0.845)
1999 -3.436*** -3.405*** -3.803*** -3.627***
(1.097) (0.951) (0.829) (0.865)
2000 -2.532* -2.385** -2.866*** -2.555***
(1.355) (1.075) (0.941) (0.915)
2001 -2.536* -2.390** -2.939*** -2.585**
(1.412) (1.106) (1.025) (0.987)
2002 -2.726** -2.596** -3.143*** -2.838***
(1.247) (0.985) (0.881) (0.901)
2003 -2.106 -1.976* -2.574** -2.277**
(1.419) (1.155) (1.044) (1.018)
2004 -2.062 -1.982 -2.603** -2.329**
(1.414) (1.207) (0.994) (1.028)
2005 -2.714* -2.801** -3.316*** -3.160***
(1.372) (1.177) (0.914) (0.988)
2006 -2.609* -2.573** -3.344*** -3.041***
(1.457) (1.242) (0.949) (0.976)
2007 -2.549* -2.778** -3.358*** -3.289***
(1.387) (1.144) (0.949) (0.972)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
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Table B.2 — Continued
C. Time-Varying Treatment Eects, Log of Net Assets
1982 0.418 0.416 0.736 0.416
(1.869) (1.738) (1.870) (1.800)
1983 -0.258 -0.378 -0.0122 -0.319
(1.592) (1.425) (1.529) (1.431)
1986 -0.00538 0.439 0.145 0.607
(0.533) (0.553) (0.591) (0.581)
1987 0.249 0.0978 0.182 0.211
(0.432) (0.406) (0.396) (0.383)
1988 -0.113 -0.117 -0.300 -0.0422
(0.533) (0.499) (0.377) (0.336)
1989 -0.256 -0.214 -0.558 -0.183
(0.741) (0.661) (0.503) (0.396)
1990 -0.562 -0.433 -0.932 -0.349
(0.805) (0.640) (0.614) (0.525)
1991 -0.826 -0.736 -1.236* -0.733
(1.048) (0.876) (0.708) (0.568)
1992 -1.201 -1.158 -1.589** -1.169**
(0.988) (0.764) (0.672) (0.549)
1993 -1.160 -1.172 -1.542** -1.094
(1.047) (0.848) (0.740) (0.652)
1994 -1.281 -1.359 -1.605* -1.272*
(1.117) (0.945) (0.842) (0.731)
1995 -1.812 -1.882* -2.162** -1.876**
(1.231) (0.991) (0.848) (0.761)
1996 -2.649** -2.842*** -3.049*** -2.884***
(1.115) (0.960) (0.875) (0.804)
1997 -2.546** -2.656** -3.023*** -2.783**
(1.198) (1.133) (1.096) (1.065)
1998 -3.188** -3.362*** -3.693*** -3.475***
(1.247) (1.137) (1.072) (1.041)
1999 -3.690*** -3.738*** -4.369*** -3.884***
(1.256) (1.131) (1.046) (1.055)
2000 -3.181** -3.264** -3.863*** -3.229**
(1.387) (1.327) (1.181) (1.228)
2001 -2.485* -2.609* -3.231** -2.556*
(1.454) (1.376) (1.264) (1.320)
2002 -2.793* -2.906** -3.612*** -2.934**
(1.491) (1.255) (1.133) (1.137)
2003 -3.286** -3.391*** -4.185*** -3.531***
(1.487) (1.250) (1.160) (1.106)
2004 -3.687** -3.616*** -4.652*** -3.803***
(1.557) (1.336) (1.245) (1.194)
2005 -2.851* -2.623* -3.838*** -2.816**
(1.686) (1.469) (1.410) (1.275)
2006 -2.937* -2.851* -4.003*** -3.213***
(1.717) (1.445) (1.392) (1.183)
2007 -2.606 -2.339 -3.721** -2.766*
(1.980) (1.668) (1.740) (1.513)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
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Table B.2 — Continued
D. Time-Varying Treatment Eects, Fundraising (Extensive Margin)
1982 -0.467 -0.504 -0.314 -0.381
(0.530) (0.607) (0.523) (0.603)
1983 -0.272 -0.334 -0.187 -0.261
(0.378) (0.445) (0.337) (0.411)
1986 0.312 0.354 0.328 0.336
(0.329) (0.382) (0.337) (0.376)
1987 -0.355 -0.420* -0.400 -0.469**
(0.267) (0.221) (0.291) (0.227)
1988 -0.485 -0.742*** -0.536 -0.790***
(0.310) (0.235) (0.335) (0.251)
1989 -0.705* -0.980*** -0.725* -0.986**
(0.362) (0.359) (0.398) (0.383)
1990 -0.472 -0.697 -0.544 -0.706
(0.405) (0.419) (0.448) (0.436)
1991 -0.771* -0.980** -0.881* -1.013**
(0.423) (0.445) (0.462) (0.462)
1992 -1.186** -1.326*** -1.309** -1.391***
(0.457) (0.467) (0.494) (0.465)
1993 -1.134** -1.321*** -1.279** -1.398***
(0.461) (0.451) (0.485) (0.432)
1994 -1.357*** -1.522*** -1.475*** -1.592***
(0.505) (0.501) (0.532) (0.478)
1995 -1.186** -1.393*** -1.289** -1.459***
(0.489) (0.467) (0.504) (0.441)
1996 -1.057* -1.294** -1.169* -1.369**
(0.617) (0.578) (0.627) (0.559)
1997 -0.955* -1.182** -1.076* -1.261**
(0.543) (0.518) (0.560) (0.505)
1998 -1.001* -1.190** -1.115** -1.270**
(0.503) (0.489) (0.528) (0.478)
1999 -0.835 -0.942* -0.954* -1.033**
(0.506) (0.480) (0.522) (0.462)
2000 -0.998* -1.075** -1.106** -1.139**
(0.504) (0.486) (0.496) (0.459)
2001 -1.117* -1.117** -1.242** -1.190**
(0.576) (0.548) (0.593) (0.520)
2002 -1.421** -1.388** -1.535** -1.459**
(0.637) (0.605) (0.621) (0.566)
2003 -1.357** -1.432** -1.461** -1.502**
(0.654) (0.630) (0.633) (0.596)
2004 -1.289* -1.436** -1.371** -1.482**
(0.657) (0.653) (0.643) (0.624)
2005 -0.901 -0.977 -0.965 -0.997
(0.755) (0.706) (0.710) (0.669)
2006 -1.095 -1.151 -1.169 -1.176*
(0.756) (0.694) (0.713) (0.668)
2007 -0.804 -0.857 -0.903 -0.878
(0.710) (0.650) (0.683) (0.645)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
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Table B.2 — Continued
E. Time-Varying Treatment Eects, Log of Fundraising Expenditure + $10,000
1982 -1.179 -1.314 -0.929 -1.016
(1.841) (2.121) (1.715) (2.025)
1983 -1.161 -1.231 -0.919 -0.957
(1.416) (1.649) (1.302) (1.509)
1986 0.222 0.379 0.341 0.350
(1.094) (1.284) (1.195) (1.335)
1987 -1.048 -1.206 -1.176 -1.296
(0.883) (0.834) (1.019) (0.940)
1988 -1.929* -2.680*** -2.235** -2.860***
(1.042) (0.860) (1.110) (0.992)
1989 -2.241** -3.078*** -2.563** -3.176**
(1.073) (1.035) (1.266) (1.235)
1990 -1.802 -2.574** -2.084 -2.416
(1.269) (1.251) (1.484) (1.481)
1991 -2.415* -3.331** -2.859* -3.307**
(1.272) (1.275) (1.470) (1.514)
1992 -3.890*** -4.397*** -4.462*** -4.590***
(1.435) (1.421) (1.595) (1.516)
1993 -3.439** -4.075*** -3.950** -4.204***
(1.421) (1.405) (1.527) (1.439)
1994 -4.410*** -4.983*** -4.972*** -5.191***
(1.486) (1.480) (1.611) (1.487)
1995 -4.100** -4.715*** -4.731*** -5.060***
(1.737) (1.704) (1.753) (1.618)
1996 -3.259* -4.112** -4.011** -4.484**
(1.912) (1.829) (1.889) (1.714)
1997 -3.160* -3.949** -3.938** -4.362***
(1.717) (1.610) (1.697) (1.500)
1998 -2.833 -3.431* -3.551* -3.784**
(1.902) (1.836) (1.845) (1.649)
1999 -2.383 -2.766 -3.124 -3.185*
(1.936) (1.882) (1.892) (1.701)
2000 -3.335* -3.747** -3.707** -3.725**
(1.831) (1.800) (1.733) (1.623)
2001 -3.572* -3.895* -3.962** -3.887**
(2.000) (1.953) (1.935) (1.729)
2002 -4.129* -4.408** -4.559** -4.512**
(2.060) (2.041) (1.856) (1.738)
2003 -3.956 -4.402* -4.429** -4.581**
(2.424) (2.365) (2.177) (2.079)
2004 -3.778 -4.528* -4.214* -4.608**
(2.509) (2.363) (2.241) (2.087)
2005 -2.161 -2.760 -2.606 -2.758
(2.724) (2.530) (2.431) (2.271)
2006 -3.425 -4.015* -4.041* -4.153*
(2.556) (2.365) (2.291) (2.096)
2007 -2.591 -3.326 -3.279 -3.433*
(2.398) (2.121) (2.152) (1.895)
Org. Eects X X X X
Year Eects X X
Year*Region Eects X X
Macro Controls X X
Notes and Sources: See notes to figure 3.4.
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APPENDIX C
War on Poverty Data Appendix
Our final dataset is compiled from multiple sources: some hand-entered, some shared
by other researchers, and some publicly available at Inter-University Consortium for Po-
litical and Social Research (ICPSR), Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), or
through the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). We describe each of
these data sources and our variables here.
State-Level Data
Information on CAP Grants
State-level information on federal CAP grants are derived from the NARA microdata
(Community Services Administration 1981). These records are structured as two data files
spanning 1965 to 1981. One dataset is observed at the level of 163,483 individual grant
actions; the other dataset records data on the 4,769 organizations receiving grants. The
combined data include information on any “action” on a grant (when it is recorded, ex-
tended, renewed or terminated), dates associated with these actions, and some information
about the funded project. We use addresses from the grantee data and grant-action file,
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which include the name and address of the designated grantee as well as the county where
the services are provided in most cases. Because a larger urban organization may be funded
to provide services in a rural area, we use information on the area of service delivery in all
of our analysis, data permitting. We aggregate these amounts by the fiscal year of disburse-
ment and state of service delivery1.
We have verified these amounts by state against information printed in OEO annual
reports for FY 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968 (Oce of Economic Opportunity 1965–8). The
NARA data have systematically fewer CAP grants than the OEO reports in 1965, which
can be attributed to missing Head Start grants in this first year. We are unsure about why
these data are missing from the electronic files: the 1965 report tabulates Head Start grants
separately from other CAP program grants, and includes all “approved” grants. Since Head
Start began as a summer program in 1965, it may be that these grants are charged to the
new fiscal year that began in July 1965 and counted in both 1965 and 1966 reports. The
other FYs are very close in the NARA and OEO annual reports.
CAP grant-action data include data on the target population of grant proposals; taken
together, grants from 1965-8 total 18 million people targeted by approved CAP grants. The
OEO deemed these data unreliable in 1971 and ceased collecting it; available documenta-
tion does not indicate how grantees made their estimates or even whether the OEO believed
the estimates were too high, too low, or simply too inaccurate.
Reconstruction of the EOA Apportionment Index, FY 1965-1968
Our reconstruction of the components of the EOA apportionment index in equation 4.1
requires three state-level components in each year from 1965 to 1967: (A) unemployment
1The grant-action file includes separate variables for the action’s fiscal year, “signing date,” and “obli-
gation date,” as well as a “termination date” in some cases. The documentation does not make clear the
meaning of these variables or the distinction between them. The number of grant-actions where the fiscal
year recorded and the fiscal year implied by signing and obligation dates accounts for a small share of federal
dollars, and using either of these as an alternative fiscal year identifier does not change our results.
161
counts, (B) public assistance recipients, and (C) counts of children in families with house-
hold incomes below $1,000. The House Conference Report on the 1964 EOA (H.R. Rep.
88-1458 1964: 13-14) tabulates the current state-level data on these three measures that
was used for FY 1965, and estimates the share of federal funds apportioned to each state
based on the data. We hand entered these data for FY 1965.
The three components of the EOA apportionment index for the subsequent years were
entered using the following sources.
(A) Unemployment counts come from the annual Manpower Report of the President
for FY 1966 to 1968 (U.S. Department of Labor 1966-8). These totals are transformed into
state shares of the national total.
(B) Public assistance recipients are derived from the Social Security Bulletin’s annual
statistical supplements for FY 1966 to 1968 and transformed into state shares of the na-
tional total (Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1966, 1967, 1968). The annual
supplement tabulates data for five public assistance programs: old age assistance, aid to the
blind, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, aid to families with dependent children
(AFDC), and general assistance. For each of these five programs, the Bulletin tabulates
total expenditures and expenditure per recipient by state and program; total recipients are
derived by state and program by dividing total expenditures ($) by expenditures per recip-
ient ($/person), and then summing across the five categories. This risks double-counting
recipients of more than one form of public assistance, but the number of such people are
likely to be small relative to the total number of recipients, as old-age assistance and AFDC
recipients exceed recipients of all the other three forms of assistance by orders of magni-
tude, and since relatively few elderly people have dependent children. Furthermore, to the
extent that such double-counting occurs proportionally in every state, transforming total
recipients into state share of the national total eliminates any problem.
(C) We found no state-level information on child poverty counts beyond the 1964 infor-
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mation printed in the House Conference Report (H.R. Rep. 88-1458 1964: 13), nor do we
know how subsequent figures would have been computed at the OEO. Consequently, our
primary analysis uses the published 1964 child poverty rates for subsequent fiscal years.
Because our state-level analysis relies on the index being what the OEO actually used, the
lack of child poverty data could introduce measurement error. Therefore, we also examine
the robustness of our results to a measure of child poverty that is linearly interpolated be-
tween 1964 and the 1970 census, which we compute using the 1970 IPUMS Census 1%
sample.
County-Level Data
Except as noted, all data are reported at, aggregated to, or mapped onto consistent geo-
graphic units. The final data set contains 3,091 counties or super-counties.2 Super-counties
are the aggregations of individual counties into a single unit for analysis, either because
some data are reported at a super-county level, or because county boundaries change over
the period of study. These super-counties include:
1. the five boroughs comprising New York City;
2. Menominee, Oconto, and Shawano counties, Wisconsin;
3. La Paz and Yuma, Arizona;
4. Cibola and Valencia, New Mexico;
5. Washabaugh and Jackson, South Dakota;
6. Armstrong and Dewey, South Dakota;
2Throughout this paper, we use “county” to refer to both proper counties and county equivalents, including
independent cities and Louisiana parishes.
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7. Yellowstone National Park designated area and Yellowstone county, Montana;
8. Yellowstone National Park designated area and Park county, Wyoming;
9. Lexington city and Rockbridge county, Virginia;
10. Elizabeth city and Hampton city, Virginia;
11. Emporia city and Greensville county, Virginia;
12. Norfolk county and South Norfolk city become Chesapeake city, Virginia;
13. Princess Anne county and Virginia Beach city, Virginia;
14. Franklin city and Southampton county, Virginia;
15. Warwick county and city and Newport News city, Virginia;
16. Fairfax city and Fairfax county, Virginia;
17. Salem city and Roanoke county, Virginia;
18. Bedford city and Bedford county, Virginia;
19. Manassas city, Manassas Park city, and Prince William county, Virginia; and
20. Poquonson city and York county, Virginia.
For each of the datasets described below, we aggregated county information (count
information is summed and share information is population weighted) to our set of consis-
tently identified counties and supercounties and then linked these datasets together. Alaska,
Hawaii and the District of Columbia are excluded from analysis. Additionally, Bradley
and Independence counties, Arkansas, are missing 1960 presidential election data from all
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sources, and are excluded from analysis. Necessarily, all are reported at the county level or
lower.
Figure 4.3 maps per-capita CAP spending at the county level using GIS shape files
obtained from the Newberry Library (Siczewicz 2011). We extracted county borders as
of December 31, 1959 from their panel of US historical county boundaries. In a small
number of cases where map counties were more disaggregated than our super-counties, the
super-county value is mapped in each constituent county.
Demographic Information
Demographic information are data entered from the U.S. Census publications and posted
at ICPSR by Michael Haines (2010; ICPSR dataset 2896). Variables from this dataset in-
clude shares of population living in urban, farm, and rural non-farm areas; shares of the
population that are white and nonwhite; shares of population younger than five years old
and older than sixty-four; share of population in households earning less than $3000 per
year or more than $10,000; shares of population with less than or equal to 4 years educa-
tional attainment and with greater than or equal to twelve years.
Haines (2010) is also the source of several additional demographic and political controls
included in table D.5, used to replicate as closely as possible for the 1960s the variables
used in Fishback, Kantor and Wallis’s (2003) study of the New Deal. These additional
variables include the civilian unemployment rate, inverse population density, voter turnout,
total population, change in per capita retail sales 1958 to 1963, share of population with
less than four years of education, share of land in farms, average farm size in 1964, and
change in average farm size 1959 to 1964.
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County-level Measures of Local Government Spending
Data on county-level local government spending are collected from Volume VII, table
28 of the 1962 Census of Governments (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1964). We collect
data on direct general expenditure, which includes all outlays other than outgoing intergov-
ernmental transfers, direct public welfare expenditure, and total local tax revenue. Local
government spending is an aggregate of all local governments in a county, including the
towns, cities, townships, villages, school districts, special districts and county government
itself. We divide these aggregats by total population to obtain per-capita figures.
County-level Information on Vietnam Casualties
Unfortunately, information on the number of men serving by county is not available
from the National Archives or Selective Service, so casualty records are the best infor-
mation we have on Vietnam mobilization. Data on Vietnam casualties is obtained from
the NARA (U.S. Department of Defense 2008). The level of observation is the individual
decedent. Records for 58,220 decedents contain date of death, state, and home city; most
records also have data on home county.
We aggregate individual decedents and compute the cumulative number of deaths in
Vietnam in a county per draft-eligible man ( 100) at t+2 for, because tours were two years
long. The number of draft-eligible men by county are calculated using the number of males
in the 1960 Census who would have been draft-eligible by year t+2. So, for the share of
men in years 1960-70, we total males aged 8 to 20 in the 1960 Census. (The youngest
would have been 18 by the start of 1970; the oldest 26 in 1966.) To confirm that this
variable is not driven by outmigration of males in heavily drafted areas, we also construct
a backward-looking denominator of females aged 21-34 in the 1970 Census. Using this
alternative measure of Vietnam mobilization does not aect our results. In practice, deaths
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appear to be a good proxy for mobilization. The association between two-year rolling
windows of Vietnam casualties and lagged mobilization rates at the state level is 0.66.
In 1,709 cases where the decedent’s city could refer to areas in more than one county,
the county identifier is missing. When a decedent’s city is uniquely named within a state,
he is assigned to the county containing that city. When a decedent’s city of origin is in mul-
tiple counties, we assign the casualty to the county containing the larger area or population
mass of that city. For example, the incorporated area of Columbus, Ohio includes parts of
three dierent counties, and Columbus decedents are coded as being from multiple coun-
ties. However, the largest, oldest, and most populous portion of Columbus is located in
Franklin County, and we therefore assign Columbus decedents to Franklin County. When
a decedent’s city could refer to more than one populated area within a state, we assign the
casualty to the county containing the largest populated area. For example, there are two
places named Liberty in Illinois. One is a small town of a few hundred people in Adams
County; the other is an even smaller, unincorporated place in Saline County. Two decedents
from Liberty, Illinois are assigned to Adams County.
For 13 observations lacking county identifiers, a county cannot be assigned, and these
decedents are dropped from the analysis. Once county assignments have been made, casu-
alties are aggregated to the county-year level.
County-year casualty totals are then transformed into a proxy measure of mobilization
at year t by dividing casualties from 1960 to year t + 2 by the number of males in the 1960
census eligible for service by year t + 2. For instance, for year 1966, we total all casualties
in a particular county recorded from 1960 to 1968 and divide by the number of males in the
1960 census aged 10 to 20 (since all would have been greater than 18 and draft eligible by
1968). We look forward two years from year t to capture men who may have been drafted
in year t and killed during their two-year tour of duty. We confirm that this measure is not
driven by migration by calculating an alternative version using the 1970 census and women
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of appropriate age from Haines (2010).
Information on Riot Intensity
Data on rioting was generously shared by Collins and Margo (2007). These data were
originally collected by Carter (1986) and encompass 752 urban riots spanning from 1964
to 1971, observed at the level of individual riots.
We match city names for these riots to counties by hand and then aggregate to the
county-year level. Where a city is located in more than one county (e.g. Columbus, Ohio)
we match it to its principal county.
Following Collins and Margo, we measure riot intensity using an equally-weighted
index of five measures of riot intensity (deaths, injuries, arrests, days of rioting, and number
of arsons) as a proportion of the sum of these measures for all urban riots from 1964 to 1971
in a specific county-year, measured as shares of the total count of all of these measures in
all years and multiplied by a scaling factor of 10,000. The county-year index value is
the sum of all riot index values in that county and year. For instance, the riot data set in
cumulatively counts 15,835 arsons, 69,099 arrests, 1,802 days of rioting, 12,741 injuries,
and 228 deaths. The notorious July, 1967 Detroit riot had 7,231 arrests, 1,682 arsons, 491
injuries, 43 deaths, and lasted 9 days. Therefore the 1967 Detroit riot’s index value is
 
1682
15835
+
7231
69099
+
9
1802
+
491
12741
+
43
228
 10; 000 = 4430
!
Counties with no riots observed in a particular year are assigned a zero value. The
Detroit riots were much more extensive than several small riots more typical of the time.
During 1968, the worst year of the rioting, there are 167 individual riots, with a mean index
value of 126. Of the 330 individual riots observed from 1964 to 1968, the mean index value
is 140 and the mean index value is 30.
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County-level Poverty Counts
In addition to income measures from the Haines Census files, we obtain counts and
shares of families living below $1,000, $2,000, $3,000 and below the poverty line from
the 1960 Putnam file (Community Services Administration 1975). The documentation
included with the National Archives’ copy of the Putnam file explains,
OEO needed a definition of poverty and identification of the extent and pattern
of poverty in the United States. The definition did not exist previously, and no
documentation was available on what constituted poverty. No one knew ex-
actly how the picture of poverty in the United States looked or what programs
would act to eliminate it in the nation. . . To establish this definition and pattern
of poverty, the Bureau of the Census took the first step and created the PUT-
NAM FILE using data from the Census of 1960. The file acquired the name
from its originator in the OEO, Israel Putnam. . .OEO and other agencies used
their files recurrently. . . OEO also used these files to justify the allocation of
funds, the Department of Agriculture used them to estimate the cost burden of
the Food Stamp Program, and the Center for Infectious Disease in Atlanta used
them to identify disease vectors.
The documentation suggest the Putnam file once included data by city and congres-
sional district as well, but the National Archives holds a copy of county-level data exclu-
sively. The documentation also indicates that the Putnam file is stored as EBCDIC plain
text, but we found no software that was able to successfully convert the Putnam file to
ASCII. To translate the data into a modern format, we did a “hex dump” of the underlying
binary code into a text file recording each byte in hexadecimal (base-16) digits. We then
compared individual bytes to a sample page of bytes and corresponding meanings in the
National Archives documentation to “decode” the data format of the underlying file. We
then translated the hexadecimal output directly into Stata format. We confirmed that this
method correctly obtained the underlying data by aggregating poverty counts from the Put-
nam file and comparing the results to those published in a 1970 Census special report on
changes in local poverty rates (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975).
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County-level Information on US Election Outcomes and Voter Turnout
We obtain votes cast by party by county for the 1960, 1964, and 1968 presidential
elections from ICPSR (1995), “General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990.”
From these data, we create variables for each election measuring the share of votes cast for
the Democrat relative to the decisive vote, indicator variables for close vote shares within
the county or for Democratic victory, and interactions of these variables. Because county-
level 1960, 1964 and 1968 presidential election vote totals for Mississippi and Alabama
have missing observations in ICPSR (1995), we hand-entered this information using ocial
state publications: the Alabama Ocial and Statistical Register (1963) and Mississippi
Election Statistics (1968). Bradley and Independence counties, Arkansas have missing data
as well, but we could not find an alternative data source. These two counties are dropped
from our analysis.
Specifically, we construct the relative vote share as half the dierence between the
Democratic vote share and the winner (in the case of a loss) or the second-place candidate
(if the Democrat is the winner). In a two-party race, a 50-50 split sets this variable equal
to 0; a 75-25 win is a relative share of +25 percent; a 60-40 loss is a relative share of -10
percent; etc. For the 1964 election, the share of ballots cast for third parties is small in all
states, and the variable is extremely close to this ideal.
We obtain county-level estimates of voter turnout and measures of Democratic vote
share in elections to the House of Representatives from 1950 to 1972 from (Clubb et al.
2006, ICPSR 8611). This dataset estimates the number of eligible voters using interpola-
tion between decennial censuses and laws governing voter eligibility. As such, turnout can
exceed one hundred percent when county vote totals exceed their estimated number of eli-
gible voters; see their documentation for more details. Some counties are missing election
data in this source in each election cycle; as such we use balanced panel of 2,585 counties
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in our analysis of turnout and Democratic vote share that are observed in each election from
1950 to 1972.
Clubb et al. (2006) is also the basis of several additional political variables included
in table D.5 to replicate as closely as possible for the 1960s the variables used in Fish-
back, Kantor and Wallis’s (2003) study of the New Deal. These additional variables are the
Democratic presidential vote share over 9 election cycles, the volatility (measured by stan-
dard deviation) of Democratic share over 10 election cycles, and the swing in Democratic
share since the previous election.
County-level Information in Agriculture
An indicator variable for the Census “plantation county” designation is derived from
a special report on 1910 cotton production in 337 counties characterized by plantation
agriculture (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1916). The list of these counties was generously
provided in machine-readable form by Paul Rhode.
Sharecroppers as a share of farm operators are derived from counts of total operators
and croppers from the U.S. Censuses of Agriculture for 1930 and 1959. Data for 1930
and 1935 were kindly provided by Price Fishback, Michael Haines and Paul Rhode. Total
operators for 1959 was obtained from Haines (2010). Sharecropper counts for 1954 and
1959 were hand-entered (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1959; Depew et al. 2013).
Measures of Congressional Power and Committee Chairmanship
Party identification and committee membership and rank data for members of Congress
is observed at the level of the individual, with one observation per committee assignment,
per congress (Nelson 1993). We matched these data to counties using a crosswalk con-
structed from the district number variable in Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (2006) and maps
in the Atlas of Congressional Districts (1964, 1966, 1968). Following Alston and Ferrie
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(1999, p.45), we define the powerful committees of the House of Representatives as Ways
and Means, Appropriations, Rules, Education/Labor, Judiciary, and Agriculture.
House representatives in leadership positions — that is, Speaker of the House or the
leader or whip of either party — who do not also serve on committees are missing from
the data set. We add information about these people and their leadership roles to the data
manually, using the printed edition of Nelson’s data (1993).
We use our crosswalk to turn these variables and their interactions at the level of the
congress-representative-assignment level into variables at the county level. Some coun-
ties have more than one representative in the House. We create indicator variables equal
to one if any county representative is a member of a powerful committee or in a House
leadership position; if any representative is in chair or senior minority member of a power-
ful committee or in a House leadership position; if any representative is both a Democrat
and a committee member or a leader; and if any representative is both a Democrat and a
committee chair or member of the House leadership; otherwise, each variable is equal to
zero.
We also create a variable equal to the share of a county’s representatives that were
Democrats. When counties have more than one representative, the variable for a Demo-
cratic representative is equal to (Number of county Democratic representatives) / (Total
number of county representatives). Since most counties have a single House representa-
tive, in the 88th congress there are only 150 of 3,093 counties where this variable is not
equal to zero or one.
Information on CAP Grants
See discussion on CAP grant data under state-level discussion. Note that the address of
the provision of services may dier from the grantee’s primary address, so we use infor-
mation on the delivery of services to aggregate to the county level when available. For 55
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grant actions where service delivery county codes are missing, grant actions are assigned to
a local area based on the location of the grantee organization. For 24 grant actions missing
both grantee and grant-action county codes, geographic codes are assigned by inferring a
project’s probable location from the project description string variable which contains this
information. Then, federal CAP funding is aggregated to the county-FY level using these
geographic codes and the dates of likely disbursement.
New Deal Spending and Covariates
Column 4 of Appendix Table D.5 adds a vector of correlates of New Deal spending to
a county-level analysis of War on Poverty grants. These variables include demographic,
political, and structural measures of the American economy up to year 1932, and are de-
scribed in detail in the Data Appendix to the working paper version of Fishback, Kantor and
Wallis (2003) (see NBER working paper No. 8309). The county-level data were obtained
from Price Fishback’s web site in June 2013.
Miscellaneous Data
County Boundaries
Figure 4.3 maps real 1965-8 per capita War on Poverty spending at the county level.
County boundaries were obtained from the Newberry Library’s Atlas of Historical County
Boundaries and downloaded in August 2013. Shape files for counties as of December 31,
1959 were extracted from the full panel of US county shape data using ARCMap software.
The map was created by merging our county-level data set with the extracted shape files
using the shp2dta and spmap Stata .ado extensions. As described above, our dataset is
observed at the level of “super-counties”; when a super-county corresponded to more than
one county shape, the same super-county value is mapped to all component counties.
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Roll Call Votes
Roll Call votes in the House and Senate for passage of the Economic Opportunity
Act are taken from ICPSR dataset No. 4, “United States Congressional Roll Call Voting
Records, 1789-1998.” Roll call votes are coded as a 1 for a YES and 0 for a NO (including
paired votes), and coded as missing for members not voting or voting present.
Congressional District Demographic Data
The roll call vote analysis in table D.6 uses demographic and economic data from the
Congressional District Data Book for the 88th Congress obtained from E. Scott Adler’s
homepage.
Congressional Tenure
The comparative analysis with New Deal spending uses ICPSR andMcKibben (1997)’s
data on individual congresspersons to construct a measure of tenure. We define tenure as
the total number of Congresses served by a Representative of Senator in their respective
chamber at the time of the vote for passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. Partial terms
(e.g. those who took oce in a special election) are counted as equivalent to full terms.
Non-consecutive terms are included, but service in the other chamber of Congress or in
other political oce is not.
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics for County Dataset
 
 
  Mean Median SD 
Federal CAP funds. (Cumulative in thousands 
1968$, others current thousands $) 
1965-68 783576 10528 4633000 
1965 46111 0 413798 
1966 188728 0 1101000 
1967 253857 0 1568000 
1968 265428 0 1445000 
Local government direct general expenditures 
per capita 1962 183.1 171.1 77.78 
Local government public welfare 
expenditures per capita 1962 9.743 3.001 15.48 
Local government tax revenue per capita 1962 87.23 79.62 55.48 
Share of Population ! 5 years old 1960 0.111 0.111 0.018 
Share of Population > 64 years old 1960 0.106 0.104 0.033 
Share of Nonwhite population 1960 0.107 0.024 0.165 
Share of Population living in urban areas 1960 0.321 0.311 0.284 
Share of Population living in rural farm areas 1960 0.226 0.204 0.162 
Share of Population with income <$3K/year 1960 0.079 0.068 0.051 
Share of Population with income " $10K / 
year 
1960 0.355 0.335 0.162 
Vietnam deaths 1960-65 per Men aged 11-20 
in 1960 x 100  0.129 0.117 0.12 
Vietnam deaths 1960-68 per Men aged 10-20 
in 1960 x 100  0.21 0.202 0.149 
Vietnam deaths 1960-69 per Men aged 9-20 
in 1960 x 100  0.256 0.243 0.161 
Vietnam deaths 1960-70 per Men aged 8-20 
in 1960 x 100  0.267 0.257 0.16 
Collins-Margo Riot Intensity Index 
1964 0.90 0 29 
1965 1.63 0 87.5 
1966 1.09 0 25.7 
1967 4.48 0 93.1 
1968 5.62 0 64.8 
Democratic vote share for President 1964 0.0534 0.0765 0.151 
Democrats win electoral votes 1964 (0/1) 0.731 1 0.443 
Presidential vote margin within 10 pct. points 1964 (0/1) 0.233 0 0.423 
Dem win * close election 1964 (0/1) 0.138 0 0.344 
Democratic vote share for President 1960 -0.0208 -0.0388 0.134 
Democrats win electoral votes 1960 (0/1) 0.38 0 0.486 
Presidential vote margin within 10 pct. points 1960 (0/1) 0.275 0 0.446 
Dem win * close election 1960 (0/1) 0.118 0 0.322 
Croppers as share of farm operators 1930 0.0837 0 0.14 
Percent Change in cropper share of operators 1930-1959  -33.64 0 42.56 
Census plantation county designation 1910 (0/1) 0.109 0 0.312 
Northeast (0/1) 0.0689 0 0.253 
Midwest (0/1) 0.341 0 0.474 
South (0/1) 0.457 0 0.498 
West (0/1) 0.133 0 0.34 
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Table C.1 — Continued
 
  Mean Median SD Democratic Share of US House Reps., 88th 
Congress 1964 0.589 1 0.48 
House Reps. include major committee 
member/leadership, 88th Congress 1964 0.455 0 0.498 
House Reps. include Democrat major 
committee member, 88th Congress 1964 0.247 0 0.431 
House Reps. include major committee chair or 
leader, 88th Congress 1964 0.0456 0 0.209 
House Reps. include Dem major comm. 
member/leadership, 88th Congress 1964 0.0197 0 0.139 
 
  Notes: Summary statistics for 3,091 counties in the 48 contiguous states (excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and
District of Columbia; see data appendix). Sources: Riot data, Collins and Margo (2007); Vietnam data,
Defense Casualty Analysis System; 1960 Census data, Haines (1995); Election outcomes, ICPSR (1997);
Local government budgetary data, Census of Government (1962); Plantation data, U.S. Census Bureau (1910,
1930, 1959), Haines (2010) and Fishback, Haines and Rhode (2011).
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics for Dataset on Voter Turnout and Share Democrat
 
 
 Year Mean Median SD 
Estimated Voter Turnout 
1950 43.98 50.6 22.68 
1952 58.61 67.3 22.07 
1954 44.87 50.2 20.90 
1956 57.46 65.7 21.33 
1958 45.36 52.5 23.06 
1960 61.19 69.9 22.15 
1962 48.01 52.9 21.27 
1964 60.28 65.7 18.46 
1966 49.68 50.8 15.41 
1968 59.65 62.3 14.66 
1970 49.07 50.1 18.56 
1972 56.30 58.9 16.78 
Democratic House Election Vote 
Share 
1950 56.55 47.86 27.29 
1952 52.84 44 28.31 
1954 56.87 49.19 25.89 
1956 57.18 50.23 25.23 
1958 63.54 56.54 23.78 
1960 59.07 52.4 24.38 
1962 57.10 50.55 23.24 
1964 56.43 52.48 22.14 
1966 51.93 48.19 21.87 
1968 49.31 45.5 22.97 
1970 55.31 51 23.17 
1972 52.43 48.5 24.38 
 
Notes: Summary statistics for a balanced panel of 2,585 counties in the 48 contiguous states (excludes Alaska,
Hawaii, and District of Columbia). Source: Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (2006).
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APPENDIX D
War on Poverty Additional Results
Comparison of the New Deal with the War on Poverty
This article’s political economy of the EOA can also be compared to research on the
political economy of the New Deal.1 Like the New Deal literature, we find that EOA
spending was influenced by need and by presidential politics. Unlike the New Deal, we
do not find evidence that the OEO attempted to allocate grants to areas with powerful
congressmen. This is consistent with historical accounts of the lack of influence by local
elites and Congress, or, perhaps, with Alston and Ferrie’s hypothesis that some powerful
Congressmen did not want EOA spending in their districts.
In his seminal analysis of reelection-seeking behavior of the Roosevelt administration,
Gavin Wright (1974) constructs a measure of “political productivity” for each state that
captured its electoral votes per capita and proximity to the 50% vote threshold to create a
measure of expected electoral votes for FDR per New Deal dollar spent per capita.2 His
1See Table 2 of Fishback et al. (2003) for a thorough overview of the literature and Fleck (2008).
2Wright assumes the cost of buying one vote is the same everywhere, so the formula is Index = Electoral
votes * (probability of winning with 1% votes “bought” - probability of winning with no spending) / number
of votes needed to buy 1% of electorate.
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state-level analysis finds that New Deal spending is correlated with his measure of politi-
cal productivity and that spending increased Democratic share in 1936 and 1938 elections,
but not in the 1940 election. In contrast, he reports that federal work-relief job allocation
predicts vote share in all three elections. Wallis (1987) adds annual data on state unemploy-
ment rates to the analysis and finds that Wright overstates the importance of politics relative
to economic conditions. The series of articles that followed have investigated these find-
ings further. Wallis (1998) found his own results were driven by a single outlier, Nevada,
which had extremely high electoral votes per capita (over triple the second-highest state’s)
and which was represented the powerful Senator, Key Pittman, throughout the New Deal.
Fleck (2001) argues that Wallis (1998) should control using land area rather than 1/popula-
tion.
Because it is dicult to disentangle these competing hypotheses with state-level data,
a new literature examines the correlates of New Deal spending at the county-level. Fleck
(1999) shows higher voter turnout increased spending under the Federal Emergency Re-
lief Administration in Southern counties. Fishback, Kantor and Wallis (2003) extend this
analysis to all counties. Their baseline specification is
SpendingPerCapi =
0
Popi
+ 0 +
nX
i
kXik +
48X
s=1
sbsi + "i (D.1)
where SpendingPerCap is per-capita New Deal spending from 1933-9 in county i, Pop is
county population, 0 is a constant (baseline spending per person), 0 is also a constant
(baseline spending per county), Xik is one of k controls at the county or state level, b is
a state fixed eect. Fishback, Kantor and Wallis exploit the greater number of observa-
tions available in a county-level analysis to include a variety of measures of political pro-
ductivity and both 1/population and square mileage/population terms, encompassing both
approaches of the state-level analysis.
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To examine the robustness of our findings to Fishback, Kantor and Wallis’s (2003)
county-level model, our table D.5 replicates their elasticities (column 1) and then uses the
same specification for our dependent variable of interest: real, cumulative CAP spending
from 1965 to 1968 (column 2). Their regressors are changed to be the closest available
analogues in more recent data. In particular, we add land area and some additional eco-
nomic and political variables from the 1960 Census and 1962 and 1967 County Data Books
(Haines 2010). Instead of tax returns, which were mandated for a much larger share of the
population following the SecondWorld War, we use share of households earning more than
$10,000 to measure high-income households.3 In addition, we use share of population with
less than four years of education in lieu of literacy rate. Average tenure of congressional
representatives for a county is measured by averaging the number of Congresses served by
all representatives of a county for representatives serving at the time of the August 1964
vote on the EOA, using the Congressional data from ICPSR and McKibbin (1997).
Consistent with our preferred specification and with Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis’s
analysis, high per capita CAP spending is associated with measures of poverty (unem-
ployment rate) and with presidential politics (mean Democratic vote over recent elections,
Democratic swing from 1960 to 1964). As in our main table, the inverse of population and
inverse of population density are not statistically significant predictors of CAP spending.
Interestingly, we find a negative (though not statistically significant) relationship between
a Representative’s tenure and total CAP funding, where Fishback et al. find a positive re-
lationship. Consistent with the Alston and Ferrie hypothesis, this seems to be driven by
lower funding in the South, where Representatives generally had served longer. (The me-
dian county in the South had an average tenure of 6 terms across its Representatives; the
North, Midwest and West all had medians of 3 terms.) Column 3 adds variables for rioting,
3The $5,000 filing requirement on the 1932 income tax return equals $8,663 in 1960 dollars, making
$10,000 household income the closest equivalent income level in the available data.
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Vietnam mobilization, and Southern paternalism, which do not meaningfully change the
estimates.
These estimates confirm the robustness of our primary findings: that the OEO directed
funds toward poorer areas, as well as those most valuable for presidential politics, while
actually spending less in congressional districts held by powerful Southern congressmen,
consistent with Alston and Ferrie’s hypothesis. Overall, however, politics mattered far
less for CAP spending relative to New Deal spending. Together, the political variables
directly analagous to Fishback, Kantor and Wallis’s have a partial R2 of just 0.014 for the
Community Action Program, compared to 0.206 for the New Deal.
Roll Call Voting Analysis of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
Footnote 6 of chapter 4 describes patterns of roll call voting on the Economic Opportu-
nity Act; this section provides more detail on the roll call voting analysis. For a set of votes
on the Economic Opportunity Act, we estimate a linear probability model
Yi =  + P0i + X
0
i +
1X
p=0
X
j
(Di = p)  R j(i)  p j + "i (D.2)
where Yi is equal to 1 for a yea vote and 0 for a no vote on a particular roll call (including
paired and announced votes), and missing if members voted present or did not vote (ICPSR
2010). P0i is a column vector of political controls from election outcomes, including Demo-
cratic vote share and a close election dummy. In the House, Democratic vote share and
the close election dummy are calculated with respect to the 1962 election to that House
seat; since only one-third of Senate seats are up for election in a given cycle, Democratic
vote share and close election dummy in the Senate regressions are for the 1960 Presidential
election (Clubb et al 2006). X0i is a column vector of socioeconomic controls including
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black, urban, and farm shares of the population and the median income taken from Census
estimates for congressional districts (Adler undated; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1963); p j
is a coecient on a vector of interacted dummies for membership p in the Democratic party
(Di) and a district in each of j census regions (R j). The residual is denoted "i and  is a
constant. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The results are reported in table D.6. In both chambers, the most important determinant
of a positive vote for the Economic Opportunity is partisan identity: Southern Democrats
were less likely to vote for the EOA than Democrats of any other region, but much more
likely to vote for passage than Northeastern Republicans (who were themselves more fa-
vorable than any other regional block in the GOP). In addition to partisan and regional
patterns, legislators from states or districts with high shares of black population were less
likely to vote for the bill, though this eect seems to be driven by the inclusion of Southern
legislators (columns 2-3 and 6-7). House members were significantly more likely to vote
for EOA passage if unemployment in their districts was high.
Estimated Relationships between Election Outcomes
and Demographics Over Time
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Table D.1: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending, by Urban Status
A. Urban Counties Only
1 
 
 
                                                          
                                                         Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Poverty Variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K 37.01*** 
    
37.16**  
  (13.04) 
    
(15.28)  
 ! $1K  108.97*** 
   
 113.92*** 
   (38.92) 
   
 (43.12) 
 ! $2K   53.67***     53.71*** 
   (16.10)     (17.68) 
Share nonwhite    23.60*  22.03 12.05 16.62 
    (13.02)  (15.63) (12.64) (13.75) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population     –16.83 –19.48 –12.90 –16.67 
     (20.19) (21.92) (21.35) (21.25) 
For 1964 Presidential election:         
Change in share for Democrat,     36.72* 47.50** 49.46** 48.04** 
1960–1964     (20.89) (22.95) (24.11) (23.64) 
Share for Democrat     –1.33 0.61 0.38 0.21 
     (23.94) (22.26) (22.98) (22.74) 
1= Democratic won     2.18 1.10 1.06 1.14 
     (5.24) (4.90) (4.94) (4.93) 
1= Election close (+/–10 points)     –1.01 –1.31 –1.07 –1.09 
     (2.67) (2.51) (2.65) (2.58) 
1= Presidential election close     1.64 2.47 2.50 2.42 
x 1=Democrat won     (4.65) (4.33) (4.44) (4.41) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat     2.18 1.92 2.02 2.05 
     (2.22) (2.07) (2.12) (2.10) 
1= Major committee member/     0.93 0.88 0.95 0.95 
Leader     (1.74) (1.72) (1.73) (1.73) 
1= Major committee member     –2.92 –2.88 –2.91 –3.02 
x 1=Democrat     (3.30) (3.13) (3.19) (3.18) 
1= Major committee chair/     –2.21 –1.31 –1.08 –1.20 
Leader     (1.67) (1.61) (1.63) (1.58) 
1= Major committee chair/     1.23 1.50 2.37 1.70 
leader x 1= Democrat     (3.59) (3.58) (3.64) (3.60) 
Observations     1,545     1,545     1,545     1,545      1,545     1,545     1,545     1,545 
R-squared 0.089 0.075 0.079 0.077 0.074 0.078 0.085 0.088 
Partial R-squared         
Poverty variables  0.002 0.006 0.004 0.003  0.003 0.004 0.004 
Political variables     0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
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Table D.1 — Continued
B. Rural Counties Only  
 
                                                 
                                                    Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Poverty Variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K 76.60*** 
    
55.68***  
  (17.32) 
    
(15.95)  
 ! $1K  136.29*** 
   
 69.87** 
   (38.27) 
   
 (29.19) 
 ! $2K   105.03***     59.20*** 
   (25.11)     (17.93) 
Share nonwhite    98.25***  98.31*** 98.30*** 94.60*** 
    (25.54)  (25.82) (25.64) (25.34) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population     9.27 12.28* 7.96 8.29 
     (7.26) (6.93) (6.46) (6.42) 
For 1964 Presidential election:         
Change in share for Democrat,     12.99 45.91*** 44.72*** 44.30*** 
1960–1964     (11.57) (17.14) (16.90) (17.03) 
Share for Democrat     47.35** 41.22** 41.42** 41.38** 
     (19.84) (18.51) (18.51) (18.51) 
1= Democratic won     –8.12 –3.81 –3.86 –3.71 
     (5.55) (5.20) (5.21) (5.21) 
1= Election close (+/–10 points)    –7.30** –2.82 –2.92 –2.79 
     (3.25) (3.01) (3.00) (3.00) 
1= Presidential election close     6.25 1.25 1.40 1.21 
x 1= Democrat won     (5.09) (4.78) (4.78) (4.79) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat     –8.08* –9.29** –9.27** –9.02** 
     (4.70) (4.59) (4.59) (4.58) 
1= Major committee member/     –8.54 –4.50 –4.68 –4.28 
leader     (6.50) (5.94) (5.85) (5.90) 
1= Major committee member     13.46* 13.94** 13.57** 13.27* 
x 1=Democrat     (7.24) (6.93) (6.81) (6.88) 
1= Major committee chair/     5.75 3.77 2.95 3.38 
leader     (6.87) (5.40) (5.67) (5.59) 
1= Major committee chair/     –9.58 –10.09 –8.53 –9.44 
leader x 1= Democrat     (7.91) (6.72) (6.93) (6.90) 
         
Observations     1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546 
R-squared 0.242 0.244 0.250 0.275 0.238 0.301 0.298 0.300 
         
Partial R-squared         
Poverty variables  0.013 0.020 0.021 0.035  0.054 0.047 0.048 
Political variables     0.014 0.021 0.019 0.019 
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Table D.1 — Continued
C. Farming Counties Only
 
 
 
 
                                                     Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)       (6) (7)    (8) 
Poverty Variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K 60.83*** 
    
35.58*  
  (22.64) 
    
(21.07)  
 ! $1K  105.53** 
   
 21.02 
   (45.47) 
   
 (34.11) 
 ! $2K   84.81***     26.77 
   (31.07)     (21.64) 
Share nonwhite    113.58***  117.85*** 121.15*** 117.83*** 
    (34.17)  (33.96)   (34.27) (33.76) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population     12.38 12.87   9.42 9.68 
     (8.80) (8.53)  (7.56) (7.61) 
For 1964 Presidential election:         
Change in share for Democrat,     22.67 48.45** 48.91** 48.08** 
1960–1964     (17.52) (21.72) (21.67) (21.73) 
Share for Democrat     21.04 27.59 26.24 26.99 
     (20.09) (20.74) (20.74) (20.73) 
1= Democratic won     –1.47 –0.36 –0.54 –0.46 
     (5.31) (5.21) (5.21) (5.21) 
1= Election Close (+/–10 points)    –3.96 –1.20 –1.56 –1.38 
     (2.94) (2.82) (2.80) (2.81) 
1= Presidential election close     –0.25 –2.32 –1.90 –2.12 
x 1= Democrat won     (4.75) (4.69) (4.68) (4.68) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat     –3.03 –6.09 –6.11 –5.97 
     (4.79) (4.92) (4.91) (4.87) 
1= Major committee member/     –3.42 –1.84 –2.16 –1.94 
leader     (5.40) (5.01) (4.95) (4.98) 
1= Major committee member     5.52 8.18 8.36 8.11 
x 1= Democrat     (6.77) (6.69) (6.62) (6.63) 
1= Major committee chair/     –0.24 –1.05 –1.48 –1.32 
leader     (4.43) (4.12) (4.25) (4.21) 
1= Major committee chair/     –5.81 –6.12 –5.40 –5.63 
leader x 1= Democrat     (6.29) (6.13) (6.20) (6.19) 
         
Observations     1,545     1,545     1,545     1,545 1,545     1,545     1,545     1,545 
R-squared 0.050 0.051 0.054 0.086 0.050 0.101 0.099 0.100 
Partial R-squared         
Poverty variables  0.005 0.006 0.009 0.024  0.030 0.026 0.026 
Political variables     0.004 0.010 0.009 0.009 
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Table D.1 — Continued
D. Industrial Counties Only
  
 
 
  
     Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)       (6)      (7)    (8) 
Poverty Variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K 89.39*** 
    
66.21***  
  (19.83) 
    
(14.88)  
 ! $1K  244.17*** 
   
 189.24*** 
    (82.46) 
   
 (62.26) 
 ! $2K   115.35***     81.79*** 
   (28.98)     (18.77) 
Share nonwhite    68.61**  63.60** 54.54** 59.56* 
    (30.91)  (32.01) (26.80) (31.18) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population     6.16 9.88** 8.41 6.88 
     (5.39) (4.88) (5.30) (4.99) 
For 1964 Presidential election:        
Change in share for Democrat,    24.51** 55.12*** 51.54*** 53.38*** 
1960–1964     (11.07) (19.83) (19.62) (19.79) 
Share for Democrat     57.44*** 50.06*** 48.54*** 50.21*** 
     (18.07) (17.00) (17.42) (17.13) 
1= Democratic won     –11.71** –10.45** –9.43** –10.08** 
     (4.80) (4.57) (4.65) (4.58) 
1= Election close (+/–10 points)    –9.25*** –8.20** –7.24** –7.92** 
     (3.42) (3.24) (3.18) (3.25) 
1= Presidential election close    18.33*** 16.85*** 15.70*** 16.68*** 
x 1= Democrat won     (6.37) (6.03) (5.65) (6.00) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat     –0.39 –0.70 –0.12 –0.41 
     (2.64) (2.46) (2.56) (2.48) 
1= Major committee     –3.43 –2.87 –2.51 –2.73 
member/leader     (2.70) (2.43) (2.44) (2.44) 
1= Major committee member     –0.26 0.47 –0.06 0.20 
x 1= Democrat     (3.71) (3.40) (3.49) (3.41) 
1= Major committee chair/     1.26 2.44 2.32 2.09 
leader     (2.35) (2.38) (2.26) (2.30) 
1= Major committee chair/     0.34 –0.68 1.59 0.13 
leader x 1= Democrat     (4.05) (4.23) (4.24) (4.18) 
Observations 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546 1,546     1,546     1,546     1,546 
R-squared 0.079 0.103 0.086 0.088 0.065 0.131 0.145 0.132 
Partial R-squared         
Poverty variables  0.022 0.046 0.031 0.020  0.039 0.046 0.038 
Political variables     0.028 0.032 0.029 0.030 
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Table D.1 — Continued
Notes: Urban counties are defined as those with an urban share of population in 1960 above the median
(31.3%) and rural counties are defined as those at or below the urban share median. Farming counties are
those above the median share of population living on farms in 1960 (20.4%) and industrial counties are those
at or below the farming median. See table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.
187
Table D.2: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending, 1965 to 1968, Using Alternative
Cutos for “Close” Election 
 
 
                                                          
                                                              Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Closeness cutoff +/– 3% +/– 5% +/– 7% +/– 15% 
Poverty variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K  49.53*** 
 
48.89*** 
 
48.71***  49.36*** 
  (11.65) 
 
(11.62) 
 
(11.63)  (11.65) 
Share nonwhite  85.58*** 85.78*** 86.15***  85.56*** 
  (21.59)  (21.67)  (21.67)  (21.80) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population 7.81 9.99* 7.82 9.94* 7.67 9.82* 7.75 9.99* 
 (5.95) (5.66) (5.87) (5.61) (5.87) (5.62) (5.93) (5.68) 
For 1964 Presidential election:         
Change in share for Democrat, 26.35** 56.09*** 27.06** 56.53*** 27.39*** 57.10*** 26.53** 55.34*** 
1960–1964 (10.57) (14.92) (10.55) (14.90) (10.46) (14.88) (10.47) (14.61) 
Share for Democrat 28.91** 30.37*** 29.60** 32.02** 28.71** 34.90** 14.21 21.80 
 (11.96) (11.67) (13.42) (13.13) (14.25) (14.10) (17.13) (17.03) 
1= Democratic won –3.65 –3.48 –5.15 –4.99 –5.70 –6.79 0.23 –0.72 
 (2.69) (2.61) (3.53) (3.44) (4.27) (4.24) (6.83) (6.73) 
1= election close  –4.70** –3.07* –6.15*** –4.41** –6.24*** –4.98** –3.41 –1.03 
 (1.92) (1.84) (2.14) (2.02) (2.30) (2.31) (3.31) (3.33) 
1= Presidential election close 8.35* 6.97 7.71** 6.77* 6.88* 7.40** 0.75 0.53 
x 1= Democrat won (4.61) (4.33) (3.71) (3.58) (3.64) (3.68) (5.16) (5.09) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat –0.97 –2.33 –1.08 –2.40 –1.02 –2.31 –1.09 –2.37 
 (2.51) (2.43) (2.52) (2.44) (2.51) (2.43) (2.50) (2.42) 
1= Major committee member/leader –3.58 –2.24 –3.66 –2.29 –3.63 –2.22 –3.68 –2.23 
 (3.07) (2.81) (3.08) (2.82) (3.08) (2.82) (3.09) (2.82) 
1= Major committee member 2.90 3.98 3.09 4.13 3.04 4.06 2.99 4.02 
x 1=Democrat (3.83) (3.65) (3.83) (3.65) (3.83) (3.65) (3.81) (3.64) 
1= Major committee chair/leader 1.67 2.25 1.77 2.30 1.69 2.10 1.91 2.42 
 (2.32) (2.20) (2.33) (2.21) (2.33) (2.20) (2.33) (2.22) 
1= Major committee chair/leader –2.53 –3.37 –2.73 –3.51 –2.76 –3.42 –3.03 –3.71 
x 1= Democrat (3.33) (3.28) (3.33) (3.28) (3.32) (3.28) (3.34) (3.30) 
         
Observations     3,091     3,091     3,091     3,091     3,091     3,091     3,091     3,091 
R-squared 0.008 0.090 0.008 0.090 0.008 0.090 0.008 0.089 
Notes: “Close elections” are defined using margins of +/- 3 percentage points from the pivotal vote (columns
1 and 2), +/- 5 (3 and 4), +/- 7 (5 and 6), and +/- 15 (7 and 8). Specifications are otherwise identical to
columns 5 and 6 of table 2. See table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.
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Table D.3: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending, 1965 to 1968, Omitting Local Gov-
ernment Variables
  
 
  
 
 
                                                         Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Poverty variables        
Population share in HH with incomes        
! $3K   83.09*** 
    
59.62***  
  (16.44) 
    
(12.99)  
 ! $1K  156.98*** 
   
 90.68*** 
   (38.81) 
   
 (27.42) 
 ! $2K   103.63***     62.06*** 
   (21.60)     (14.46) 
Share nonwhite    87.77***  85.13*** 82.82*** 81.68*** 
    (21.77)  (21.74) (20.70) (21.40) 
Political Variables          
1,000/Population     –1.28 5.59 0.87 0.98 
     (3.80) (4.36) (3.73) (3.90) 
For 1964 Presidential election:         
Change in share for Democrat,     23.63** 54.98*** 52.36*** 53.00*** 
1960–1964     (10.30) (14.86) (14.65) (14.77) 
Share for Democrat     34.45** 35.43*** 37.74*** 36.31*** 
     (14.16) (13.64) (13.90) (13.76) 
1= Democratic won     –5.56 –5.25 –5.58 –5.34 
     (3.62) (3.51) (3.54) (3.52) 
1= Election close (+/–10 points)     –6.75*** –4.69** –4.92** –4.70** 
     (2.20) (2.04) (2.05) (2.04) 
1= Presidential election close     7.32** 6.37* 6.75* 6.52* 
x 1=Democrat won     (3.70) (3.57) (3.57) (3.59) 
89th Congress House Representative(s)        
1= Democrat     –1.52 –2.66 –2.67 –2.50 
     (2.51) (2.41) (2.42) (2.40) 
1= Major committee member/     –4.42 –2.66 –2.65 –2.54 
leader     (3.22) (2.88) (2.86) (2.87) 
1= Major committee member     3.41 4.24 4.07 3.93 
x 1= Democrat     (3.85) (3.64) (3.62) (3.61) 
1= Major committee chair/     0.38 1.35 0.49 0.82 
leader     (2.29) (2.10) (2.10) (2.10) 
1= Major committee chair/     –2.15 –2.95 –1.52 –2.23 
leader x 1= Democrat     (3.29) (3.23) (3.17) (3.21) 
         
Observations  3,091 3,091     3,091     3,091  3,091     3,091 3,091 3,091 
R-squared      0.085 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.061 0.027 0.084 0.082 
  
Notes: Local government variables are omitted from the set of suppressed controls. Specifications are other-
wise identical to columns 1 to 8 of table 2. See table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.
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Table D.4: County-Level Correlates of CAP Spending, 1965 to 1968, Regression Coe-
cients Suppressed in Tables 2 and 3
A. Regression Coecients Suppressed in Table 2
 
 
 
 
 
 !
                                                              
                                                              Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    1960 Census Variables (Share of Population)       
< 5 years old 202.51* 166.90 165.85 –62.14 286.32** –74.53 –78.69 –79.09 
 (116.67) (105.92) (111.61) (87.66) (130.33) (90.41) (90.40) (90.76) 
> 64 years old –98.72** –84.22* –97.31** –158.71*** –32.17 –219.18*** –200.42*** –208.12*** 
 (50.15) (47.23) (49.51) (52.35) (46.94) (54.49) (52.45) (53.35) 
Urban 1.64 –0.72 0.03 –1.25 –1.80 2.66 0.36 0.70 
 (3.99) (4.15) (4.11) (4.11) (4.38) (3.88) (3.94) (3.97) 
Rural nonfarm –41.17*** –39.91*** –43.36*** –17.56*** –17.94** –25.62*** –22.40*** –24.14*** 
 (9.79) (10.34) (10.38) (6.72) (7.39) (7.68) (7.80) (7.64) 
Income " $10,000 15.03 –2.88 11.07 –40.31*** –37.28** 6.98 –12.86 –5.94 
 (17.62) (16.11) (16.64) (15.16) (15.36) (17.58) (15.62) (16.09) 
   Census of Government (1962) Local Government Finance      
Direct total expenditures  –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 
    per capita (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total tax revenue per capita –0.05 –0.07* –0.06 –0.09** –0.11** –0.07 –0.08* –0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Welfare expenditures  0.31** 0.36** 0.31** 0.35** 0.35** 0.30** 0.34** 0.32** 
    per capita (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
   Miscellaneous Social Factors         
Sharecroppers / total operators 1.44 –7.33 –7.15 –33.89** 17.16* –20.87* –24.12* –23.95* 
    1930 (Southern paternalism) (7.93) (9.51) (8.83) (14.18) (8.76) (12.56) (13.00) (12.80) 
Collins-Margo riot intensity 35.00*** 35.27*** 31.22** 10.32 60.53*** –2.57 1.75 0.04 
    Index, 1964–1968 (13.44) (11.97) (12.15) (11.01) (19.25) (13.31) (12.99) (13.28) 
Vietnam deaths 1960–1970 / 4.05 4.81 4.56 6.89 4.35 6.16 6.40 6.24 
    Males aged 8–20 in 1960 (4.85) (4.83) (4.83) (4.70) (4.95) (4.73) (4.77) (4.76) 
         
Observations 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 3,091 
R-squared 0.045 0.050 0.050 0.070 0.038 0.090 0.089 0.089 
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Table D.4 — Continued
C. Regression Coecients Suppressed in Table 3
  
 
 
                                                              
                                                              Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   1960 Census Variables (Share of Population)       
< 5 years old –13.83 –20.99 –34.97 –78.06 44.99 –131.19 –125.54 –135.66 
 (106.04) (104.18) (106.03) (118.80) (100.97)  (127.23) (126.90) (127.73) 
> 64 years old –72.47 –58.67 –69.99 –89.12 –43.87 –143.94** –125.91** –134.58** 
 (55.86) (52.54) (53.81) (57.94) (46.63) (61.62) (59.42) (60.40) 
Urban 12.76*** 11.12** 11.61** 10.75** 10.50* 12.23** 10.71* 10.94* 
 (4.94) (5.16) (5.10) (5.20) (5.73) (5.43) (5.67) (5.64) 
Rural nonfarm –15.93** –15.62* –18.08** –5.65 –3.78 –11.58 –10.66 –12.97 
 (8.10) (8.32) (8.58) (7.25) (7.46) (8.38) (8.36) (8.63) 
Income " $10,000 11.49 –11.90 1.65 –37.97 –43.45 5.61 –16.98 –5.64 
 (32.53) (28.29) (30.46) (26.15) (28.79) (36.22) (31.14) (32.74) 
   Census of Government (1962) Local Government Finance      
Direct total expenditures  –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 
    per capita (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Total tax revenue per capita 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Welfare expenditures  0.26 0.30 0.28 0.41 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.24 
    per capita (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
   Miscellaneous Social Factors         
Sharecroppers / total operators 7.39 5.05 4.81 0.68 15.29* 5.73 4.38 4.13 
    1930 (Southern paternalism) (7.56) (8.01) (7.70) (9.08) (9.06) (9.53) (9.72) (9.58) 
Collins-Margo riot intensity 6.63 2.24 –0.30 –28.07 8.79 –39.56 –40.62 –41.56 
    Index, 1964–1968 (59.89) (59.37) (58.93) (63.11) (61.69) (61.78) (61.00) (60.98) 
Vietnam deaths 1960–1970 / 7.41 7.49 7.45 9.16* 7.69 8.27 8.30 8.13 
    Males aged 8–20 in 1960 (5.44) (5.46) (5.50) (5.32) (5.59) (5.60) (5.57) (5.62) 
         
Observations 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 1,414 
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.028 
Notes: Specifications are identical to the specifications reported in columns 1 to 8 of Table 2 (panel A) and Table 3 (panel B). Estimates 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 are suppressed here for brevity. See Table 2 and 3 notes for information on specification and sources. 
 
  
Notes: Specifications are identical to the specifications reported in columns 1 to 8 of table 2 (panel A) and
table 3 (panel B). Estimates reported in tables 2 and 3 are suppressed here for brevity. See table 2 and 3 notes
for information on specification and sources.
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Table D.5: Comparision of Total Federal Grants Per Capita by County, NewDeal and Com-
munity Action Program
 
 
 
 
 
Fishback, Kantor, 
and Wallis 
Community Action 
 Program, 1965–1968 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relief and Recovery     
 Growth retail sales per cap. 0.001 0.311* 0.311* 0.351* 
 Unemployment rate 0.058* 1.117* 1.106* 1.142* 
 % Farm failures(a)  –0.021* –0.127 –0.117 –0.136 
Redistribution and Reform     
 Tax returns / % High income(b) –0.06* 0.0621 0.419* 0.484* 
 Retail sales per capita 0.12* –0.585* –0.588* –0.809* 
 % Black 0.02 0.109 0.0238 0.116 
 % Illiterate / % Low education(c) –0.027 0.388* 0.00170 0.240 
 Average farm size 0.303* 0.0513* 0.0610* 0.0650* 
Political Variables     
 9-cycle Dem. pres. vote mean 0.14* 0.610 0.845*  
 Presidential election swing 0.226* 0.0534* 0.0569*  
 10-cycle Dem. pres. vote std. dev.  0.016 –0.0565 0.0758  
 Pres. votes per population 0.58* –1.725* –2.118*  
 Avg. tenure in House(d) 0.009 –0.0158 –0.009  
Structural Variables     
 Inverse population 0.024* 0.0904 0.0764 –0.00215 
 Square miles per capita 0.067* –0.0507 –0.0449 –0.0427 
 % Population urban –0.004 0.114 0.245* 0.286* 
 % Land on farms –0.278* 0.386* 0.358* 0.374* 
Additional Controls     
 % Families <= $3K Income, 1960   0.0904 0.0764 
 Sharecroppers, 1930   –0.0507 –0.0449 
 Vietnam deaths, 1960–1970 p.c.   0.114 0.245* 
 Riot intensity index   0.386* 0.358* 
1964 Presidential Election Variables     
 Dem Swing from previous election    0.175* 
 Democratic vote share    0.128* 
 Win county (0/1)    –0.177 
 Close election (< 10% margin)    –0.0665 
 Win * close    0.0540 
 State-fixed effects     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 Committee indicators     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
 R-squared 0.426 0.107 0.114 0.108 
 Observations     3,060     3,067     3,067     3,067 
 Partial R-squared     
    All variables except state-fixed effects  0.367 0.040 0.051 0.047 
    Political variables 0.206 0.011 0.014 0.005 
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Notes: Elasticities for New Deal spending taken from the working paper version of Fishback, Kantor and
Wallis (2003), Table 4, “Elasticities of relief, recovery, and reform variables: Total Grants.” An asterisk (“*”)
denotes an elasticity that is significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test. Congressional standing commit-
tees varied over time; our set of committee eects comprises indicator variables equal to 1 if the district was
represented in the 88th Congress by a representative on one of the following committees: Appropriations,
Agriculture, Banking, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Foreign Commerce, Merchant Marine, Public Works,
Rules, and Ways and Means. Fishback, Kantor and Wallace use: Agriculture, Appropriations, Banking and
Currency, Exports, Flood Control, Irrigation Control, Labor, Labor, Public Buildings, Public Lands, Rivers
and Harbors, Roads, Ways and Means. Independent variables for OEO spending are the contemporary equiv-
alents of the New Deal variables, with some substitutions: (a) Because farm failures are not presented at the
county level in the 1963 census of agriculture, we use negative of the percent change in number of farms
from 1958 to 1963; (b) Instead of tax returns per capita, we use 1960 share of population in households with
income above $10,000 from the Putnam file; the filing cuto for an income tax return in 1932, $5,000, equals
$8,663 in 1960 dollars; (c) Instead of percent illiterate, we use 1960 share of population with less than four
years of education. (d) We measure tenure in the House using the number of Congresses served as of the 88th
Congress, for representatives as of the vote on the EOA. Partial R-Squared is calculated by taking the sum of
the partial R-squareds for variables of interest from the Stata ado-file pcorr2.
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Table D.6: Multivariate Regression of Armative Vote on EOA  
 
 
  
Senate Vote For EOA Passage 
July 23, 1964 
House Vote for EOA Passage 
August 8, 1964 
         (1)         (2)         (3)          (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)          (8)  
     Democrat 0.654*** 0.672*** 0.795*** 
 
0.887*** 0.875*** 0.765*** 
  
 
(0.0964) (0.118) (0.208) 
 
(0.0515) (0.0440) (0.115) 
 Electoral Outcomes         
 Democratic vote  –2.079* –1.718 0.982 –2.134** –0.536*** –0.286 –0.518* –0.480** 
      share (1.077) (1.299) (2.676) (1.056) (0.194) (0.174) (0.283) (0.189) 
 Close election 0.0652 0.0605 0.0623 0.00981 –0.0209 0.00443 –0.137 –0.0408 
 
 
(0.0911) (0.107) (0.202) (0.0863) (0.0352) (0.0342) (0.118) (0.0356) 
 JFK Win 1960 0.193 0.0895 0.186 0.232** 
     
 
(0.130) (0.168) (0.319) (0.115) 
    Region Dummies         
 Midwest –0.421*** –0.507** 
  
–0.177*** –0.180*** 
   
 
(0.152) (0.194) 
  
(0.0434) (0.0387) 
   South –0.268* 
   
–0.163** 
    
 
(0.148) 
   
(0.0654) 
    West –0.357** –0.328** 
  
–0.195*** –0.166*** 
   
 
(0.142) (0.141) 
  
(0.0410) (0.0397) 
  Regions by Party         
 Democrat * Northeast 
   
0.205 
   
0.691*** 
 
 
   
(0.194) 
   
(0.0817) 
 Democrat * Midwest 
   
0.0762 
   
0.704*** 
 
 
   
(0.178) 
   
(0.0784) 
 Democrat * South 
   
0.227 
   
0.557*** 
 
 
   
(0.186) 
   
(0.105) 
 Democrat * West 
   
0.114 
   
0.666*** 
 
 
   
(0.160) 
   
(0.0793) 
 Not Dem. * Midwest 
   
–0.899*** 
   
–0.344*** 
 
 
   
(0.157) 
   
(0.0710) 
 Not Dem. * South 
   
–0.494** 
   
–0.141 
 
 
   
(0.207) 
   
(0.116) 
 Not Dem. * West 
   
–0.623*** 
   
–0.376*** 
     (0.221)    (0.0763) 
Demographic Controls         
 Black pop. –1.753*** 1.311 –3.665*** –1.975*** –0.495** –0.152 –0.592 –0.498** 
  (0.528) (2.526) (1.020) (0.490) (0.202) (0.151) (0.367) (0.201) 
 Urban pop. 0.429 0.219 0.310 0.588 0.231* 0.151 0.0502 0.293** 
  (0.610) (0.946) (1.156) (0.487) (0.124) (0.107) (0.280) (0.131) 
 Rural farm pop. 0.662 0.809 3.049 1.248 0.348 0.0234 1.005 0.444 
  (1.013) (1.303) (2.685) (0.865) (0.386) (0.321) (0.766) (0.383) 
 Unemployment  21.57 13.73 –9.954 18.56 12.64*** 4.429 32.96*** 10.40*** 
  (14.17) (17.66) (41.71) (12.90) (2.866) (2.723) (8.611) (2.706) 
 Median Income –0.00246 0.00488 0.0315 0.0214 0.0142 –0.00745 0.107 –0.00206 
  (0.0683) (0.0796) (0.171) (0.0709) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0695) (0.0300) 
 Constant –1.753*** 1.311 –3.665*** –1.975*** –0.495** –0.152 –0.592 –0.498** 
  (0.528) (2.526) (1.020) (0.490) (0.202) (0.151) (0.367) (0.201) 
          
 Observations 99 67 32 99 422 292 130        422 
 R–squared 0.541 0.639 0.410 0.602 0.594 0.776 0.245 0.617 
 Region All Non-South South All All Non-South South All 
  
Table D.6 — Continued
Notes: standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Sources: Demographic data from Adler (undated) and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963); Voting data from
ICPSR (2010).
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Table D.7: Congressional Election Outcomes by Demographic Variable and Year 
 
 
  
Turnout Democratic Vote Share 
 
Year Dummy All Non-South South All Non-South South 
Share of 
population with 
income ! $3,000 x  
1950 10.516*** 9.138* 13.762*** –2.261 15.675*** –20.779*** 
 
(3.386) (4.960) (4.560) (3.886) (4.247) (7.458) 
1952 0.437 2.992 –3.791 –3.652 11.604** –24.060*** 
 
(3.225) (4.813) (3.862) (3.870) (4.751) (6.075) 
1954 10.565*** 10.225** 13.371*** –6.196 14.792*** –26.986** 
 
(3.181) (4.165) (5.046) (5.881) (5.086) (11.442) 
1956 8.753*** 10.870*** 5.730 –4.632 8.145 –21.447*** 
 
(3.136) (4.192) (4.792) (4.268) (5.786) (6.111) 
1958 8.876*** 11.199*** 10.284** –6.903** –1.402 –10.696* 
 
(2.966) (3.981) (4.730) (3.348) (4.227) (6.094) 
1962 11.423*** 14.924*** 11.437** –1.624 0.028 –6.742 
 
(2.954) (3.641) (5.184) (3.818) (3.663) (7.734) 
1964 2.774 5.288 0.572 6.562 –3.335 21.215** 
 
(3.009) (3.471) (5.367) (5.093) (4.649) (10.236) 
1966 14.613*** 22.430*** 7.954 11.290** 1.445 26.282*** 
 
(3.398) (4.525) (5.482) (4.863) (5.093) (9.186) 
1968 5.964* 7.065 4.025 3.498 –0.105 9.932 
 
(3.312) (4.442) (5.380) (5.485) (5.785) (10.417) 
1970 3.354 3.602 5.704 –1.702 –12.780** 17.085 
 
(3.587) (5.181) (5.334) (6.287) (6.010) (12.543) 
1972 –5.237 –8.941 7.327 –2.742 –1.172 –7.879 
 
(5.508) (9.439) (5.276) (6.422) (6.597) (13.079) 
Share nonwhite x 
1950 2.784 –1.728 4.573* –6.401** –6.709 –3.272 
 
(2.126) (5.099) (2.431) (3.164) (4.204) (4.517) 
1952 –0.195 2.770 0.314 2.049 –8.727** 7.352** 
 
(1.715) (3.684) (2.018) (2.952) (4.002) (3.728) 
1954 1.200 7.407*** 0.437 3.348 –4.930 11.896** 
 
(1.910) (2.872) (2.640) (3.523) (4.499) (4.962) 
1956 1.354 –1.944 2.333 –4.496 –4.677 0.392 
 
(1.760) (2.436) (2.417) (2.799) (4.595) (3.613) 
1958 11.259*** 5.189 12.683*** –5.981** –6.009* –4.739 
 
(2.000) (3.490) (2.813) (2.914) (3.419) (4.179) 
1962 0.184 –5.034 1.942 4.092 –1.541 7.153 
 
(1.980) (3.209) (2.808) (3.341) (2.624) (4.911) 
1964 8.721*** 12.481*** 9.156*** –7.105 10.373*** –16.237** 
 
(2.138) (3.238) (2.941) (4.847) (3.552) (6.926) 
1966 14.703*** –4.044 19.971*** –15.216*** 5.458 –22.718*** 
 
(2.428) (4.894) (2.888) (4.374) (4.236) (6.074) 
1968 20.088*** 5.936 24.326*** –9.245** 3.443 –12.120** 
 
(2.359) (3.919) (3.082) (3.973) (4.716) (5.354) 
1970 22.017*** 6.438 25.789*** –8.505* 8.590 –9.737 
 
(2.711) (6.973) (2.871) (4.711) (5.385) (6.595) 
1972 22.150*** 4.615 23.553*** 0.739 21.951*** –1.410 
 (3.377) (10.033) (3.201) (5.190) (6.518) (7.179) 
 
Table notes: standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Regression specification is described in equation 3 of the main text. 1960 is the comparison election and is
dropped. Omitted controls include interactions of election year dummies interacted with the set of suppressed
control variables tabulated in Table D.4 and with state dummies.
Sources: Estimates of voter turnout from Clubb et al. (2006). Other sources are described in the note to Table
2.
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